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INTRODUCTION: A Charter ‘with Due Regard to the 
Principle of Subsidiarity’? 
‘United in diversity’ – the motto of the European Union – not only sends a message of 
tolerance and dignity, but also reflects the Union’s constant need to reconcile European 
values with respect for the particularities of its Member States.1 In a multicultural system 
of multi-layered governance, such as the EU, the legitimate use of power must balance 
supranational interests with national, local and individual ones. In the quest for a just 
equilibrium between the autonomy of the Union legal order, the sovereignty of the 
Member States and the self-determination of individuals, the principles of subsidiarity and 
respect for fundamental rights have come to play an important role.2 
This continuous struggle to strike a balance between unity and diversity, on the one 
side, and integration and integrity, on the other, can be linked to the constitutionalisation of 
the Union legal order. Unmistakably, the process of European integration has reached a 
point where the construction of an internal market can no longer in itself legitimate the EU 
as a venture for peace, democracy, prosperity and the well-being of its peoples. To enhance 
its legitimacy and justify its expanding powers, the Union has found it necessary to resort 
to a constitutional framework. Along with the principle of conferred competences, the 
principles of subsidiarity and respect for fundamental rights regulate and condition the 
exercise of the powers of the Union and its Member States. In this sense, they represent 
important cornerstones in the process of European multilevel constitutionalism.3 
At the intersection of subsidiarity and fundamental rights, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union constitutes an important step in the constitutional process of 
the Union. Its drafting history, legal nature and interpretation all express a constant 
balancing-act between Union and Member State interests, on the one hand, and general and 
individual interests, on the other.4 In the words of its Preamble, the Charter reaffirms the 
‘indivisible, universal’ and ‘common values’ of the Union, whilst ‘respecting the diversity 
of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of 
                                                
1 The motto of the EU was first unofficially introduced in May 2000 and later made official in 2004 with Article I-8 of the draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe. The Treaty of Lisbon, however, contains no such provision, but the motto is mentioned in 
Declaration No. 52 on the symbols of the EU, affirmed by 16 of the Member States. See e.g. NEERGARD U. – NIELSEN R. (2011): p. 
131. 
2 WEILER J.H.H. (1999): p. 103-104; ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 6; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 38; CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 36-37; 
SCHIEK D. (2012): p. 222; SEMMELMANN C. (2012): p. 6-9; BENGOETXEA J. (2014): p. 150-151. 
3 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 49; PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 5; ARMSTRONG K. (et.al.) (2008): p. 417; TUORI K. (2010): p. 
11-12; SARMIENTO D. (2012a): p. 288; TANASESCU E.S. (2013): p. 207-210; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 211. 
4 LENAERTS K. – DE SMIJTER E. (2001): p. 274; VON DANWITZ T. (2001): p. 290; CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 35-37; PERNICE I. – 
KANITZ R. (2004): p. 4; KAILA H. (2012): p. 292; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 19-20; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 145. 
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the Member States’. Despite its objective of ‘creating an ever closer union’, it still aims to 
place ‘the individual at the heart of its activities’ and respects Member State ‘authorities at 
national, regional and local levels’. 
In essence, the Charter ‘reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the 
Union and for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result’ from the Union legal 
order. Undeniably, the Charter embodies a culmination of fundamental rights under EU 
law, but all the same it may have created more questions than it actually answers. In 
particular, its references to subsidiarity give scope for a stimulating discussion on the 
relation between fundamental rights under the Charter and the principle of subsidiarity in 
EU law. Is the Charter applied ‘with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity’? 
 
 
3 
1 A Study of the Charter in the Light of the Principle of 
Subsidiarity 
1.1 Defining Subsidiarity, Fundamental Rights and Their 
Interconnection 
1.1.1 Subsidiarity as a Means of Finding Unity in Diversity 
Subsidiarity derives from the Latin word subsidium, originally referring to supporting 
military actions of assisting, subordinate or secondary nature.5 In societal organisation, 
embryonic ideas of subsidiary can be traced back to the philosophical theories of Aristotle 
and Thomas Aquinas.6 Throughout history, however, a plurality of sources can be 
identified as having contributed to the development of subsidiarity as a principle of 
governance. Historical milestones of governance through subsidiarity include the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648 with its commitment to respect the sovereignty of States, the 
Constitution of the United States of America introducing subsidiarity as an underlying 
principle of federalism as of 1791, as well as the Catholic Church introducing in 1891 
subsidiarity as a means of reconciling individualism with collectivism in its teachings.7 
Given the diversity of sources from which subsidiarity has evolved, the concept cannot 
easily nor unambiguously be defined.8 Despite this conceptual ambivalence, its 
fundamental characteristic remains the distribution of powers between a bigger central 
entity and various smaller member units at a more local level, in order to determine the 
appropriate level of intervention in a given situation.9 In essence, the principle suggests 
that the central authority should assist lower level entities in addressing social issues at the 
most immediate level of governance. Questions should be dealt with at the central level of 
governance only to the extent that decentralised entities cannot adequately attain the 
desired objectives. In a spirit of cooperation, subsidiarity aims to achieve the envisaged 
objectives efficiently, whilst preserving the division of powers between the different levels 
of governance.10 
Even though the principle of subsidiarity seeks to balance the different levels, it 
primarily favours a more direct level of governance. By presuming local intervention, the 
                                                
5 The Oxford English Dictionary (2004), definitions for ’subsidiary’ and ’subsidiarity’. 
6 MILLON DELSOL C. (1992): p. 15-45. 
7 SCHÜTZE R. (2009a): p. 245; EDWARD D. (2012): p. 93. 
8 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 75-77. 
9 FOLLESDAL A. (2011): p. 6. 
10 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 38, 66; FOLLESDAL A. (2011): p. 6. 
 
 
4 
competences of the central organisation are restrained. This understanding of the concept 
can be referred to as negative subsidiarity. Nonetheless, the principle may as well take 
expressions in favour of a higher level of governance. From the perspective of positive 
subsidiarity, the central authority has the opportunity to act on the condition that it can 
better achieve the expected result than its associated local authorities. In this sense, 
subsidiarity both limits and justifies State intervention, depending on the circumstances 
and the means available.11 
Irrespective of whether positive or negative subsidiarity is prioritised in a given 
situation, the fundamental nature of the principle lies in its reconciliation of unity with 
diversity.12 While respecting national values and the sovereignty of States, supranational 
intervention can be legitimately justified in order to achieve a common good.13 The 
presumption of a necessary degree of freedom at all levels of society is, thus, inherent to 
subsidiarity. In spite of their diversity, individual entities are perceived as united by their 
ultimate strive towards human dignity.14 
Although difficultly defined, the principle of subsidiarity unmistakably takes the 
expression of both a value and an instrument, as it simultaneously embodies moral and 
social functions.15 Broadly, subsidiarity has been described as an objective of good 
governance attributable to philosophical, sociological and political theory.16 As a 
functional principle without any clear content, however, subsidiarity has sometimes been 
argued to be of limited legal and normative significance – or even ‘a-legal’ as a principle.17 
Regardless of whether subsidiarity is understood as a concept of non-interference, 
federalism, good governance or public morality, the EU has integrated the principle into its 
legal and political discourse.18 Despite the Union’s awareness that the principle might be 
of a rather political nature, subsidiarity still occupies a prominent place in the Treaties and 
ranks among the constitutional principles of the Union.19 It has become an ethos of the 
Union, mediating ‘the interests of integration and differentiation, of harmonisation and 
                                                
11 ENDO K. (2001): p. 6; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 44, 79; ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 80-81. 
12 SCHÜTZE R. (2009a): p. 245. 
13 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 80, 134-135; CARTER W.M. (2008): p. 320; FOLLESDAL A. (2011): p. 7; CRAIG P. (2012a): p. 73; 
DELMAS-MARTY M. (2013): p. 335. 
14 ENDO K. (1994): p. 2026-2029; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 43-45. 
15 SCHLÜTTER B. (2010): p. 5. 
16 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 2, 96; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 37. 
17 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 2, 74-75, 89; BIONDI A. (2012): p. 213. 
18 EDWARD D. (2012): p. 94. 
19 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 38; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 36. See Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaption of 
Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle, COM(93) 545, p. 2; Conclusions of Working Group I on the Principle of 
Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02, 23.9.2002, p. 2. 
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diversity, of centralisation and localisation’.20 As expressed by the Committee of Regions, 
‘developing a culture of subsidiarity could make a decisive contribution to strengthening 
public confidence in European cooperation’.21 
Establishing a presumption of subsidiary Union intervention, the principle of 
subsidiarity is consolidated in Article 5 TEU and the attached Protocol on subsidiarity.22 In 
essence, the principle provides that the Union should act only to the extent that the 
Member States cannot better achieve a given objective.23 Keeping in mind the negative and 
the positive dimensions of subsidiarity, the principle may function either as a limit to or as 
a justification for intervention at EU level.24 Although simplified, the question of whether 
the Union should act or not can accordingly be answered either ex ante in the light of 
procedural subsidiarity as part of the political and legislative process of the EU, or ex post 
from the perspective of material subsidiarity under judicial review.25 Ultimately, the 
principle of subsidiarity in EU law embodies the search for a fair balance between unity 
and diversity in the process of European integration.26 
1.1.2 Fundamental Rights as Protection of Diversity and Legitimacy for Unity 
As a link between morality and law, fundamental human rights comprise a plurality of 
motives that coincide with the affinities of the subsidiarity principle. Like subsidiarity, 
human rights can be understood as a relational concept, departing from the individual. In 
this sense, the rationale of dignity is fundamental to both subsidiarity and human rights. 
Human dignity places the individual at the centre of society and preconditions the validity 
of any social construction. The belief that all human beings are free and equal supports the 
vision of human rights as inherent to democratic societies and the rule of law. Albeit 
embodying common values of humanity, human rights still need to ensure respect for 
diversity. Therefore, it is critical to consider the question of who defines the universality of 
rights. A universal understanding of rights must not only reflect the values of the 
dominant, but also protect minorities against majoritarian tyranny.27 
                                                
20 DE BÚRCA G. (1999): p. 21. 
21 CoR Opinion on Guidelines for the Application and Monitoring of the Subsidiarity and Proportionality Principles, 2006/C 115/08, 
16.5.2006, section. 1.4 
22 Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. See ESTELLA 
A. (2002): p. 5. 
23 JOUTSAMO K. (et.al.) (2000): p. 43; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 243. 
24 Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaption of Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle, COM(93) 545, p. 
2; BIONDI A. (2012): p. 214; DELMAS-MARTY M. (2013): p. 332. 
25 MURPHY D.T. (1994): p. 74; ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 105; SCHLÜTTER B. (2010): p. 3. 
26 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 134-135. 
27 WEILER J.H.H. (1999): p. 103; BREMS E. (2001): p. 3-5; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 46-47; LEINO-SANDBERG P. (2005): p. 38; 
PALOMBELLA G. (2006): p. 1-6; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 95-97, 116. 
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Due to their inviolable nature, human rights are normatively fundamental to society. 
Through a vertical approach to governance, they create ideals and expectations for 
individuals in relation to the State. Like subsidiarity, human rights aim to regulate the 
exercise of public powers against the individual. On the one hand, human rights set 
standards that limit and condition the use of powers, thus protecting the individual against 
arbitrary use of authority. On the other hand, the State’s respect for such standards also 
legitimates and justifies its actions.28 For these reasons, human rights constitute an 
important constitutional element. While authority is needed to guarantee the rights and 
freedoms of the people, these rights and freedoms conversely precondition the existence of 
such authority. Only a free people can lawfully submit itself to a public power.29 
The conviction that human rights are fundamental to governance can be traced back to 
historical documents of positive law, such as the Magna Carta of 1215, the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen of 1789 as well as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948.30 Already in these early constitutive instruments, human rights are indirectly 
linked to subsidiarity, through the obligation of the State to not intervene in the lives of its 
people more than what is necessary.31 
Albeit simplistic, human rights are traditionally divided into three different generations 
of rights, described as entailing either negative or positive obligations. The first generation 
refers to the civil and political rights, opposing the individual against the State. These 
rights constitute negative obligations for the State to respect the freedom of individuals 
through the non-intervention with their guaranteed rights. The second generation refer to 
economic, social and cultural rights, giving rise to positive obligations for the State to 
actively intervene to guarantee these rights to the members of society.32 This idea of non-
interference versus interference is fundamentally similar to the concept of subsidiarity.33 
Notwithstanding this dichotomy of generational rights, it must be emphasised that such 
a categorisation can never be completely accurate. The effects of rights may vary 
according to content and context. As demonstrated by the third generation of rights, 
                                                
28 BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): p. 669; TUORI K. (2000): p. 247; CHALMERS D. (2010): p. 140; SCHLÜTTER B. (2010): p. 3-4; 
DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 195. 
29 WEILER J.H.H. (1999): p. 103; PERNICE I. (2008): p. 237; TUORI K. (2010): p. 13-15. 
30 SZABO I. (1982): p. 11-23; JANIS M.W. (et.al) (2008): p. 4-12; PERNICE I. (2008): p. 237. 
31 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 46. 
32 VASAK K. (1990): p. 301-303; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 48-49; CRAIG P. (2012c): p. 218; SCHIEK D. (2012): p. 220-222; ROSAS 
A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 172; FOMERAND J. (2014): p. 290; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 98-99, 181, 229-230. 
33 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 39. 
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comprising guarantees such as the right to peace, development and the environment, some 
rights may entail both positive and negative obligations of the State. Not only positive 
obligations require State action, but also the inaction of the State may lead to a breach of a 
negative obligation. Neither are human rights necessarily individual, but they may as well 
be collective. In addition to this, human rights do not always govern vertical relations 
between individuals and the State, but may additionally have a horizontal influence on 
relations between private parties.34  
In principle, human rights are fundamental rights.35 In the EU context, however, the 
term fundamental rights is preferred, designating their distinctive sources and restrictive 
scope. While the term human rights rather refers to the Union’s ‘relations with the wider 
world’, fundamental rights – influenced by the economic fundamental freedoms of 
European integration – designate the standards of protection under EU law.36 Applicable to 
both serious and obvious violations of rights as well as to complicated matters of everyday 
life, the fundamental rights of the EU today permeate its entire legal order and is 
characterised by a plurality of sources.37 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2 TEU proclaims that ‘[t]he Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.’ Further 
to this, Article 7 TEU establishes the possibility for the Union to impose sanctions against 
‘a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values’ of the Union. Article 6 
TEU, in turn, identifies the three components of the EU fundamental rights system, 
comprising the Charter together with the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States and the ECHR as general principles of EU law. The proclamation of the Charter has 
come to mark an important step in the constitutionalisation of the Union legal order, 
shedding new light on fundamental rights as normative foundations of the EU.38 
                                                
34 VASAK K. (1990): p. 301-303; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 48-49; CRAIG P. (2012c): p. 218; MICKLITZ H.-W. (2012): p. 360-363; 
ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 172; FOMERAND J. (2014): p. 290; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 98-99, 181, 229-230. 
35 PALOMBELLA G. (2006): p. 3-4. 
36 See Article 5(3) TEU in relation to Articles 2 and 21 TEU, regarding the promotion of human rights in the EU’s international relations. 
37 PARMAR S. (2001): p. 355-356; DUTHEIL DE LA ROSCHÈRE J. (2009): p. 121-122; CHALMERS D. (2010): p. 140; KUMM M. 
(2010): p. 107; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 164; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 47; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 195. 
38 LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 292; JÄÄSKINEN N. (2008): p. 69-70; PERNICE I. (2008) p. 240, 252; BRYDE B.-O. (2010): p. 119-120; 
ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 54-59, 161; CHRONOWSKI N. (2014): p. 13; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 237, 275. 
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1.2 Examining the Charter as an Intersection of Fundamental Rights 
and Subsidiarity 
1.2.1 Fundamental Rights and Subsidiarity in the EU Context 
The drafting of the Charter and its transformation into primary law, have sparked more 
doctrinal and political discussion than four decades of fundamental rights adjudication 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union.39 What triggered the debate were not 
concerns over shortcomings in EU fundamental rights law, but rather resistance against a 
too dominant influence of the EU in fundamental rights protection.40 The universal nature 
of fundamental rights made Member States fear that a legally binding Charter would have 
a centralising impact, resulting in the imposition of a federal fundamental rights standard, 
leading to the inevitable increase in powers of the Union, at the expense of Member State 
sovereignty and national constitutions.41 Undeniably, grand moments of federal State 
history have proven that a Bill of Rights may indeed have both constitutionalising and 
federalising effects.42 
At the heart of resistance against the Charter lie two colliding interests of constitutional 
nature, namely the protection of fundamental rights and the allocation of competences 
between the Union and its Member States.43 A too broad interpretation of EU competences 
under the label of fundamental rights protection could have the latent effect of extending 
the Union’s powers into areas in which it has previously had only a limited influence, if 
any at all. Whilst fundamental rights have traditionally filled a function of limiting the use 
of public powers, in the case of the Charter they could, in fact, have the adverse effect. As 
a consequence, they would be liable to affect the vertical constitutional equilibrium of 
Union and Member States powers. For these reasons, the Charter has been vested with 
another constitutional feature, namely the principle of subsidiarity.  
Originally, the concept of subsidiarity was introduced into the EU legal system as a 
constitutional principle aimed at limiting the powers of the Union, thus mitigating the 
federalising effects of European integration.44 Its more recent incorporation into the 
Charter serves a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, the subsidiarity principle aims to 
                                                
39 DE WITTE (2001): p. 84. 
40 CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 38; MUTANEN A. (2015): p. 65. 
41 LENAERTS K. (2000): p. 21; GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) (2013): p. 99; CARTABIA M. (2012): p. 259-262, 272; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 
271-272. 
42 DE BÚRCA G. (2001): p. 127; EECKHOUT P. (2002): p. 945, 951; DE BÚRCA G. – ASCHENBRENNER J.B. (2003): p. 372; ROSSI 
L.S. (2008) p. 77; KAILA H. (2012): p. 294; LENAERTS K. (2012) p. 275; MUIR E. (2014): p. 238; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 131. 
43 CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 39-40, 54-57; ARMSTRONG K. (et.al.) (2008): p. 417; SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 1, 14; DUBOUT E. (2014): 
p. 193-196, 211. 
44 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 74-82; SCHÜTZE R. (2009a): p. 242-243, 247; AZOULAI L. (2014): p. 9. 
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balance the competences of the EU and its Member States in the area of fundamental rights 
protection. On the other hand, it enhances the legitimacy of Union action when needed. 
This understanding of subsidiarity as an underlying principle of EU fundamental rights law 
is reflected in Article 51(1) CFR, providing that ‘[t]he provisions of this Charter are 
addressed to the […] Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’ 
1.2.2 Subsidiarity as a Principle of EU Fundamental Rights Law? 
Through its Preamble and Article 51(1), the Charter officially introduces subsidiarity as a 
principle of EU fundamental rights law. Nevertheless, its reference to subsidiarity risks to 
give rise to more questions than answers. It is true that the strength of both the subsidiarity 
and fundamental rights concepts lies in their ambition to reconcile unity with diversity, but 
it is equally true that therein also lies their challenge. This ambiguity raises the question of 
whether the introduction of subsidiarity into the Charter will only water down its 
constitutional impact, or if it will actually contribute to striking a fair balance between 
fundamental rights protection at Union and Member State levels.45 
Against the background of subsidiarity as an ethos of European integration, this study 
departs from the protection of fundamental rights under the Charter. The underlying 
question is whether the Union should intervene in fundamental rights protection, and if so, 
to what extent.46 In other words, it is a question of ‘whose understanding of [fundamental] 
rights will be protected, and by whom.’47 The aim is to examine the influence that the 
principle has on the balance of powers between the Union and the Member States in the 
area of fundamental rights. Does the literal presence of subsidiarity in the Charter have a 
function to fulfil, or will it remain ‘a subsidiary principle of European constitutionalism’?48 
The examination of subsidiarity as a principle of EU fundamental rights law is not only 
concerned with the values it represents, but also with the actions it justifies.49 
It is submitted that the Charter endorses subsidiarity as an interpretative principle of 
EU fundamental rights law. As a consequence, the study revolves around the application of 
the Charter by the CJEU. The intersection of different-level systems of fundamental rights 
protection is liable to result in conflicts that ultimately have to be resolved by the Court.50 
                                                
45 See e.g. OJANEN T. (2003): p. 679; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 303. 
46 WILLIAMS A. (2007): p. 74. 
47 CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 39. 
48 SCHÜTZE R. (2009a): p. 256; SCHÜTZE R. (2009b): p. 526. 
49 WILLIAMS A. (2007): p. 82. 
50 MURPHY D.T. (1994): p. 95; WEILER J.H.H. (1999): p. 102; BIONDI A. (2012): p. 214; MUIR E. (2012): p. 9. 
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Hence, in the light of the principle of subsidiarity, this study aims to examine how the 
Charter is applied when the Court balances competing fundamental rights standards and 
interests, in order to find unity in diversity. 
In essence, this study of the relation between subsidiarity and the Charter has two 
dimensions. In the first place, focus lies on how the subsidiarity principle operates with 
respect to the Charter as a legal instrument. What expressions does the principle of 
subsidiarity take in relation to the Charter? In the second place, the study examines how 
subsidiarity can be seen in the Court’s fundamental rights review under the Charter. How is 
the principle of subsidiarity observed by the CJEU in its application of the Charter? 
1.3 Approaching the Charter from the Perspective of Subsidiarity 
1.3.1 Sources of Subsidiarity and Fundamental Rights in EU Law 
Subsidiarity and the respect for fundamental rights both form part of the constitutional 
principles of the Union legal order and are elevated to the status of primary law through 
the Charter and the Treaties.51 In this sense, the study is primarily situated in the uppermost 
part of the EU hierarchy of norms, revolving around the legally binding Charter, the 
Treaties and general principles of EU law.52 
EU primary law provides a legal basis for EU secondary legislation and conditions its 
legitimacy and validity.53 With the Charter at the heart of the investigation, EU secondary 
law will play a secondary role in this study.54 In the same way as the Charter complements 
their interpretation and application, legislative acts will mainly be used as a 
complementary source, primarily in connection to the analysis of relevant case law on the 
application of the Charter. Furthermore, historical and contemporary EU documents of a 
political and soft-law nature will contribute to a contextual understanding of how the 
principle of subsidiarity and the Charter have evolved, respectively and in parallel.55 
Given the crosscutting nature of subsidiarity and fundamental rights within the Union 
legal order, the case law of the CJEU is essential for understanding the Charter. As the 
ultimate interpreter of EU law, the Court has an important influence on the EU 
constitutional framework, including issues such as the conferral of competences, 
                                                
51 LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 292. 
52 On the hierarchy of norms in EU law, see e.g. Cases C-294/83 Les Verts, para. 23; C-402/05 P & 415/05 P Kadi, para. 305. See also 
VON DANWITZ T. (2001): p. 292; ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 169; RAITIO J. (2003): p. 6, 83; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 52-53; 
LEBECK C. (2013): p. 23, 32. 
53 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 7; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 103; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 52-53. 
54 Regulations, Directives and Decisions form the body of EU secondary legislation under Article 289 TFEU. 
55 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 8-10; NEERGAARD U. – NIELSEN R. (2011): p. 99. 
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subsidiarity and respect for fundamental rights. Historically, the Court played a decisive 
role in the development of EU fundamental rights, and therefore its interpretation of the 
Charter is of particular relevance also for this study.56 Rulings delivered after 1 December 
2009, when the Charter became legally binding, are especially significant, irrespective of 
whether they resulted from preliminary references under Article 267 TFEU, or appeals and 
direct actions under Article 258, 259 or 263 TFEU.57 Even so, the Court has not yet 
explicitly pronounced itself on the principle of subsidiarity for the purpose of the Charter. 
Lastly, the EU legal doctrine has likewise remained relatively silent on the relation 
between subsidiarity and the respect for fundamental rights. The issue has scarcely been 
addressed, neither in the research on EU fundamental rights law, nor in the study of the 
function of the subsidiarity principle in EU law.58 Only a few studies explicitly – albeit 
only in part – examine the impact of the subsidiarity principle on fundamental rights 
protection in EU law.59 The views expressed are both diverse and dispersed, and thus 
provide a fertile basis for further research on the topic. 
1.3.2 Methods for Understanding the Relation between Subsidiarity and 
Fundamental Rights 
The examination of the Charter and its application in the light of the principle of 
subsidiarity departs from a sui generis understanding of the EU as an autonomous legal 
order, distinct from both national and international laws.60 In this sense, the 
methodological point of departure could be characterised as an internal perspective on EU 
law, focusing on its proper legal sources and the case law of the CJEU.61 Nevertheless, the 
investigation also has inter-systemic features, in the sense that it considers the effects of 
European constitutional pluralism on EU fundamental rights protection.62 This relational 
approach is inherent to both subsidiarity and fundamental rights. Whilst the confrontations 
                                                
56 RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS G.C. (1995): p. 179; WIKLUND O. (1997): p. 96; RAITIO J. (2003): p. 94; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. 
(2012): p. 53; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 45; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 196; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 254, 270. 
57 LEBECK C. (2013): p. 45. 
58 On the rare occasions when overtly pronounced, the question of subsidiarity in EU fundamental rights law has been described as ‘quite 
unsettled’, ‘unclear’, ‘most unclear’ and even ‘incomprehensible’. See MURPHY D.T. (1994): p. 76-77; CURTIN D. – VAN OOIK R. 
(2001): p. 105; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 39; MUIR E. (2014): p. 240. 
59 Most notably, see MURPHY D.T. (1994): ‘Subsidiarity and/or Human Rights’ in University of Richmond Law Review, 29/1994, pp. 67-
97; BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): 'Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: on Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the 
European Union' in Common Market Law Review, 35, pp. 629-680; CAROZZA P.G. (2003): ’Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law’ in American Journal of International Law, 97(1), pp. 38-79; JIRÁSEK J. (2008): ‘Application of the 
Principle of Subsidiarity in Decision Making of the ECJ in the Area of Fundamental Rights Protection’ in Dny práva – 2009 – Days of 
Law: the Conference Proceedings (Brno, Masaryk University), pp. 1-13; MUIR E. (2014): ‘The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU 
Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges’ in Common Market Law Review, (51)1, pp. 219-245. 
60 See e.g. Cases C-26/62 Van Gend, section B; C-6/64 Costa, para. 3. See also RAITIO J. (2003): p. 6; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 16. 
61 KIIKERI M. (2001): p. 1; RAITIO J. (2003): p. 5; MYLLY T. (2009): p. 100, 121-122. 
62 POIARES MADURO M. (2007): p. 1-2; MYLLY 2009 (2009): p. 100, 122; TUORI K. (2010): p. 3-4; BENGOETXEA J. (2014): p. 
149-150, 160-161; BESSON S. (2014): p. 175-176; MUTANEN A. (2015): p. 10. According to SARMIENTO D. (2012b): p. 342, 
’[c]onstitutional pluralism is a methodology that explains why and how legitimacy in the European Union is a shared enterprise, the result 
of the pooled sovereignty that the Union shares with Member States.’ 
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between different fundamental rights standards of the Union and the Member States set the 
scope for the analysis, the subsidiarity nature of international human rights law serves as a 
source of inspiration for the exercise of balancing unity and diversity.  
Despite its normative integrity, the study of EU law is not characterised by any common 
legal method, but rather a vast variety of approaches can be said to exist.63 Still, the 
objective of this study, namely to interpret and systematise the interrelations of subsidiarity 
and the Charter, finds its inspiration in traditional legal dogmatics.64 This does not imply, 
however, that the venture would represent a purely legalistic understanding of the EU legal 
system. On the contrary, it is recognised that the constant push and pull between 
universalism and particularism in European integration necessitates a dynamic approach to 
Union law. Given the moral, cultural, historical, political and legal connotations that both 
subsidiarity and fundamental rights entail, their impact on EU law cannot be understood 
without the context in which they have evolved.65 In other words, the investigation 
approaches EU law not only as a positive legal system on the surface but also as legal 
practice with a particular legal culture and a normative depth.66 
A dynamic approach to EU law is especially useful in the analysis of the case law of the 
CJEU. Even though the Court has never explicitly referred to the subsidiarity principle in 
fundamental rights adjudication, the limited possibilities of a literal analysis do not rule out 
the significance of the principle for the Charter.67 Instead, in the absence of literal 
references to subsidiarity, it is possible to resort to other interpretational models of the 
Court, such as functional, teleological and analogical arguments. The reasoning of the 
CJEU is characterised by references to concepts such as the effectiveness of EU law and 
the common objectives of integration, as well as the use of creative and flexible 
interpretations.68 The abstract but flexible nature of subsidiarity and fundamental rights as 
general principles may also contribute to a dynamic and purposive interpretation of Union 
law.69 
Rather than focusing on subsidiarity as a mere technicality of the Charter, the study 
                                                
63 HÄYHÄ J. (1997): p. 29; VAN GESTEL R. – MICKLITZ H.-W. (2011): p. 67; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 14. 
64 AARNIO A. (1978): p. 52-53; AARNIO A. (1997): p. 36-37; WIKLUND O. (1997): p. 59; TUORI K. (2000): p. 160-162. 
65 KLAMI H.T. (1997): p. 12; ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 4; DE BÚRCA G. – ASCHENBRENNER J.B. (2003): p. 364; RAITIO J. (2003): 
p. 7; WILLIAMS A. (2007): p. 72; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 353; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 26. 
66 TUORI K. (2000): p. 160-162. TUORI’s theory on critical legal positivism has been applied to EU law e.g. in NEERGAARD U. – 
NIELSEN R. (2011): p. 100-104. 
67 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 39. 
68 BENGOETXEA J. (1993): p. 250-260; KLAMI H.T. (1997): p. 12; ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 163; RAITIO J. (2003): p. 7, 86; CRAIG P. 
(2009): p. 91; NEERGAARD U. – NIELSEN R. (2011): p. 108-148. 
69 JÄÄSKINEN N. (2008): p. 95; ROTH W.-H. (2011): p. 92-93; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 16. 
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recognises the transversal nature of fundamental rights and subsidiarity in EU law.70 
Departing from a theoretic framework on the coincidence of subsidiarity and fundamental 
human rights, the study ultimately seeks to examine whether a subsidiary approach to the 
Charter is operational in fundamental rights cases before the CJEU. Subsidiarity may be 
put to test by examining when and how the Charter is applied by the Court in concrete 
cases.71 Nonetheless, the Charter’s subsidiary makes it equally relevant to examine 
situations where the Court has not applied the Charter. Silence in legal reasoning offers a 
look into whether the Court actually ‘means what it says and says what it means’.72 
In the end, the question of whether subsidiarity functions as an interpretational principle 
of the Charter can be described as an investigation of the discrepancy between ‘rights in 
principle’ and ‘rights in practice’.73 For the purpose of interpreting and systematising the 
application of the Charter, the study submits that subsidiarity may be used as a 
methodological approach to EU fundamental rights law. 
1.4 Scoping the Study of Charter Subsidiarity 
1.4.1 Delimitations Regarding Procedural Subsidiarity and Material Rights  
Focusing on subsidiarity as an interpretative principle of fundamental rights under the 
Charter, this study excludes material questions relating to the actual content of the 
substantive rights that the Charter guarantees. Instead, the study is concerned with the 
method of applying Charter provision as well as their status and scope.74 Similarly, the ex 
ante procedural dimensions of the subsidiarity principle in EU legislative procedures has 
been ruled out from the study. Likewise, questions relating to the balancing of opposing 
material fundamental rights and interests, their respective proportionality as well as 
temporal questions and damages resulting from disproportionate measures fall outside the 
scope of this research.  
Given the importance of judicial adjudication in the field of EU fundamental rights law, 
the application of the Charter is mainly studied through the case law of the CJEU.75 By 
analogy, cases where the Court has applied the principle of subsidiarity or other general 
principles, will also be relevant. However, the application of the Charter by national courts 
                                                
70 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 2. 
71 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 78. 
72 SANKARI S. (2013): p. 10. See also SARMIENTO D. (2012a): p. 292-305. 
73 LANDMAN T. (2004): p. 927; WILLIAMS A. (2007): p. 83. 
74 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 164. 
75 SCHLÜTTER B. (2010): p. 31. 
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in the Member States of the Union will not be considered. Similarly, the case law of the 
ECtHR is merely used for comparison, where this is considered to contribute to the 
discussion. Neither will the accession of the EU to the ECHR be outlined in detail, albeit 
relevant for the protection of fundamental rights within the Union. 
The objective is not to examine the effects of EU fundamental rights in general, but the 
interpretation and application of the Charter in particular. Still, it is necessary to also 
situate the Charter in relation to other concepts and elements of Union law. However, the 
narratives over the development of fundamental rights, the Charter and the principle of 
subsidiarity in EU law must not be understood as thorough. Likewise, the comparison of 
rights and principles as legal concepts, as well as the description of the relation between 
the Charter and fundamental rights as general principles, do not aspire to be exhaustive. 
Primarily, their purpose is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the legal environment 
in which the Charter operates. After all, at the heart of the study lies the application of the 
Charter, with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity. 
1.4.2 A Structure Embracing the Transversal Nature of Fundamental Rights 
and Subsidiarity 
For the purpose of examining the relation between the Charter and the principle of 
subsidiarity, the first chapter (1) of this study aims to set out its theoretical framework, 
comprising its research object, scope, sources and methods applied. As demonstrated, the 
investigation is focused on two concepts of EU law, namely fundamental rights and 
subsidiarity, and their intersection under the Charter. Throughout the study, other concepts 
of EU law are introduced and considered in relation to these, such as the principles of 
primacy, direct effect, indirect effect and effectiveness of EU law. 
The second chapter (2) looks into the legal nature of the Charter a well as the context in 
which it operates. The formal connection between subsidiarity and fundamental rights is 
found in Article 51(1) CFR. Nevertheless, this provision cannot be isolated, but must be 
examined in relation to other general provisions of the Charter and with regard to place the 
Charter occupies in the EU legal landscape.76 By illustrating how fundamental rights have 
developed within the EU legal system, the study offers a deeper understanding of the legal 
heritage that the Charter represents. In order to bring further clarity to the conditions in 
which the Charter is applied, theoretical insight is provided into the relation between 
                                                
76 WARD A. (2014): p. 1449. 
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Charter rights and principles, as well as the similarities and differences between the 
Charter and the general principles of EU law. 
In the third chapter (3), the Charter’s many intersections of subsidiarity and 
fundamental rights are examined. Common denominators of the subsidiarity principle and 
the Charter are uncovered by looking into how they developed and operate in parallel 
within the EU legal system. The relation between the subsidiarity principle and EU 
fundamental rights is analysed, on the one hand, with respect to the level of protection 
under the Charter, and on the other, with regard to the Charter’s personal and material 
scope. 
Lastly, the fourth chapter (4) analyses the application and interpretation of the Charter 
by the CJEU. In the light of the principle of subsidiarity, the different forms of Charter 
adjudication before the Court are examined. In this regard, the study aims to investigate 
what expressions subsidiarity takes when the Charter is balanced with economic freedoms, 
applied in conjunction with other norms or used to invalidate EU norms or set aside 
national legal acts. As a complement to this, the analysis also considers the role of the 
subsidiarity principle in cases where the Court has not applied the Charter. 
In conclusion, the study aims to demonstrate how subsidiarity operates as an 
interpretative principle of the Charter, when applied by the CJEU. Consequently, the 
principle of subsidiarity may be used to systemise the application of the Charter, which in 
turn could enhance legal certainty in EU fundamental rights adjudication. 
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2 The Charter and Its Legal Context 
2.1 Developments towards a Fundamental Rights Document of the EU 
2.1.1 The Gradual Emergence of Fundamental Rights in EU Law 
In the genesis of early initiatives for European integration – contrarily to what is 
sometimes believed – fundamental rights were envisaged as an essential component in the 
construction of what came to develop into the present EU. In parallel with the founding of 
the Council of Europe in 1949, a movement for European unity and integration emerged in 
1948.77 Supportive of the European Coal and Steal Community established in 1951 and the 
European Defence Community negotiated in 1952, the European movement in March 1952 
set up a working group named Comité d’études pour la Constitution européenne. The aim 
of the working group was to explore the possibilities of drafting a Statute for a European 
Community associating the ECSC with the EDC.78 According to its Resolutions declared 
in November 1952, ‘constitutional order, democratic institutions and fundamental 
freedoms’ should be among the primary objectives of this new European Community.79 
These initial fundamental rights visions of the CECE were partly recycled when the 
EDC and the ECSC in September 1952 entrusted an Ad Hoc Assembly comprising a 
Constitutional Committee with the drafting of a Treaty establishing a European Political 
Community (EPC). Article 2 of the Draft Treaty outlined ‘the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in Member States’ as one of the objectives of the new 
Community.80 Unlike the CECE’s vision of Member States themselves being primarily 
responsible for fundamental rights, the Constitutional Committee in its draft also addressed 
the obligation of the Community to respect fundamental rights.81 
In March 1953 the Ad Hoc Assembly adopted the EPC Treaty as drafted by the 
Constitutional Committee. Due to the failure of the ratification of the EDC Treaty in 
August 1954, the process for establishing a new European Community was nevertheless 
disrupted. Still, these early strivings to promote European political unity came to influence 
how the institutionalisation of continued European integration unfolded.82 
                                                
77 PELLONPÄÄ M. (2007): p. 1. 
78 PREDA D. (2003): p. 15; DE BÚRCA G. (2012): p. 467-469. 
79 Resolutions of the Comité d’études pour la Constitution européenne (1952). Resolution 1, sections A and B.7. 
80 Draft Treaty embodying the Statue of the European Community (1953). 
81 PREDA D. (2003): p. 14-15; COHEN A. (2007): p. 121-123; DE BÚRCA G. (2012): p. 472-473. 
82 PREDA D. (2003): p. 18; COHEN A. (2007): p. 123. 
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The more moderate Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community that followed in March 1957 
both remained silent on the topic of fundamental rights protection. With the vision of a 
common market, the protection of fundamental rights was reduced to a question of national 
constitutional order for the Member States to determine.83 Aimed at promoting the 
common market, the Treaties nevertheless contained provisions of fundamental rights 
character, such as the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 7 
and the principle of equal pay for women and men in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty.84  
Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the principle of respect for fundamental rights is today 
enshrined in Articles 2, 6 and 7 TEU. Nevertheless, more than three decades had to pass, 
since the early attempts in 1952, before the protection of fundamental rights at Treaty level 
would formally reappear on the agenda of European integration. Some early signs could be 
observed in 1987 in the Preamble to the Single European Act. Later, in 1992, Article F of 
the Maastricht Treaty recognised fundamental rights as an integral part of the EU legal 
order. By stipulating that the Union was founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the amended Article F of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 further emphasised the Union’s commitments to uphold 
fundamental rights.85 With the amendment of Article L, the competences of the CJEU were 
also extended to cover the judicial review of Union actions with regard to its commitment 
to respect for fundamental rights under the amended Article F.86 
Initially, scrutiny for the CJEU to review fundamental rights was held to fall outside the 
scope of the integration process, because it was believed to constitute a threat against the 
autonomy of the Community legal order.87 The absence of fundamental rights in the 
founding Treaties was echoed in the early judgements of the CJEU. In Stork the Court 
rejected the claim that Community law was in breach with the right to occupation as 
guaranteed under national law.88 Accordingly, in Geitling, the Court held that ‘Community 
law […] does not contain any general principles, express or otherwise, guaranteeing the 
maintenance of vested rights’ provided for under national constitutions. In its ruling, the 
                                                
83 DE BÚRCA G. (2012): p. 474-476. 
84 DE VRIES S.A. (2012): p. 10. 
85 Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty, currently corresponds to Article 6(3) TEU under the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
86 ROSAS A. (1999): p. 913; LYONS C. (2000): p. 97-99; ALONSO GARCÍA R. (2002): p. 493-494; CHALMERS D. (2010): p. 145; 
DE BÚRCA G. (2012): p. 480; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 111-112. 
87 ROSAS A. (2007): p. 33; ROSAS A. (2009): p. 457; CUNHA RODRIGUES J.N. (2010): p. 89-90; AZOULAI L. (2012): p. 207-208; 
SCHMAUCH M. (2012): p. 466; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 345. 
88 Case C-1/58 Stork, p. 24. 
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Court likewise declared inadmissible the argument that the Community legal order in itself 
would protect the right to property.89 Finally, in Sgarlata, it was held that not even the 
right to an effective remedy as a fundamental principle common to all the Member States 
could override the application of a Treaty provision.90 
Eventually the hostile attitude towards fundamental rights became unsustainable under 
the doctrines of direct effect and primacy. The principle of direct effect, introduced in Van 
Gend, established that individuals may be directly affected by Community law.91 Further 
to this, the principle of primacy, originating from Costa, entitled Community law to 
override provisions of national law.92 As a result of the growing powers and influence of 
the Community legal order over the Member States, the Community had to legitimate itself 
through the introduction of its proper fundamental rights mechanisms.93 
With the introduction of fundamental rights as general principles of Community law in 
Stauder, the respect for fundamental rights was no longer solely the responsibility of each 
Member State.94 As subsequently concluded by the Court in Handelsgesellschaft – ‘whilst 
inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States’ – the protection of 
fundamental rights as general principles still had to be ‘ensured within the framework of 
the structure and objectives of the Community’.95 Alongside the identification of common 
constitutional traditions, as a source of inspiration for the general principles of Community 
law, the Court later in Nold added that also international human rights instruments could 
provide guidance, most notably the ECHR.96 ‘[A] possible infringement of fundamental 
rights by a measure of the Community institutions’ nevertheless remained a question to be 
appreciated solely in the light of Community law, as established in Hauer.97 
Through the case law of the CJEU, fundamental rights considerations continued to gain 
ground, in particular by the emphasis on Community law as an integral part of the legal 
orders of the Member States.98 Implicitly, the scope of application of fundamental rights 
under Community law was first addressed in Rutili, where the Court concluded that the 
scope of derogations from the principle of equal treatment cannot be ’determined 
                                                
89 Cases C-36/59 – 38/59 & 40/59 Geitling, p. 438-439. 
90 Case C-40/64 Sgarlata, p. 227. 
91 Case C-26/62 Van Gend, section B. 
92 Case C-6/64 Costa, para. 3. 
93 DE WITTE B. (1999): p. 863; VON DANWITZ T. (2001): p. 292; PERNICE I. (2008): p. 238-240; BRYDE B.-O. (2010): p. 119-120; 
KUMM M. (2010): p. 107; KÜHN Z. (2010): p. 152; DE BÚRCA G. (2012): p. 478; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 161; SCHIEK 
D. (2012): p. 225-227; VAN BOCKEL B. – WATTEL P. (2013): p. 873. 
94 Case C-29/69 Stauder, para. 7. 
95 Case C-11/70 Handelsgesellschaft, para. 4. 
96 Case C-4/73 Nold, paras. 12-13. 
97 Case C-44/79 Hauer, paras. 15-17. See RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS G.C. (1995): p. 172; DE WITTE B. (1999): p. 863-867. 
98 ROSAS A. (1999): p. 911; RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS G.C. (1995): p. 171, 177. 
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unilaterally by each Member State without being subject to control by the institutions of 
the Community.’99 It was not until Johnston, however, that equal treatment and the right to 
obtain an effective remedy, in their capacity of general principles, were explicitly extended 
to obligate also Member States acting within the scope of Community law.100 This decisive 
conclusion was later confirmed and further developed in Wachauf and ERT, where the 
Court held that Member States are bound by fundamental rights as general principles when 
they implement as well as derogate from Community law.101 
In parallel with the emerging case law, the Community continued to further develop the 
normative framework on fundamental rights. This process came to be characterised by a 
veritable inventory of rights, which culminated in the drafting of the Charter.102 
2.1.2 Writing a ‘Bill of Rights’ for the EU 
In parallel to the CJEU and its elaboration of fundamental rights as general principles, a 
vision of formally incorporating fundamental rights into the legal order of the Community 
successively emerged.103 Calls for an explicit Community commitment to fundamental 
rights came from different stakeholders engaged in the debate, such as national 
constitutional courts104, groups of experts105 and the Community institutions,106 most 
prominently the Parliament. As early as 1975 in the Report on European Union, the idea of 
a ‘list of specified rights’ was introduced, and later the same year echoed in the Resolution 
on European Union, where the Parliament called for a ‘Charter of the rights of the peoples 
of the European Community’ to be drawn up. 107 
                                                
99 Case C-36/75 Rutili, para. 27. With Defrenne II, however, this development was disrupted for almost a decade, as the Court held that the 
Community principle of equal treatment did not cover relations subject to national law. See Case C-149/77 Defrenne II, paras. 26-33. 
100 Case C-222/84 Johnston, paras. 17-21. See also Cases C-201/85 & 202/85 Klensch, paras. 8-12; C-249/86 Appropriate Housing, paras. 
12-24. 
101 Cases C-5/88 Wachauf, paras. 17-22; C-260/89 ERT, paras. 41-43. 
102 DE BÚRCA G. – ASCHENBRENNER J.B. (2003): p. 368; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 56; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 11, 110. 
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Human Rights Agenda for the EU for the year 2000; SIMITIS S. (et.al.) (1999): Affirming Fundamental Rights in the European Union: 
Time to Act; EP Directorate General for Research (1999): Fundamental Social Rights in Europe. 
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protection of fundamental rights; Commission report on the protection of fundamental rights, COM(76) 37 final; BERNHARDT R. 
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In 1977, the Parliament, together with the Commission and the Council, made a 
declaration on their commitment to respect fundamental rights when acting on behalf of 
the Community.108 However, the first steps of the European institutions towards actively 
promoting fundamental rights had to wait until 1989 when the Parliament issued its 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.109 Later that same year, the Council 
adopted a Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, as drafted by the 
Commission.110 These two political instruments were not legally binding, but still 
underlined the growing importance of fundamental rights within Community law. 
Another early aspiration to strengthen the formal status of fundamental rights within the 
legal order of the Community was the vision of Community accession to the ECHR.111 
Before the Community was even established, a possible accession had been envisaged in 
the 1953 EPC draft Treaty.112 Still, Council of Europe standards were not recognised until 
1975, when the CJEU for the first time found inspiration from the ECHR in interpreting 
Community law in Rutili.113 The question of accession was later touched upon in a 
Resolution from the Parliament in 1977 and a report from the Commission in 1979.114 The 
question of accession has ever since been subject to European political declarations.115 
With the Maastricht Treaty, a reference to the ECHR and the Union’s commitment to 
respect the fundamental rights therein, was inserted into Article F.2. The question of 
accession was nevertheless temporarily put on hold as a result of the lack of political 
unanimity combined with the Opinion of the CJEU in 1996 declaring the EU incompetent 
to accede to the ECHR on the basis of the Treaties.116 
As the accession procedure to the ECHR stagnated, the vision of a fundamental rights 
catalogue proper to the Union once again grew.117 In 1996, the Commission nominated 
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experts for a Comité des Sages to work on a proposal on how the fundamental rights of the 
Union could be consolidated. The report resulted in a call for an EU fundamental rights 
agenda, which was followed by another report from the Expert Group on Fundamental 
Rights, emphasising the indivisibility of civil, political and social rights.118 
The idea to officially draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was 
eventually launched by the German Presidency in April 1999.119 The Cologne European 
Council in June 1999 subsequently established a body, mandated to create a catalogue 
comprising the fundamental rights of the Union.120 The Tampere European Council in 
October 1999 further outlined the composition and work methods of the body, stating that 
it should be characterised by a transparent and participatory drafting process.121 
Continuous support in favour of the elaboration of a Charter also came from the 
Parliament.122 Above all, however, the political mandate given to the drafters was one of 
‘revelation rather than creation, compilation rather than innovation.’123 
The drafting body gave itself the constituent name ‘Convention’ and presented a first 
complete draft already in July 2000.124 A revised final draft of the Charter was later 
approved by the Biarritz Informal European Council in October 2000.125 Eventually, the 
Charter was solemnly proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 by the Council, together 
with the Parliament and the Commission.126 In order to clarify the scope as well as the 
sources of each of the Charter provisions, an explanatory memorandum was also published 
by the Secretariat of the Council.127 
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2.2 The Legal Status of the Charter 
2.2.1 The Early Use of the Charter by the European Courts 
As a result of a political compromise, the compilation of rights proclaimed in the Charter 
did not become a legally binding source of EU law.128 As expressed already in the 
conclusions from the Cologne European Council, the purpose had been to draft ‘a Charter 
of fundamental rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more 
visible to the Union's citizens.’129 Early in the process, it was stressed that the mandate 
given to the Convention was not to amend or change the responsibilities of the Union, but 
merely to draw up a list of existing fundamental rights applicable within the scope of EU 
law.130 The proclaimed Charter was supposed to strengthen the Union’s commitment to 
fundamental rights and enhance the legal certainty in fundamental rights adjudication. 
However, the judicial significance of the Charter was left for the CJEU to decide.131 
Before the CJEU, the AGs paved the way for making use of the Charter in their legal 
argumentation.132 As early as two months after its proclamation, the AGs Alber and 
Tizzano made references to the Charter as a means of reinforcing the reasoning in their 
Opinions.133 Four months later, AG Léger further examined the status of the Charter in 
Hautala, stating that despite its lack of legal force, it still expressed the ‘highest level of 
values common to the Member States’ and thus ought to be considered ‘a source of 
guidance as to the true nature of the Community rules’.134 This call for interpretation of EU 
law in the light of the Charter was nevertheless disregarded by the CJEU in its judgement. 
The CJEU remained reluctant to the appreciation of Charter-based arguments and it was 
not until June 2006 that a situation arose in which the consideration of the Charter and its 
legal value was inevitable for the Court.135 In Parliament v Council, the Court had to 
interpret Directive 2003/86 on family reunification in relation to the right to respect for 
family life and the child’s best interest as guaranteed under Articles 7 and 24 CFR.136 It 
held that while the Charter did not have binding legal force, the legislature still 
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acknowledged its importance by stating in Recital 2 of the Preamble of the Directive that it 
observed the principles recognised in the Charter.137 
Given the Court’s early references to the Charter as of mere secondary relevance, its 
legal nature remained uncertain.138 The Cologne European Council had intentionally left 
the question of the formal legal status of the Charter to be dealt with for later. After its 
proclamation in Nice, it was to be considered ‘whether, and if so, how, an integration of 
the Charter into the treaties could take place’.139 Hence, the Charter had already from the 
beginning been drafted ‘as if’ it would be integrated into the Treaties.140 
As a result of the Nice Declaration on the future of the Union in December 2000 and the 
Laeken European Council in December 2001, a European Convention was entrusted with 
the inclusion of the Charter into the Treaties, as part of the elaboration of a Constitution of 
Europe.141 Together with the continued discussions on EU accession to the ECHR, the 
issue of the legally binding status of the Charter thus came to be closely associated with 
the debate on the constitutionalisation of the Union.142 However, when the ratification 
process of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe eventually failed in 2005, also 
the legal binding incorporation of the Charter was adjourned for a period of reflection.143 
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2.2.2 The Increasing Application of the Legally Binding Charter after Lisbon 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the Charter 
eventually gained full legal effect. Article 6(1) of the TEU establishes that the Union 
recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter, which shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties. In other words, the Charter has gained the status of 
primary law, which in turn has opened up for new possibilities of fundamental rights 
adjudication within the legal order of the Union. 
Initially the legal recognition of the Charter was envisaged through incorporation into 
the Treaties. However, when the enactment of the Constitution for Europe failed, it was 
suggested the Charter instead become legally binding by cross-reference. For this purpose 
the numbering and provisions on the interpretation and application of the Charter were 
slightly revised and its explanatory memorandum was updated. It is thus the amended 
Charter, as reproclaimed by the Council, the Commission and the Parliament on 12 
December 2007, that has been given full legal effect by the Treaty of Lisbon.144 
The original intention had been to draft a Charter with the potential of eventually 
gaining binding legal status. Interestingly, however, the explanatory memorandum was 
never drafted with the intention of having legal significance. Still, it seems to have 
acquired a ‘hybrid status’.145 Article 52(7) CFR presently states that the Explanations, 
drawn up as a way of providing guidance in interpretation, shall be given due regard by the 
EU Courts and the courts in the Member States. This is further emphasised in Article 6(1) 
TEU, providing that the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted 
with due regard to these Explanations. Although the Explanations ‘do not as such have the 
status of law’ the explanatory memorandum describes itself as ‘a valuable tool of 
interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter’. For instance, in DEB, 
Åkerberg Fransson and Alemo, the CJEU has relied on the Explanations for the 
interpretation of the Charter, which confirms their strengthened position post-Lisbon. 
Guiding its interpretation, the explanatory memorandum is susceptible of furthering a 
harmonised application of the Charter within the Union.146 
Even though the Charter had existed for almost a decade, the transition towards a 
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legally binding document was not without political compromise.147 In order to reach 
consensus regarding the general provisions in Articles 51 to 54 and the applicability of the 
Charter, Poland and the UK were eventually accorded special guarantees assuring its 
restrictive interpretation, as agreed in Protocol No. 30 attached to the Lisbon Treaty.148 
Aimed at ‘clarifying’ the application of the Charter, Article 1 of the Protocol states that the 
‘Charter does not extend the ability of the Court […] to find that [national measures] are 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.’ 
Today the Charter enjoys the same legal status as the TEU and the TFEU.149 The Lisbon 
Treaty has thus been crucial when it comes to the reinforcing of the legal effects of the 
Charter.150 As early as two months after its entry into force, the CJEU in Kücükdeveci 
made a first reference to the legally binding Charter and thus implied its potential as an 
influential source of Union law.151 Concerning the prohibition of discrimination based on 
age in Article 21 CFR, the Court held that ‘it is to have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.’152 Less than a year later, in Schecke the Court declared an act of secondary 
Union legislation void because of its incompliance with the fundamental rights standards 
under the Charter.153 In the pre-Lisbon era, the CJEU had never invalidated a piece of 
secondary legislation in a similar way, which makes the strengthened status of the Charter 
after Lisbon even more evident.154 
Through the consolidation of fundamental rights, the post-Lisbon Union has equipped 
itself with a legally binding ‘Bill of Rights’. By making the rights guaranteed more 
apparent to all, the Charter aspires to lower the threshold for individuals to invoke 
fundamental rights-based arguments in adjudication.155 The broad scope of rights 
contained in the Charter also contributes to an increased number of right-based claims.156 
Moreover, the ‘depillarisation’ that came with the Lisbon Treaty might further expand the 
application of the Charter, as the area of freedom, security and justice was included in the 
structure of the general legal order of the EU. As of 1 December 2014, the CJEU has 
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jurisdiction in these areas, which is likely to step up the rate of claims regarding violations 
of fundamental rights.157 
The strengthened access to legal protection can be seen in the development of the case 
law of the Court. As a consequence of the solemn proclamation of the Charter in 2000, the 
fundamental rights-related caseload before the Court grew, only to further expand after the 
recognition of the Charter as primary law in December 2009.158 Throughout almost a 
decade of soft law status, the CJEU referred to the Charter in 142 of its judgements.159 This 
can be compared to the five time increase of references within the Charter’s first five years 
of legally binding effect, a period during which the CJEU cited the Charter in 422 
judgements.160 Today, the legally binding Charter is one of the most prominent sources of 
fundamental rights adjudication within the EU.161 
2.3 The Distinction between Rights, Freedoms and Principles 
2.3.1 Substantive Rights and Freedoms under the Charter 
The Charter has been described as a creative catalogue of rights, because it combines 
traditional civil and political rights with economic, social and cultural ones. In addition to 
this, it introduces fundamental rights of a more innovative nature, such as principles of 
bioethics. The Preamble insists on its modern character, aiming to ‘strengthen the 
protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and 
scientific and technological developments’. By placing all the rights guaranteed on the 
same level, it not only presents an indivisible and horizontal understanding of fundamental 
rights, but also a represents a creative combination of provisions touching upon all three 
generations of fundamental rights.162 
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Drawing inspiration from the case law of the CJEU, international human rights 
instruments, constitutional traditions common to the Member States as well as EU primary 
and secondary law, the Charter comprises 54 Articles, divided into seven different Titles 
covering the themes of Dignity (Title I: Articles 1-5), Freedoms (Title II: Articles 6-19), 
Equality (Title III: Articles 20-26), Solidarity (Title IV: Articles 27-38), Citizens’ Rights 
(Title V: Articles 39-46) and Justice (Title VI: Articles 47-50). In addition to the Titles 
outlining the material fundamental rights provisions, the Charter entails one last Title 
containing some General Provisions (Title VII: Articles 51-54) regarding the scope of 
application of the Charter as well as its interpretation and level of protection.163 
In accordance with Article 6(1) TEU, the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter. Yet, the EU assembles all its fundamental rights in one 
catalogue, under one common denominator, namely that of fundamental rights.164 This 
‘language of rights’ emphasises the autonomy of the individual and entitles its addressees 
to invoke their rights against other legal subjects, thus resulting in legal obligations for the 
adversaries.165 However, the notion of ‘rights’ is ambiguous, because not all rights in EU 
law are fundamental.166 Still, the inclusion of a right in the Charter allows for the 
presumption that it constitutes a fundamental right.167 Notwithstanding this presumption, 
the categorisation of fundamental rights still remains complicated due to their character as 
underlying principles of EU law.168 Indeed, the notion of fundamental rights is not a mere 
issue of formal denomination, but above all a question about normative function, 
effectiveness and constitutional significance.169 It follows, that the Charter’s notion of 
rights is more complex than what appears at a first glance. 
As a fact, the Charter does not keep up a very rigorous distinction between fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Provisions laying down fundamental freedoms can be found in Title II 
on ‘Freedoms’ (Articles 6-19). Still, only some of these are literally designated as 
freedoms (Articles 10-13 and 15-16), whereas others are rather described as rights 
(Articles 6-9, 14, 17 and 18). Also, one additional freedom can be found in Article 45. 
Furthermore, several of the Articles combine the concepts of rights and freedoms (Articles 
10-12, 14-15, 45), some even formulated in terms of a ‘right to freedom’ (Articles 10-12). 
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Hence, a part from the different semantics, there appears to be no legally relevant 
distinctions between fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Charter.170 This is 
also supported by the case law of the CJEU, which has treated freedoms under the Charter 
as equivalent to fundamental rights.171 
What rather causes polemic and uncertainty is the Charter’s distinction between rights 
(and freedoms), on the one hand, and provisions giving expression to principles, on the 
other. Although the inclusion of social rights into the Charter provoked some resistance, 
such a distinction was not envisaged when the non-binding Charter was first drafted.172 It 
was not until later, when the Charter became legally binding, that Article 52(5) with its 
legal distinction between rights and principles was introduced.173 For obvious reason, the 
posterior introduction of such a distinction is likely to cause ambiguous results. 
According to the Preamble and Article 51(1) CFR, rights shall be ‘respected’, whereas 
principles are only to be ‘observed’. This is further developed in Article 52(5), which 
emphasises that provisions containing principles must be implemented by legislative and 
executive acts of the Union or the Member States, before they become ‘judicially 
cognisable’. However, the Article places no such restrictions on the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the Charter. A contrario, the Charter implies that only provisions held to 
constitute rights are capable of being invoked and enforced before a court of law.174 
Based on the wording of the Charter, Articles 2-3, 6-12, 14-15, 17-18, 24-31, 33-35, 39-
45, 47-48 and 50 contain explicit references to rights. Out of these, however, the 
Explanations to the Charter point out Articles 25 and 26 as examples of principles. It must 
therefore be assumed that a literal interpretation of the Charter does not significantly 
contribute to the identification of what substantive fundamental rights it guarantees. 
2.3.2 Programmatic Principles under the Charter 
The Charter’s distinction between rights and principles must not be confused with the 
concept of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.175 Rather, the division into 
rights and principles should be understood in the light of the theoretical distinction 
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between legal rules and principles. A basic distinction between the two can be made on the 
basis of generality. Principles are held to be of a more general nature than rules.176 In 
comparison to rules, principles are qualitatively different, being more flexible, but also 
more vague.177 Whereas rules either apply or do not apply to a given situation, principles 
apply either more or less, thus comprising a ‘dimension of weight or importance’. As a 
consequence, principles do not dictate any specific outcome for their application, but 
merely indicate the direction that decisions should take.178 
Whether rules validly apply is determined by their proper content. Principles, on the 
contrary, are more dependent on the specific circumstances of the situation at hand.179 
With regard to its normative content, a rule is either relevant or irrelevant to the subject 
matter. Conversely, several principles can simultaneously apply to a given situation.180 
While the application of rules primarily take the form of interpretation, the application of 
principles also comprises a balancing act, where different principles and values are 
weighed against each other.181 In this sense, principles can also be understood as 
commands of optimisation, requiring their underlying visions to be carried out as far as 
possible under the given the circumstances. In other words, the objective of a principle 
must always be satisfied to the highest degree possible.182 Exceptions can be made to rules, 
but principles never completely lose their impact.183 
The solemn proclamation of the Charter inspired hope for a more effective enforcement 
of social rights at European level.184 Contrary to the ideal of indivisible rights, however, 
Article 52(5) introduced a distinction between rights and principles.185 As a result of this 
legal separation, it has been suggested that the Charter’s notion of rights primarily refers to 
civil and political rights and the negative obligations they impose on the Union and the 
Member States. However, the drafters of the Charter nor the CJEU never implied such a 
prioritisation.186 Still, the remedial capacity of social rights appears weaker, something that 
is further emphasised by Protocol No. 30, stating that ‘nothing in Title IV [on ‘Solidarity’] 
creates justiciable rights […] except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has 
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provided for such rights in its national law.’187 
The distinction between rights and principles in the Charter reflects a traditional 
distinction between constitutional provisions that may be judicially enforced, on the one 
hand, and those that may not, on the other.188 As established by Article 52(5) CFR, 
provisions that contain principles have limited invocability as they ‘shall be judicially 
cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality’. As a 
result, they may be reviewed by a the CJEU or by a national court only once they have 
been ‘implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union, [or] by acts of Member States when they are implementing 
Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers.’189 
Notwithstanding the implementation criteria, the Union and its Member States retain 
their normative discretion, since Article 52(5) CFR does not contain any requirement to 
legislate. As set out in the Explanations to the Charter, principles are rather programmatic 
and do not ‘give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union's institutions or 
Member States authorities.’190 It may be added, that Charter principles appear to express 
not only supporting arguments for rights, but also policy arguments.191 The concept of 
policies can be understood as referring to collective goals, as opposed to individual 
rights.192 Charter provisions like Articles 35-38 on health care, services of general 
economic interest, environmental and consumer protection, could arguably qualify as such 
policies. While neither policies nor principles establish any substantive rights or give rise 
to any obligation to legislate, they may still have an influence on EU policy-making.193 
However, should the Union wish to concretize certain rights and principles of the Charter 
through further legislation, it can do so only within its competences under the Treaties.194  
Albeit ambiguous, the Explanations intend to give guidance on how to identify 
principles among the provisions of the Charter. For illustration, Articles 25, 26 and 37 are 
listed as examples of principles. Out of these, however, only Article 37 is situated under 
Title IV on ‘Solidarity’, which Protocol No. 30 explicitly identifies as nonjusticiable 
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rights.195 Further to this, ‘the field of social law’ is cited as a source of principles, but the 
two other Articles, cited as examples, still refer to ‘rights’. Moreover, the Explanations 
refer to pre-Charter case law on the principles of precaution and reasonable expectations, 
but none of these principles are found among the provisions of the Charter.196 
In an attempt to clarify the notion of principles, it has been suggested that provisions 
containing references to EU legislation or national laws and practices, like Articles 16, 27-
28, 30 and 34-36, are likely to express principles. However, this is not a decisive 
characteristic of principles, because Article 37 is the only example of such a principle that 
is also mentioned by the Explanations.197 The character of imposing obligations on the 
Union and its Member States, rather than creating individual rights, has been brought forth 
as another way of identifying potential principles among the provisions of the Charter.198 
The Explanations suggest that the distinction between rights and principles should be 
understood in the light of the case law of the CJEU. Still, this interpretational guidance 
hardly clarifies the ambiguity of the Charter. Based on its title, for instance, Article 49 is 
the only provision designated as a ‘principle’. Nevertheless, the Court has long ago 
established that the legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties that the 
Article enshrines, in fact constitutes a substantive right.199 In a similar manner, Article 23 
lays down a ‘principle of equality’, although the Court has confirmed that professional 
equality between women and men may be judicially enforced as a substantive right.200 
In addition to this, the Explanations specify that some provision of the Charter, such as 
Articles 23, 33 and 34, may simultaneously express ‘both elements of a right and of a 
principle’. In other words, Article 23 is held to express both a ‘principle of equality’ and a 
‘right to equality’ between women and men.201 Indeed, a fundamental standard may 
sometimes be interpreted as a right and sometimes as a principle, depending on its form 
and the situation to which it applies.202 This correlates with the understanding of 
fundamental standards as capable of expressing both rules and principles. The core content 
of a right may be thought of as a concrete rule, operating on the surface of the legal order. 
Its more peripheral elements, on the contrary, operate as abstract principles, influencing 
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and conditioning the entire legal system, from the deepest structure of the law, through the 
legal culture and up to the legal activities at the surface of the legal order.203 The more 
peripheral elements of a right are also more likely to be influenced by the particularities of 
Member States, whereas core-rights to a larger extent are capable of expressing universal 
values.204 
Ultimately, the question of whether Charter provisions qualify as rights or principles, 
has to be answered by the CJEU in casu. In Dominguez, AG Trstenjak identified the right 
to annual paid leave under Article 31(2) CFR as a social fundamental right, based on a 
literal and systematic approach, but found that it cannot be directly applied in disputes 
between private parties.205 AG Villalón Cruz in AMS argued that ‘Article 27 of the Charter, 
given specific substantive and direct expression in Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/14, may 
be relied on in a dispute between individuals’ in order to invoke the right of workers to 
information and consultation.206 Still, the CJEU ruled that it was ‘clear from the wording 
of Article 27 of the Charter that, for this article to be fully effective, it must be given more 
specific expression in European Union or national law.’207 Equivalently in Glatzel, the 
Court held that Article 26 on the integration of people with disabilities ‘cannot by itself 
confer on individuals a subjective right which they may invoke as such’.208 Seemingly, not 
only must EU norms be interpreted in accordance with the Charter, but also must the 
Charter itself to some extent be interpreted in the light of other EU norms in order to take 
effect.209 In this sense, the distinction between rights and principles in Article 52(5) 
contributes to the subsidiary nature of the Charter. 
In the end, no clear-cut criteria exist to determine whether a Charter provision expresses 
a fundamental right or principle.210 A valid observation that nevertheless can be made 
relates to nature of the provisions. In fact, the problem is not one of definition, but rather 
pertains to the norm’s ‘effectiveness in concrete terms’.211 For a provision to give rise to a 
substantive right, it must be ‘sufficient in itself’.212 This autonomous sufficiency must be 
determined based on the content of the provision, the context in which it operates and the 
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circumstances of the case. The more concrete and ascertainable the Article is in itself, the 
more likely it is to give rise to a substantive right.213 As to the ‘process for giving specific 
expression to the content’ of less substantial provisions, it is for the CJEU to ‘delimit the 
justiciability of the ‘principles’ of the Charter, indicating both to the public authorities and 
to citizens the type of review which courts can carry out, and within what limits.’214 
2.4 The Charter and the General Principles of EU Law 
2.4.1 Fundamental Rights as General Principles 
There is no formal definition of general principles in EU law.215 At the outset, however, 
these normative standards may be understood with respect to their generality and character 
as principles. The general nature of principles reflects their abstract but omnipresent 
character within the EU legal system. They apply to a broad variety of situations that 
cannot be quantitatively or qualitatively anticipated.216 As general standards, they also 
express a certain degree of transversality.217 Albeit referred to as principles, they are also 
characterised by a certain judicial force. General principles of EU law may, in fact, 
function as concrete rules in certain situations, as opposed to Charter principles.218 
A great variety of general principles exist within the EU legal system and may thus be 
categorised in different ways. As a point of departure, general principles can be identified 
as either stemming from the prerequisites of governance through the rule of law, or from 
the autonomous character of the EU legal order. Principles such as legal certainty, 
proportionality, access to justice and a fair trial can be understood as inherent to the rule of 
law, whereas the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, primacy and direct effect are 
structural principles characteristic to the EU.219 Alternatively, an administrative distinction 
can be made regarding the general principles. According to such a grouping, legal certainty 
and proportionality are material principles, access to justice and a fair trial are procedural 
principles, primacy and direct effect are interpretative principles, while conferral and 
subsidiarity are principles governing the competences of the Union.220 
Although difficultly classified, the general principles of EU law can also be grouped 
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according to their sources.221 Firstly, general principles can be derived from the Treaties, 
such as the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. Secondly, general 
principles like legal certainty, access to justice and the right to a fair trial, originate from 
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, from the ECHR and other 
international legal instruments. Thirdly, general principles have been elaborated through 
the case law of the CJEU, such as the principles of primacy and direct effect.222 
Nevertheless, any categorisation is liable to remain an incomprehensive simplification, not 
only due to the open and continuously evolving nature of the general principles, but also 
due to the difficulties in defining the EU competences and the scope of EU law itself.223 
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear-cut and exhaustive categorisation of the general 
principles of EU law, some observation can still be made about their sources. On the one 
hand general principles exist regardless of whether they have been codified or not.224 On 
the other hand, this does not exclude the possibility of their anterior or posterior 
codification in either primary or secondary Union law.225 Generally understood as part of 
EU primary law, the CJEU has even held that ‘the general principles of Community law 
have constitutional status’.226 As a result, the general principles constitute a normative 
source of primary importance within EU law and its constitutional order.227 Above all, they 
contribute to the consistency and coherence of the Union legal order through their capacity 
to promote a harmonious interpretation of the law. Nevertheless, the flexibility of general 
principles also favour the dynamic and teleological nature of EU law, thus adding to its 
unity and effectiveness by filling normative gaps in the legal order.228 
General principles fulfil an important function in the practice of the CJEU. Not only has 
the Court actively participated in their development, but also it actively applies general 
principles to develop the EU legal order.229 Due to the incomplete nature of EU law, the 
Court is likely to recourse to general principles in its interpretation. Supported by Article 
19 TEU, according to which it ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed’, the Court engages in a creative and evolutive apprehension 
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of the EU legal order with the help of the general principles.230 This appeal to general 
principles offers interpretative limits, but all the same equips the Court with considerable 
authority and a certain degree of judicial law-making which could all the same be 
criticized as a rule of judges.231 In order to ‘establish the existence of a general principle’ 
the Court nevertheless, according to AG Léger, ‘takes a critical approach and gives the 
answer which is most appropriate in relation to the structure and aims’ of the EU.232 
The CJEU played a primordial role in the introduction, development and 
constitutionalisation of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.233 Through 
these principles it was possible to integrate fundamental rights, while still preserving the 
autonomous nature of the Union legal order.234 Against this evolution, the rights-creating 
and -protecting capacity of the general principles also becomes evident.235 As confirmed 
by the Court, ‘fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles’ of EU 
law, whose observance the Court ensures.236  
The respect for fundamental rights as general principles of EU law is enshrined in 
Article 6(3) TEU. As a consequence, the EU has to respect fundamental rights in all its 
actions. It follows, that Member States or their nationals may base fundamental rights 
claims against the Union on the general principles. This can be done either for the purpose 
of invalidating secondary EU legislation or to invoke a violation of fundamental rights 
because the EU institutions failed to take certain measures. Similarly, failure to respect 
fundamental rights may be invoked against the Member States, either as a result of their 
implementation of or derogation from Union law.237 
Prior to the ruling in Wachauf and the line of cases that followed, the CJEU had not 
explicitly confirmed the general obligation of Member States to comply with fundamental 
rights within the Union legal order. In its judgement, the Court eventually established that 
the obligation to protect fundamental rights is ‘binding on the Member States when they 
                                                
230 BENGOETXEA J. (1993): p. 44; RODRIGUEZ IGLESIAS G.C. (1999): p. 15-16; GROUSSOT X. (2006): p. 138; HERDEGEN M. 
(2008): p. 353; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 43; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 23, 49; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 42. 
231 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 119; HERDEGEN M. (2008): p. 344-345, 353; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 109-110; WALKILA S. 
(2015): p. 42. 
232 Opinion of AG LÉGER in Case C-87/01 P CEMR, para. 64, referring to Case C-11/70 Handelsgesellschaft, para. 4. 
233 RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS G.C. (1995): p. 171-178; DE WITTE B. (1999): p. 863-869; GROUSSOT X. (2006): p. 105; TUORI K. 
(2010): p. 18-21; DE BÚRCA G. (2012): p. 477-480; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 104-107. See e.g. Cases C-29/69 Stauder, para. 7; C-11/70 
Handelsgesellschaft, paras. 3-4; C-4/73 Nold, paras. 12-13; C-36/74 Walrave, paras. 6-7, 16-17, 28; C-149/77 Defrenne II, paras. 26-27; 
C-222/84 Johnston, paras. 17-21; C-415/93 Bosman, para. 8. 
234 BESSELINK L.M.F. (2012): p. 72; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 42. 
235 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 104; GROUSSOT (2006): p. 165-175; WILLIAMS A. (2007): p. 77; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 56; 
LEBECK C. (2013): p. 49; SANKARI S. (2013): p. 59; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 18. 
236 CJEU Opinion 2/94, para. 33. 
237 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 101-104; RAITIO J. (2008): p. 48; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 49 
 
 
36 
implement’ rules of the EU.238 As a result, situations where Member States either through 
implementation, application or enforcement of EU measures act as an agent on behalf of 
the Union came to be considered as falling within the scope of EU law and the ambit of its 
fundamental rights standards. In ERT and subsequent rulings, the Court further increased 
its influence over fundamental rights through the general principles, as it held that national 
measures must comply with fundamental rights also when lawfully derogating from EU 
law.239 Although Member States might enjoy a certain degree of discretion under Union 
law, national measures incompatible with EU fundamental rights will be set aside.240 
2.4.2 The Relation between the Charter and Fundamental Rights as General 
Principles 
Although different from the concept of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, 
the Charter still shares some common features with these principles. Above all, the general 
principles and the Charter may be considered to originate from the same sources. 
Furthermore, general principles with a character of fundamental rights have been codified 
in the Charter with the objective of rendering EU fundamental rights more visible.241 
Conversely, the Charter may also constitute a source of inspiration for fundamental rights 
as general principles within the Union legal order.242 
In BECTU, AG Tizzano held that ‘the Charter provides us with the most reliable and 
definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitutes a 
fundamental right.’243 AG Poiares Maduro further develop the significance of the Charter 
in Ordre des barreaux, by explaining that first ‘it may create the presumption of the 
existence of a right’ and then prove useful ‘for determining the content, scope and meaning 
to be given to that right’.244 In cases such as Viking and Kücükdeveci, the CJEU referred to 
the Charter although eventually rendering its judgments based on fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law.245 
The Charter and the general principles have a similar legal status within the EU. To a 
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large extent, they also share the same content. In accordance with its Preamble, the Charter 
reaffirms fundamental rights as they result from the Union legal order. Nevertheless, the 
general principles continue to exist independently of the Charter, as confirmed by Article 
6(3) TEU. Therefore, it cannot be ignored that these two sources of fundamental rights also 
account for some differences.246 Whilst the Charter sets out a delimited catalogue of rights, 
some of which would not by definition pass as general principles of EU law, the general 
principles represent an abstract, unwritten and continually evolving source.247 
Although fulfilling similar functions, the general principles have existed as an aid to 
interpretation and as a basis for judicial review of EU norms, long before the Charter.248 
For the purpose of filling normative lacunae in the Union legal order, it is argued that the 
Charter has a more limited role to play. It does not represent an exhaustive compilation of 
rights, but rather appears to be complementary to the general principles.249 As the 
Preamble of Protocol No. 30 points out, ‘the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and 
principles recognised in the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create 
new rights or principles.’ Article 51(1) CFR also stresses the observance of the principle of 
subsidiarity in its application. As a result, the general principles, through the CJEU, retain 
their creative capacity to further develop EU fundamental rights protection.250 
Notwithstanding their creative function, fundamental rights as general principles ‘do not 
operate in the abstract’, as explained by AG Sharpston in Bartsch.251 They do not by 
themselves bring the subject matter within the scope of Union law, but in the first place, 
they must demonstrate a sufficient connection to a substantive EU norm governing the 
situation at hand.252 It follows, that the field of application of the general principles is tied 
to the scope of Union law itself.253 Given that the Charter seeks to codify pre-existing 
fundamental rights within the EU legal system, it is therefore suggested that its material 
field of application coincides with that of the general principles of EU law.254 
Any other interpretation would unavoidably lead to a dual and asymmetric regime of 
fundamental rights protection within the EU. If the Charter’s scope of application under 
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Article 51(1) was interpreted restrictively, it could lead to a narrower protection than the 
one offered by the general principles. In consequence, the general principles would offer a 
more extensive protection, in situations when the Charter does no longer apply.255 Such a 
double standard with separate systems of protection would be liable to violate not only 
Article 19 TEU and Article 47 CFR on effective legal remedies, but also Article 53 stating 
that nothing in the Charter ‘shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised’ by Union law.256 In its recent case law, the 
CJEU also appears to confirm that the application of the Charter and fundamental rights as 
general principles are governed by the same material scope.257 
Despite the presumed equivalence between the material scope of the general principles 
and the Charter, the relation between their personal scopes appears more ambiguous. The 
Charter primarily governs the vertical relation between the Union and its Member States 
on the one side and their nationals on the other, whereas fundamental rights as general 
principles may have both vertical and horizontal impact if deemed sufficiently precise.258 
Even though fundamental rights as general principles of EU law have mainly been relied 
on in the sphere of public law, they are increasingly invoked in relations governed by 
private law.259 In cases like Mangold and Kücükdeveci, the CJEU found that the 
prohibition of age discrimination – although general in nature – was given sufficient 
expression in EU secondary legislation to be considered a general principle of law with 
direct effect in a dispute between private parties.260 
The Charter’s presumed codification of the general principles, together with the Court’s 
subtle references to the Charter in cases such as Viking and Kücükdeveci, regarding the 
horizontal impact of fundamental rights, has sparked a debate on whether provisions of the 
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Charter may also entail horizontal direct effect.261 While uncertainty still pertains, it may at 
least be noted that the Charter’s horizontal impact is not unlimited, since the Court in AMS 
held that an individual cannot rely directly on Article 27 CFR in a dispute against another 
private party.262 Interestingly, AG Trstenjak in Dominguez adopted an even stricter 
interpretation, as she argued that a fundamental right guaranteed under the Charter cannot 
have direct horizontal effect even if applied as a general principle of EU law in parallel to 
the Charter, because this would be ‘to circumvent the restriction on the addressees of 
fundamental rights provided by the EU legislature in the Charter’ under Article 51(1).263 
The underlying question hereto appears to relate to the implications that the subsidiarity 
principle may have on the Charter, which will be further examined in the following. 
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3 The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Charter 
3.1 Subsidiarity as a Principle of EU Law 
3.1.1 The Development of the Subsidiarity Principle 
Subsidiarity was introduced into EU law as a principle of environmental protection 
through the Single European Act in 1987.264 Nevertheless, subsidiarity as a concept of 
European integration had been invoked already in the 1970’s.265 In 1975, the Commission 
in its Report on European Union for the first time made explicit reference to the principle 
by suggesting the Union ‘be given responsibility only for those matters which the Member 
States are no longer capable of dealing with efficiently.’266 
’Intending to entrust common institutions […] only with those powers required to 
complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States 
acting independently’, the Parliament included a formal definition of subsidiarity in its 
Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984.267 As a means of legitimating the expansion of 
Community competences brought by the SEA, the principle continued to be supported as a 
future concept of enhanced cooperation between the European institutions and the Member 
States in the early 1990’s.268 However, it was not until 1992 and the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty that the scope of subsidiarity was broadened and gained the status of a 
general principle of the EU and its legal system.269 
The Treaty of Maastricht established the Union and consolidated the subsidiarity 
principle as an expression of the Member State’s limited conferral of powers to the EU. In 
the spirit of integration and cooperation, the Preamble of the Treaty affirmed ‘the process 
of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken 
as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.’ 
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Article 3b(2) TEC, however, limited the applicability of the principle to the area of 
competences shared between the Union and the Member States. In line with the concept of 
positive subsidiarity, the opportunity for the Union to take action was recognised in 
situations where the common objectives could be ’better achieved’ at EU level. 270 
Under the Maastricht era, the principle of subsidiarity nevertheless remained a rather 
theoretical and formal concept with few practical implications.271 As a result, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam strived to clarify the significance of subsidiarity as a functional principle 
regulating the exercise of the EU competences. In the attached Protocol on subsidiarity, the 
procedural nature of the principle in the legislative context was emphasised.272 Also, 
substantive criteria were formulated in an attempt to outline the conditions under which an 
objective more efficiently could be attained by the Union. With the ultimate aim of 
strengthening the legal character of subsidiarity, all European institutions were obliged to 
ensure that their actions were consistent with the principle.273 
The Amsterdam Treaty not only clarified the content of the subsidiarity principle, but 
also raised the question of its judicial review before the CJEU. Although the Court already 
under the Maastricht Treaty had confirmed the justiciability of subsidiarity, its judicial 
control remained ineffective.274 As a reaction to the limited possibilities to monitor the 
observance of subsidiarity, the Amsterdam Treaty aimed to extend the possibilities of ex 
post review before the CJEU.275 The principle could be reviewed under actions for 
annulment as well as under requests for preliminary rulings on interpretation or validity. 
Mistrust towards its credibility as a legal principle nevertheless persisted, despite the 
Amsterdam codification of subsidiarity’s justiciability.276 The Court’s cautious approach to 
the principle similarly prevailed.277 Even though subsidiarity was invoked in a number of 
cases,278 the Court only ruled directly on the basis of subsidiarity in a limited number of 
cases.279 In fact, still today a plea for annulment of a legislative act on grounds of 
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subsidiarity has never been successful in the case law of the Court.280 
Rather than clarifying the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity, the Treaty of 
Lisbon reinforced its procedural character.281 Article 5(3) TEU states that ‘the Union shall 
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.’ However, the new Protocol on subsidiarity attached to the Lisbon Treaty is less 
specific on the substantive conditions of subsidiarity than the previous Amsterdam 
Protocol.282 Instead, it introduces new mechanisms for subsidiarity control. 283 According 
to Article 6 of the Protocol, national parliaments can ex ante review subsidiarity 
compliance of EU draft legislation. Furthermore, Article 8 affirms that the CJEU has 
jurisdiction in ex post infringement proceedings on grounds of subsidiarity brought by 
Member States or the Committee of Regions under Article 263 TFEU. 
Subsidiarity under the Lisbon Treaty still remains a concept of more regulatory than 
legal nature.284 Yet, the enforced justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity illustrates its 
evolving judicial application.285 Even if the CJEU has been reluctant to apply the principle 
to political choices of the Union,286 it is argued that it should take the judicial application 
of subsidiarity more seriously both as a procedural and material condition of review.287 
Indeed, the Court has already for a long time continuously applied the principle of 
proportionality, which can be considered to be no less political than subsidiarity.288 
Especially the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Preamble and Article 51(1) 
CFR raises the question of the extent to which the CJEU itself is bound by the principle 
and how it can use subsidiarity in its interpretation of Union law. 
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3.1.2 Subsidiarity as a Limit and Justification to the Powers of the EU 
Together with fundamental rights, attributed powers and other general principles, such as 
proportionality, subsidiarity is part of the constitutional framework that governs the scope, 
limits and exercise of the powers of the Union.289 The designation, delimitation and 
regulation of the EU competences contribute to the legal certainty of individuals and the 
autonomy of the Member States.290 While constituting a limitation of the Member States’ 
sovereignty and a transfer of their powers to the Union, the principle of conferral still 
emphasizes the Member States as the source of EU competences.291 
By introducing a stricter control and more detailed distribution of powers between the 
Union and its Member States, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to the constitutionalisation 
of the EU legal order.292 The attribution of powers to the Union is dictated by the principle 
of conferral as enshrined in Articles 3(6), 4(1), 5(1-2) TEU and Article 7 TFEU. In 
essence, the Union shall act only within the limits of the enumerated competences 
conferred on it by the Member States in order to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred on the Union remain with the Member States. In other words, 
the principle governs the question of whether the Union is competent to legitimately take 
action in a given policy area.293  
In reality, however, inconsistencies can be found between the formal enumeration of 
competences in the Treaties and the actual scope of EU actions. The open nature of the 
attributed competences, together with their normative interpretations by the European 
institutions and their expressions given in secondary legislation, all contribute to blurring 
the division of powers between the Union and its Member States.294 No exhaustive list of 
competences exists, as the Union adopts a rather broad teleological interpretation of its 
powers as means of reaching its objectives.295  
According to Article 5(3) TEU, the principle of subsidiarity is to be observed by the 
Union ‘in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence’, thus primarily in the 
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area of competences shared with the Member States. The principle areas are listed in 
Article 4(2) TFEU, mentioning e.g. the internal market, social policy and the area of 
freedom, justice and security. Conversely, the shared competences are negatively defined 
in Article 4(1) TFEU as other areas than those referred to in Articles 3 and 6 TFEU. In 
accordance with the principle of pre-emption in Article 2(2) TEU, ’the Member States 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence.’ Similarly, the principle of sincere cooperation expressed in Article 4(3) TEU 
is of relevance for the exercise of shared competences, as the Member States shall ’refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.’ 296 
While the principle of conferral relates to the attribution of powers and the question of if 
the Union has a competence that it can exercise, the principle of subsidiarity sets out the 
conditions for who (the EU or the Member States) should exercise its competence as well 
as when.297 Subsidiarity is a dynamic principle in the sense that the Union shall act only 
when and to the extent that its objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States alone. EU intervention is justified only as long as it is required by the given 
circumstances.298 Strictly defined, the Union should act only if it is obvious that the Treaty 
objectives envisaged cannot be satisfactorily attained at national level.299 
Similarly to the complementarity of the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, there is 
also a certain degree of interdependence between subsidiarity and proportionality.300 While 
the principle of subsidiarity stricto sensu strives to answer the question of whether the 
Union has competence to act (who and when), proportionality governs the issue of how this 
competence should be exercised. Under the principle of proportionality, as defined in 5(4) 
TEU, ‘the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of the Treaties.’ In fact, subsidiarity compliance often has taken the 
expression of proportionality review before the CJEU.301 
For these reasons, it has been suggested that the proportionality review of EU measures 
is inherent to the subsidiarity control. Article 5(3) TEU, according to which the Union 
shall act ‘only if and in so far as’ the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
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Member States, can be read as an expression of proportionality.302 Broadly understood, 
subsidiarity and proportionality thus become intertwined in the assessment of whether and 
how the Union should use its attributed powers.303 The CJEU makes a distinction between 
subsidiarity and proportionality in abstract, but in practice tends to appreciate the two as 
one.304 In the words of the Court, ‘a measure will be proportionate only if it is consistent 
with the principle of subsidiarity.’305 Ultimately the objective of the subsidiarity principle 
is to examine ‘whether a European law disproportionately restricts national autonomy’.306 
From this point of view, subsidiarity may be seen as form of constitutional or federal 
proportionality.307 Consequently, it becomes an instrument for balancing not only the use 
of shared competences but also constitutional pluralism.308 
In order for the CJEU to evaluate the compliance of a Union action with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the effectiveness of the supranational measure in question needs to be 
examined.309 Article 5(3) TEU lays down two cumulative efficiency criteria for this 
purpose. Firstly, the Union should act in cases of national insufficiency, expressed through 
the formulation ‘only if and in as far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States’. Secondly, the Union action should represent 
a comparative advantage, in the sense that the objective ‘can rather, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’ On the one hand, these 
two criteria combined suggest that even though a national measure is insufficient, the 
Union cannot act unless it can efficiently attain the objectives in question.310 On the other 
hand, they imply that the Union may act when the effectiveness of Union law is at stake.311 
As a compliment to the efficiency criteria, a more teleological, functional or 
consequentialist approach to subsidiarity can be observed as part of its judicial review. 
This dynamic criterion reverts the subsidiarity logic by departing from the objectives of the 
Union, rather than the question of whether the EU or the Member States sufficiently and 
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more effectively can take action.312 In accordance with the principle of conferral in Article 
5(2) TEU, the Union ‘shall act only […] to attain the objectives set out’ in the Treaties. 
This linkage of EU competences to integration objectives offers flexibility to the 
subsidiarity principle and enables its teleological interpretation.313 From a dynamic point 
of view, a cross-border element or a potential damage to common interests may trigger the 
recourse to subsidiary EU intervention.314 It has been stated that EU action is justified in 
situations where a transnational aspect cannot be satisfactorily regulated by the Member 
States, or if the non-intervention of the Union would lead to distortion of competition, 
trade or otherwise damage the common interests of the Member States.315 As pointed out 
by AG Maduro in Vodafone, the CJEU needs to strike a balance between the interests of 
the Member States and the Union when considering the compliance of EU law with the 
substantive aspects of the subsidiarity principle.316 Yet, the Court tends to accord a wide 
margin of discretion to EU actions in its judicial subsidiarity review.317 
Although the criteria for judicial review of subsidiarity have developed over time, the 
CJEU has remained cautious in their application.318 This hesitancy concerns procedural as 
well as material subsidiarity, partly due to the fact that these two dimensions of 
subsidiarity are heavily intertwined in the case law of the Court.319 Similarly, concerning 
the negative and positive dimensions of subsidiarity, it is possible to observe that the focus 
on efficiency and results in the criteria may work as a limit as well as a justification for 
Union intervention.320 As a consequence, the subsidiarity principle has not been able to 
clarify the limits and exercise of Union competences, as initially envisaged.321 
Subsidiarity’s limited justiciability and lack of direct effect322 in turn raises the question of 
to what extent the Court itself is bound by the principle when interpreting Union law. 
Subsidiarity is a ‘rule of reason’, a ‘state of mind’ within the EU.323 As a constitutional 
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principle, it must not be reduced to a principle of merely procedural nature.324 As a result 
of its material dimension, the subsidiarity will influence the interpretation and balancing of 
different interests within the Union legal order.325 In the same way as the principle of 
proportionality is constantly present in adjudication, the principle of subsidiarity could be 
regarded as a ‘legal norm permeating all aspects of Union life’.326 Based on the Preamble 
of the TEU, subsidiarity expresses a general concept of EU law according to which 
‘decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens’. Furthermore, in support of its 
broad interpretation, Article 5(1) TEU specifically sets out that ‘[t]he use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’.327 It 
follows that subsidiarity should not be understood only as a procedural rule in its narrow 
sense, but also as a material principle in the wide sense, aimed at balancing the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of EU law with Member State interests.328  
Admittedly, the subsidiarity principle is mainly aimed at the political institutions of the 
Union. Nevertheless, it does not exclude the CJEU from its field of application.329 In fact, 
the subsidiarity principle in Article 5(3) TEU is addressed to all the EU institutions. As an 
institution under Article 13(1) TEU, the Court is hence obliged to observe the principle of 
subsidiarity in its decision-making.330 Indeed, in its narrow sense subsidiarity 
considerations by the Court can be attributed to its control of legislative acts ex post, as set 
out in Article 5(3) TEU and Article 8 of the Protocol on subsidiarity. However, there is no 
reason why subsidiarity could not be understood more broadly in relation to the Court.331 
Bearing in mind that the CJEU tends to make a wide interpretation of general principles, 
Article 5(2) TEU does not point to any particular kind of EU ‘action’, thus favouring a 
wide interpretation of material subsidiarity.332 
Although the interpretative impact of subsidiarity on the CJEU have been moderate, a 
few cases can still be identified as representative of how the Court uses subsidiarity as a 
supporting argument for limiting or justifying its own powers of judicial review.333 In fact, 
it has been argued that a restriction of the Court’s jurisdiction in favour of a wider margin 
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of discretion for Member States could be observed at the time when subsidiarity was 
enshrined as a general principle in the Treaties.334 In any case, the Court has explicitly 
restricted its jurisdiction on grounds of subsidiarity in cases such as Chrome and Salvador 
Dali, where the national level was found more appropriate for managing certain issues 
without taking actions through EU secondary legislation.335 
Conversely, the Court has also used subsidiarity to justify its jurisdiction. In Bosman, it 
balanced subsidiarity against other principles and held that the principle of subsidiarity 
cannot limit the intervention by the Union, if this would lead ‘to a situation […] which […] 
restricts the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the Treaty.’336 In Firefighters’ 
Equipment the Court based its reasoning on the market distortion criterion, finding that 
’the national provisions in question differ significantly from one Member State to another 
[and] may constitute […] a barrier to trade’.337 Similarly, the Court made use of the 
efficiency criteria to justify EU intervention in Commission v Council III, by concluding 
that although criminal law does not ‘fall within the Community’s competence […], the 
Community legislature may require the Member States to introduce such penalties in order 
to ensure that the rules which it lays down in that field are fully effective’.338 
While the CJEU has no obligation to state whether subsidiarity has been observed in its 
legal reasoning or not, it is evident that the Court has an important influence on how 
material subsidiarity is understood in EU law.339 If subsidiarity is seen as a concept 
permeating the Union legal order, then the natural consequence should be that also EU 
fundamental rights are ‘subject to subsidiarity scrutiny.’340 This assumption is particularly 
pertinent in a time when the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced as a principle 
governing the interpretation of the Charter. 
3.2 The Intersection of Subsidiarity and Fundamental Rights in EU 
Law 
3.2.1 The Subsidiary Nature of EU Fundamental Rights Law 
Subsidiarity and fundamental rights are inherently related to one another by their 
respective function as limiting and justifying intervention from public authorities at 
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different levels in society. United by common values, their aim is to find the most 
appropriate level of intervention – be it local or supranational – in order to promote ideals 
of individual freedom and human dignity. Given these functional similarities, subsidiarity 
can be regarded as a structural principle of international human rights law.341 Arguably, 
the application of fundamental human rights in a European context entails considerations 
relating to both procedural and material subsidiarity.342 
The subsidiary nature of international human rights standards can be illustrated by the 
system of external judicial review under the ECHR, to which all EU Member States have 
submitted themselves.343 From the perspective of procedural subsidiarity, the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies as an admissibility requirement under Article 35(1) ECHR, reflects the 
subsidiarity nature of European human rights protection in relation to national fundamental 
rights protection.344 As an expression of material subsidiarity, Article 53 ECHR lays down 
a minimum standard of protection, which the contracting parties may go beyond in their 
national legislation. The ECHR becomes applicable only if it provides a higher level of 
protection than the national legislation in question.345 Similarly, the ECtHR accords States 
discretion when balancing conflicting interests. This margin of appreciation doctrine in 
favour of domestic deference can also be regarded as a form of material subsidiarity.346 
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, States remain the paramount guarantors 
of supranational human rights standards within their respective jurisdictions. This follows 
from the fact that international human rights, due to their abstract nature, to a large extent 
are dependent on implementation and enforcement at national level.347 As a consequence, 
the subsidiarity presumption holds that local implementation is the most appropriate level 
of protection for safeguarding rights of the individual.348 Given this discretion, national 
authorities are left to define the concrete content of individual rights. The supranational 
bodies should only intervene in as far as domestic authorities cannot satisfactorily achieve 
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the envisaged standard of human rights protection.349  
Within the EU, fundamental rights related Treaty provisions may express a similar 
vision of subsidiarity. Article 157 TFEU states that ‘[e]ach Member State shall ensure […] 
the principle of equal pay for male and female workers’, with the support of the Union.350 
In relation to this, Grant can be mentioned as a case exemplifying the subsidiarity concerns 
of the CJEU. In its ruling the Court did not assimilate discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation to sex discrimination, but held that ‘it is for the legislature alone’ to decide 
whether a principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation should be 
introduced into the Union legal order.351 
By reconciling supranational standards with national levels of protection, the principle 
of subsidiarity promotes a unified minimum protection while still encouraging a plurality 
of standards.352 As a result, individual human rights are ensured through a system of 
complementary protection mechanisms where no level of governance has absolute 
jurisdiction.353 In other words, by encouraging cooperation and mutual respect between 
different-level guarantors of human rights, subsidiarity contributes to the balance of unity 
and diversity in the field of international human rights law.354 
Like the principle of subsidiarity, fundamental rights regulate the use of powers, in 
contrast to their attribution. Rather than conferring positive competences, human rights 
constitute ‘negative competences’ with the aim of restricting public powers.355 By 
indicating the possibilities and limits of intervention into individual rights and freedoms, 
human rights have a prescriptive nature, in the light of which other norms are assessed.356 
However, these rights not only restrict the use of powers, but also legitimate their exercise, 
in a way similar to the principle of subsidiarity. This is especially true for the distribution 
of powers within the EU, where subsidiarity, proportionality and the respect for 
fundamental rights condition the legitimacy of the EU legal system. That is to say, all legal 
acts of the Union have to comply with fundamental rights as general principles of law.357 
Fundamental rights protection may not have been the constitutive objective of the Union, 
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but still contributes to its legitimacy.358 
Under the present Lisbon Treaty, Article 2 TEU identifies respect for human rights as 
one of the founding values of the EU. Nevertheless, fundamental rights promotion is not 
listed in Article 3 TEU among the objectives of the Union. Ambiguously, it may thus seem 
that the Union does not have the means to guarantee its values.359 Namely, there is a 
crucial difference between EU values and objectives, in the sense that the objectives alone 
provide a legal basis to act. As a fact, the Union has not been attributed any general 
competence in the field of fundamental rights protection.360 Correspondingly, the CJEU 
has made a distinction between the obligation of the Union to respect fundamental rights, 
on the one hand, and the lack of explicit power to legislate in the field of fundamental 
rights protection, on the other.361 Furthermore, the mere obligation to respect fundamental 
rights must not extend the powers of the Union in any way, as explicitly stated by Articles 
6(1) and 6(2) TEU and implied by Articles 4(1) and 5(2) TEU.362 
Fundamental rights do not represent a distinct policy area with explicit EU 
competences. Still, the transversal nature of fundamental rights makes them inherently 
intertwined with all areas of EU law. Their omnipresence contributes to blurring the limits 
of conferred competences. In fact, the distinction between EU values and objectives is 
overlapping, as Article 3(1) TEU states that one of the objectives of the Union is to 
promote its values.363 This imbrication of values and objectives suggests that the Union 
might have implicit competences in the area of fundamental rights. For instance – in 
accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon, but despite the lack of general fundamental rights 
competence – the Charter has been made legally binding and the EU shall now accede to 
the ECHR.364 Similarly, the concept of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law 
was initially introduced by the CJEU without any legal support in the founding Treaties.365 
Despite the lack of any explicit general competence in the area of fundamental rights, 
the EU nevertheless possesses legislative powers in specific policy areas closely linked to 
fundamental rights protection. The Union may thus directly or indirectly be able to set 
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fundamental rights standards.366 Firstly, the Treaties explicitly empower the Union to enact 
legislation in connection to some fundamental rights, such as Article 19 TFEU regarding 
the fight against discrimination. Secondly, in policy areas such as freedom, security and 
justice, the implementing secondary legislation may inevitably touch upon fundamental 
rights issues. Thirdly, any issue falling within the scope of Union law may trigger 
fundamental rights considerations before the CJEU, as EU institutions as well as Member 
States must comply with fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.367 
Given the cross-cutting nature of fundamental rights in EU law and the non-exhaustive 
list of conferred competences in Articles 3 to 6 TFEU, it can be maintained that the powers 
in the area of fundamental rights are shared between the Union and its Member States.368 If 
this assumption is accepted, it naturally follows that the principle of subsidiarity applies to 
Union actions within the field of fundamental rights. On the one hand, this implies that 
legislative acts connected to fundamental rights issues are subjected to procedural 
subsidiarity review under Article 5(3) TEU.369 On the other hand, the imprecise 
competences of the Union in the field of fundamental rights make their connection to the 
principle of subsidiarity less obvious.370 From the perspective of material subsidiarity, the 
Member States will enjoy a margin of discretion when implementing Union law, as long as 
the EU fundamental rights standards are not compromised.371 The Union can thus be 
considered to primarily have discretion and not an obligation to act.372 
In accordance with negative subsidiarity, competences of the Union in the field of 
fundamental rights are subsidiary to the protection accorded by the Member States through 
their national legal systems.373 The Lisbon Treaty expresses a prima facie assumption of 
the Member States as the primary defenders of fundamental rights.374 Nonetheless, the 
Union will intervene if the fundamental rights issue in question falls within the scope of 
EU law and cannot satisfactorily be resolved by the Member States. In the Frontex case the 
CJEU held that ‘the fundamental rights […] may be interfered with to such an extent that 
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the involvement of the European Union legislature is required.’375 The fact that EU 
intervention is sometimes necessary illustrates how the fundamental rights policy of the 
Union may take expressions in the form of positive subsidiarity.376 In such situations, the 
complementarity of the subsidiarity principle and fundamental rights becomes evident as 
the primacy of Union law is legitimated by its respect for fundamental rights. The principle 
of subsidiarity alone is not a sufficient guarantee that the attributed EU competences will 
not be abused.377 
EU fundamental rights can be understood as a ‘second-order quality’ that conditions the 
legitimacy of the Union legal order.378 The CJEU observes that actions under EU law are 
compliant with these fundamental rights.379 Yet, the Luxembourg Court is not a human 
rights court with a general jurisdiction similar to the one in Strasbourg. The interpretation 
of fundamental rights before the CJEU is restricted to the field of Union law. The Court 
does not offer any specific remedies in cases of violations of fundamental rights, but 
fundamental rights claims can be raised under the standard judicial procedures before the 
Court.380 Ultimately, the enforcement of EU fundamental rights is also dependent on a 
decentralised system where national courts are expected to review the compliance of 
national laws with EU law.381 
In spite of the subsidiary nature of fundamental rights within the Union legal order, the 
Court’s approach to fundamental rights has also been criticised as being opportunistic, 
taking the expression of judicial activism. While the initial purpose of EU fundamental 
rights was the respect for the Member State autonomy, it has conversely been claimed that 
the Court uses fundamental rights as a means of enhancing European integration and 
expanding its jurisdiction.382 For instance, the commendable approach that the Court has 
taken towards the legal protection of vulnerable groups such as women, children, 
immigrants, homosexuals and transgender persons has been criticised as suffocating 
judicial and constitutional pluralism within the Union.383 Meanwhile, it must not be 
forgotten that diversity exists not only on a national, but also on an individual level. The 
protection of fundamental rights also entails the majority’s respect for the minority. 
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The criticism of EU fundamental rights bears similarities with the disapproval of 
subsidiarity, seen by some as a principle promoting integrationist rather than consensus 
solutions.384 In other words, subsidiarity would be inappropriate to govern the fundamental 
rights protection within the Union legal order, despite its presumption of decision-making 
close to the citizens.385 Be that as it may, it must not be forgotten that the CJEU also 
protects interests of the individual. Likewise, it has been argued that fundamental rights, in 
the same way as the principle of subsidiarity, have made the CJEU act more cautiously.386 
At a time when the Charter explicitly introduces subsidiarity as a principle of fundamental 
rights, subsidiarity could be used as an instrument for regulating the exercise of powers 
within the field of fundamental rights.387 
3.2.2 The Compliance of the Charter with the Principle of Subsidiarity 
Given the similarities between the principle of subsidiarity and EU fundamental rights, it 
may seem surprising that these two concepts have not intersected before the enactment of 
the Charter.388 Nevertheless, a parallel development towards subsidiarity and the Charter 
can still be observed throughout the history of European integration. Interestingly, the 
vision of governance through subsidiarity and the idea of a catalogue of fundamental rights 
were both brought forth for the first time in 1975 in the Report on European Union. In fact, 
both suggestions were presented as ways of regulating and delimiting competences.389 
Similarly, the Parliament Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984 suggested the inclusion 
of both subsidiarity and substantive fundamental rights at Treaty level.390 The Leaken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union in 2001 also stressed the importance of 
the subsidiarity principle and the Charter in the constitutionalisation of the Union.391 
The principle of subsidiarity was first mentioned during the drafting procedure of the 
Charter in June 2000.392 This incorporation of subsidiarity into the Charter represents a 
compromise of both political and legal nature, as a result of the Member States’ unease 
regarding the consequences of adopting a fundamental rights document. Indeed, the 
negotiation process was characterised by a fear that the Charter might provoke an 
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uncontrollable extension of the Union’s powers of the Union to the detriment of Member 
State autonomy. As a result, the general provisions, presently found in Articles 51 to 54, 
were introduced to set out the conditions for and the limits to the application of the 
Charter.393 In spite of the efforts to render the Charter subsidiary to other sources of EU 
law, its relation to the principle of subsidiarity was never clarified in official documents.394 
Today, the legally binding Charter explicitly consolidates subsidiarity as a principle of 
fundamental rights under EU law.395 Article 51(1) states that the Charter is ’addressed to 
the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity 
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’ With reference to 
the subsidiarity principle, its Preamble reaffirms the intention to balance European unity 
with a plurality of nations. While emphasising ‘universal, indivisible’ and ‘common 
values’, the Charter still recognises the diversity of the ‘peoples of Europe’, respects the 
‘authorities at national, regional and local levels’ and ‘places the individual at the heart of 
its activities.’ The Charter’s invocation of the principle of subsidiarity thus both reinforces 
and complements this reconciliation of harmonized values with national identities.396 
The Charter carries many characteristics that bear witness of its subsidiarity. First of all, 
Article 52(6) sets out that ‘[f]ull account shall be taken of national laws and practices’. 
Correspondingly, several provisions contain explicit references the legislation of the 
Member States.397 According to the Explanations, these limitations of the material scope 
underline the Charter’s respect for subsidiarity.398 The same holds true for Article 52(2) 
regarding rights for which provision is made in the Treaties. Secondly, the distinction 
between rights and principles under Articles 51(1) and 52(5) can be understood as an 
expression of subsidiarity. In order to be fully effective, the principles need to be 
implemented by the Union or the Member States in accordance with their respective 
powers.399 Thirdly, elements of subsidiarity can be identified in Article 53 and its 
reservation that ‘[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting’ fundamental rights as guaranteed elsewhere in Union or international law or by 
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the Member States.400 Similarly, Article 52(4) bears traces of subsidiarity as its rejects 
autonomous interpretations by stating that ‘[i]n so far as this Charter recognises 
fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.’401 
As yet another expression of its subsidiarity, the Charter does not autonomously 
determine its own field of application.402 It neither alters the distribution of competences 
between the EU and its Member States, nor extends the jurisdiction of the CJEU.403 Rather, 
its scope can be defined as relative, because it is tied to the general scope of EU law.404 
Paradoxically, the application of the Charter is restricted to the Union legal order, despite 
the universal nature of fundamental rights.405 As a consequence, the Charter is rather 
complementary than parallel in relation to national fundamental rights protection, because 
of their separate fields of application. In line with the subsidiarity principle, Member States 
retain their general competence as primary guardians of fundamental rights.406 
This limited applicability of the Charter is reinforced by the word ‘only’ in Article 
51(1).407 In accordance with the principle of conferral, the responsibility of the EU for 
guaranteeing fundamental rights can be understood as a transfer of power from the 
Member States.408 It follows, that Charter’s scope is limited to the areas of competence 
conferred on the Union.409 In other words, the Charter is a mere fundamental rights 
reflection of the existing Union legal order.410 In relation to this, it should to be kept in 
mind that the primary aim of drafting a Charter was to render fundamental rights within the 
EU more visible.411 
Reaffirming the Charter’s restrictive scope, Articles 51(1), 51(2) and 52(2) reiterate the 
principles of conferral and subsidiarity. The Charter neither extends the scope of EU law, 
nor modifies the powers or tasks conferred on the Union in the Treaties. With the Lisbon 
Treaty its subsidiary and non-universal nature was further emphasised by Article 6(1) TEU 
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and Declaration No. 1 relating to its application.412 Clearly, the Charter was not intended to 
provide a legal basis for the EU to legislate, but in reverse it strengthens the fundamental 
rights implications of the existing legal bases in the Treaties.413 Instead of conferring 
competences on the Union, the Charter sets limits to how the EU and the Member States 
may use their attributed powers.414 This difference between the Treaties and the Charter is 
well illustrated by Articles 19 TFEU and 21 CFR. These provisions are substantially 
similar but functionally distinct. Article 19 TFEU constitutes a specific legislative basis for 
EU acts in the fight against discrimination, whereas the prohibition of discrimination under 
Article 21 CFR conditions all areas of EU law, without thereby defining the reach of the 
Union’s jurisdiction in anti-discrimination cases.415 
Although the Charter does not provide a legal basis for the EU to legislate, this does not 
exclude its potential as an influence on policy-making.416 Fundamental rights 
implementation is facilitated by the EU’s obligation to ensure that all its actions comply 
with the Charter.417 Accordingly, the respect for fundamental rights can also be used by the 
EU as a justification for enacting legislation in a given area of competence.418 As pointed 
out by Article 51(1), the Union and its Member States ‘shall promote the application’ of 
the rights guaranteed under the Charter in accordance with their respective powers.  
Interestingly, it was pointed out during the drafting process that some rights contained 
in the Charter ‘require action by the European Union for them to be implemented, and the 
legislator has broad discretionary powers as regards such action.’419 However, the current 
Explanations to the Charter merely states that ’[p]rinciples may be implemented through 
legislative or executive acts […] adopted by the Union in accordance with its powers’.420 
Still, the Charter could also be interpreted as containing provisions of positive fundamental 
                                                
412 Declaration No. 1 concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. See VON 
DANWITZ T. (2001): p. 303; CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 36; PERNICE I. (2008): p. 242-244; DUTHEIL DE LA ROSCHÈRE J. (2009): 
p. 122; ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 9; ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2012): p. 165; AUGENSTEIN D. (2013): p. 
1919; FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 322-323; AZOULAI L. (2014): p. 11; WARD A. (2014): p. 1413. 
413 GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) (2013): p. 100; CHRONOWSKI N. (2014): p. 14. 
414 PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 8, 17. 
415 CRAIG P. (2012c): p. 227; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 176. 
416 DE BÚRCA G. – ASCHENBRENNER J.B. (2003): p. 364; WILLIAMS A. (2007): p. 90; DUTHEIL DE LA ROSCHÈRE J. (2009): 
p. 124; CHALMERS D. (2010): p. 150; FOLLESDAL A. (2011): p. 20; ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2012): p. 156, 174; ROSAS 
A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 211-212; FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 317; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 198; MUIR E. (2014): p. 221-222. 
417 ARMSTRONG K. (et.al.) (2008): p. 424; FOLLESDAL A. (2011): p. 20; ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2012): p. 174; KAILA 
H. (2012): p. 298; MICKLITZ H.-W. (2012): p. 377; FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 317. 
418 CAROZZA P.G. (2004): p. 47-48; DE SCHUTTER O. (2004): p. 25; WARD A. (2004): p. 127. See e.g. Commission Proposal for a 
European Parlimament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, COM(2001) 257, p. 150-160, section 2.4, where it is stated that ‘While it is true that the right of 
movement and residence of family members of Union citizens is not explicitly referred to by the Treaty, the right does flow from the right 
to preserve family unity, which is intrinsically connected to the right to the protection of family life, a fundamental right forming part of 
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, which are protected by Community law and incorporated in the Charter’. 
419 Draft Charter, CHARTE 4111/00, 20.1.2000, para. 20. See DE WITTE B. (2001): p. 86; HELANDER P. (2001): p. 109-116; OJANEN 
T. (2003): p. 678; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 134. 
420 Explanations to Article 52(5) CFR. 
 
 
58 
rights obligations for the Union, at least within its existing fields of competence. In fact the 
ECtHR, as a source of analogous comparison, has held that prohibitions may require States 
to take positive actions in order to fulfil their negative obligations under the ECHR.421 
Regardless of the effects that subsidiarity may have on limiting the Charter’s scope of 
application, it is clear that its incorporation into the Charter implies that there is more to 
subsidiarity in EU law than its formal definition in Article 5(3) TEU.422 Charter 
subsidiarity should not be reduced to the abstention of the Union with respect to 
fundamental rights issues outside its jurisdiction.423 Given the Charter’s lack of legal basis 
for the EU to legislate, it must be concluded that the subsidiarity envisaged under the 
Charter is not only the procedural one set out in the TEU.424 Subsidiarity in the context of 
the Charter appears to rather be of a material and judicial nature. In the same way as the 
Charter can be regarded to have interpretative effects on the entire legal order of the 
Union, the principle of subsidiarity conditions the application of the Charter. In other 
words, material subsidiarity has an impact on the Charter in the form of an interpretative 
principle.425 As a compliment to its narrow legislative definition in Article 5(3), 
subsidiarity can also be understood more broadly as a principle of legal interpretation 
promoting the values and objectives of the Union under Articles 2 and 3 TEU.426 
As explained, the notion of subsidiarity consolidated in the Charter represents a 
different understanding of the principle compared to the one applicable to legislative 
procedures.427 Nevertheless, there are no clear answers to how this material subsidiarity 
should be applied when the CJEU interprets and applies the Charter ‘with due regard to the 
principle of subsidiarity’.428 Hence, it may be asked to what extent the earlier examined 
subsidiarity tests regarding national insufficiency, comparative advantages, cross-border 
elements or potential damages to common interests applies to the Charter in the Court’s 
legal reasoning. Fundamental rights are to some extent functionally different from other 
EU policy areas. For instance, the prohibition of discrimination does not necessarily have a 
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cross-border element that could support the need for Union intervention.429 Therefore, it is 
conceivable that the subsidiarity approach to fundamental rights is more concerned with 
the moral, normative and democratic aspects of the principle.430 In the field of fundamental 
rights, it is above all collisions between different values or objectives that trigger questions 
about the distribution of competences and the adequate level of intervention.431 
The consolidation of subsidiarity in the Charter offers possibilities for fruitful 
symbiosis, but all the same leaves many questions unanswered. Obscurity persists as to the 
practical relevance of subsidiarity to fundamental rights under EU law, especially since the 
CJEU never explicitly considered the principle of subsidiarity in any fundamental rights 
case before it.432 Hence, it remains to be examined what kind of implicit expressions 
subsidiarity takes in the Court’s application of the Charter. 
3.3 The Significance of Subsidiarity in Standard-setting under the 
Charter 
3.3.1 Minimum Protection as an Expression of Negative Subsidiarity 
In the spirit of subsidiarity, the objective of the Charter is not to harmonise the level of 
fundamental rights protection within the Member States of the EU.433 The general 
provisions of the Charter limit its effects and merely lay down a minimum standard of 
protection within the Union. By setting its proper fundamental rights standard, the Union 
not only obligates the Member States to comply with fundamental rights, but also 
legitimises its own actions as an autonomous entity with fundamental values and 
constitutional limits.434 According to the Parliament, ‘the Charter constitutes a common 
basis of minimum rights, and the Member States cannot use the argument that the Charter 
would provide a lower level of protection of certain rights than the safeguards offered 
under their own constitutions as a pretext for watering down those safeguards’.435 
Through the principle of subsidiarity and the minimum level of protection, the Charter 
seeks to balance a plurality of sources.436 This balancing entails a search for a unified level 
of fundamental rights consistent with the EU legal order and its objectives, while at the 
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same time respecting the diversity of the constitutional traditions of the Member States as 
far as possible.437 The application of the Charter with respect to subsidiarity thus favours a 
‘practice of cross-judicial communication and comparison’.438 
In the plurality of EU fundamental rights sources, the ECHR plays an important role. 
According to Article 6(3) TEU, the rights guaranteed under the Convention constitute 
general principles of EU law, whereas Article 6(2) TEU provides that the EU shall accede 
to the ECHR. In addition to this, the Convention has been a source of inspiration when 
drafting the Charter. Article 52(3) CFR contributes to setting the minimum level of 
protection, by stating that in so far as its provisions correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR, they shall have the same meaning and scope.439 Nevertheless, Article 52(3) points 
out that the Charter may provide more extensive protection. Such additional protection 
may take the form of a broader personal scope, a more comprehensive content of the rights 
guaranteed or more limited possibilities of restriction. However, the Charter’s general field 
of application remains narrower than that of the Convention.440 In other words, the Charter 
takes the ECHR as a point of reference, but may still go beyond it.441 This framing of 
fundamental rights replicates the subsidiary relation of the ECHR to the Member States.442 
Similarly to the ECHR, the Charter may be understood as a living instrument regarding 
its exact content and scope. While the Charter aims to make EU fundamental rights more 
visible, it does not pretend to provide a static or exhaustive list of rights.443 The references 
in Article 6 TEU to the ECHR, the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and the general principles, confirm that the CJEU retains its freedom to continue to 
develop fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.444 
The relation expressed in Article 52(3) stresses the importance of consistency of the 
Charter with regard to the minimum standard guaranteed by the ECHR.445 In fact, the 
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ECtHR presumes that the Charter offers a protection of fundamental rights in compliance 
with the ECHR.446 As a sign of this homologous interpretation of the minimum protection, 
the CJEU primarily refers to the Charter as a source of fundamental rights, whilst 
interpreting the substantive minimum level in accordance with the corresponding 
provisions under the Convention.447 However, this does not make the CJEU competent to 
rule on whether national rights comply with the ECHR.448 For instance, in cases Bonda and 
Åkerberg Fransson the Court had to consider the effects of the ne bis in idem principle in 
Article 50 CFR in national proceedings relating to incorrect tax statements.449 In both 
cases, the Court took note of the ECtHR case law on the ne bis in idem principle in Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7 ECHR, but did not rule out a possible combination of administrative 
and criminal sanctions under the Charter.450 This has led to criticism of the Court for 
possibly according a lower level of protection than the one afforded by the ECHR.451 
Still, the interpretation of the rights guaranteed under the Charter is not autonomous, as 
a result of the principle of subsidiarity.452 Not only is it tied to the ECHR standard, but in 
accordance with Articles 52(4), 52(6) and 53 CFR, its provisions shall also be interpreted 
with the Member State constitutions as a source of inspiration.453 This requirement of 
harmonious interpretation can be seen as a form of subsidiarity, because it is aimed to 
mitigate possible tensions between the unifying effects of the primacy of Union law and 
the diversity of national constitutions.454  
Nevertheless, the Charter’s level of protection must not be understood as the ‘lowest 
common denominator’. Instead, the Explanations affirm that the Charter shall be 
interpreted ‘in a way offering a high standard of protection which is adequate for the law 
of the Union and in harmony with the common constitutional traditions.’455 Member States 
cannot automatically presume the common minimum standard to be respected in other 
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Member States.456 As a consequence, it has even been suggested that the Charter may 
contribute to a more autonomous understanding of fundamental rights within the EU, at the 
expense of the balance between commonalities and particularities of Member States.457 For 
instance, in Mangold and Kücükdeveci, non-discrimination based on age was considered a 
general principle of EU law, despite the fact that only the constitutions of Finland and 
Portugal comprised a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age at the time.458 
As a minimum standard, the Charter does not prevent Member States from providing 
better protection to its citizens.459 In line with the principle of subsidiarity, Article 53 
acknowledges divergent levels of protection by specifying that ‘[n]othing in this Charter 
shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognised’ under EU law, international laws or Member State 
constitutions.460 Like the concept of constitutional identity under Article 4(2) TEU, the EU 
grants Member States discretion to set their own level of protection in the field of domestic 
fundamental rights.461 Given the Charter’s close connection to the ECHR, this discretion 
may be compared to the margin of appreciation accorded by the ECtHR.462 Accordingly, 
the CJEU gives Member States leeway when the protection is not harmonised at EU level. 
In principle, Member States may implement their own conception of fundamental rights on 
the condition that the national provisions do not hamper the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of Union law or the minimum protection guaranteed under the Charter.463 
3.3.2 Maximum Protection from the Perspective of Positive Subsidiarity 
From a subsidiarity-oriented perspective, the rights and freedoms of individuals should be 
guaranteed at the closest but most appropriate level of governance. Subsidiarity reconciles 
a plurality of fundamental rights by giving priority to the standard that offers the best – 
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presumably the highest – level of protection.464 Like the concept of minimum 
harmonisation under EU law, the Charter thus sets out a level of protection, which Member 
States may go beyond. By providing a higher level of protection in accordance with Article 
53, Member States can set their proper local maximum standard.465 
As all EU Member States are contracting parties to the ECHR and the minimum 
protection under the Charter corresponds to the level afforded by the Convention, it is 
assumed that the choice of providing a higher level of protection lies within the discretion 
of each individual Member State.466 Ideally, EU intervention would not even be necessary, 
since the Union is only capable of offering a similar or lower level of protection.467 
Against the background of negative subsidiarity, fundamental rights protection would thus 
be attributed to national authorities.468 
According to this logic, the Union should act only if it is more apt to efficiently protect 
a given fundamental right. For instance, due to the transnational character of a particular 
right, Member States may not have all the means to guarantee its sufficient enforcement.469 
Nevertheless, this pluralistic approach to fundamental rights can also lead to tensions 
between different systems of protection. The Union legal order and national constitutions 
may balance individual rights and principles or individual rights and public interests 
differently.470 This naturally raises the question of potential conflicts between the primacy 
of Union law and subsidiarity as a principle of fundamental rights: ‘how much subsidiarity 
can [EU] law suffer in the sphere of the protection of fundamental rights’?471 
In accordance with the principle of primacy, a provision of EU law must be given 
priority before any conflicting national provision. Member State authorities and courts are 
obliged to set aside domestic legislation deemed incompatible with the Union legal 
order.472 Primacy of Union law applies to norms of primary as well as secondary law, and 
irrespective of the normative level of the conflicting national provision in question.473 
Traditionally, the principle of primacy has not been understood as leaving room for 
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subsidiarity considerations in EU law.474 
The primacy doctrine is not enshrined in the Treaties, but has been developed by the 
CJEU from the 1960’s and case Costa, indicating that EU law, as ‘an independent source 
of law, could not because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic 
legal provisions’.475 Although it is true that the Court uses the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States as a source of inspiration, only the CJEU alone is 
competent to review fundamental rights compliance under EU law.476 As a result, even 
constitutional provisions of the Member States have been subject to the primacy of Union 
law.477 In Walloon, the Court concluded that a Member State cannot ‘plead provisions, 
practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order, including those resulting from 
the constitutional organisation of that State, to justify the failure to observe obligations 
arising under Community law’.478 
Initially, the CJEU introduced fundamental rights as general principles of EU law in 
order to legitimate its primacy.479 Based on this equation, the primacy doctrine 
harmoniously coexists with fundamental rights and the principle of subsidiarity. As long as 
a specific right cannot be better guaranteed at national level, the uniform protection at EU 
level prevails.480 In this sense, the Charter can be seen as ‘a counterpart to the 
unconditional acceptance of the primacy of European law over national law’.481 However, 
by opening up for a higher level of protection, Article 53 CFR seems to render the primacy 
of Union law conditional upon the highest standard available. Such an exception could 
supposedly dilute the effects of the primacy doctrine.482 The Charter enters into a 
paradoxical reasoning in which the primacy of its proper fundamental rights standard 
would work against the idea of a local maximum standard.483 As a result, the idea of the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States as the ultimate source of legitimacy 
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for primacy of Union law is put to test.484 
The CJEU was faced with this dilemma in Melloni. In the case, the Spanish Constitution 
recognised a more extensive protection of the right to a fair trial than Articles 47 and 48(2) 
CFR. Still, the Court found that the Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European arrest 
warrant lawfully allowed for the extradition of Mr Melloni, despite the fact that he had 
been convicted in his absence by an Italian court.485 According to the CJEU, Article 53 
CFR ‘must be interpreted as not allowing a Member State to make the surrender of a 
person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the 
issuing Member State, in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the 
rights of the defence guaranteed by its constitution.’ In this sense the Melloni case appears 
to set a maximum level under the Charter.486 
In Melloni, the Court emphasised that the ‘framework decision effects a harmonisation 
of the conditions of execution of a European arrest warrant’.487 This impact of 
harmonisation was further clarified in Åkerberg Fransson, where the Court explained that 
only ‘in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by 
European Union law […], national authorities and courts remain free to apply national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection 
provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised’.488 In other words, by 
virtue of primacy, a harmonized standard at EU level – albeit explicitly lower – precludes a 
higher national standard.489 The degree of harmonisation of rights affects the margin of 
discretion for Member States to provide a higher level of protection.490 In this sense, the 
Melloni judgement may be understood as an expression of the pre-emption doctrine, 
closely related to the principle of primacy. Member States may act in areas of shared 
competence to the extent that the EU has not used its power.491 It has been suggested that 
this, in turn, might render the respect for the constitutional identity of the Member States 
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conditional upon the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law.492 
Hence, the highest protection available will not automatically become the frame of 
reference for fundamental rights within the EU.493 Instead, to justify the primacy of the 
Charter as a maximum standard in Melloni, the Court emphasised ‘the consensus reached 
by all the Member States regarding the scope to be given under EU law to the procedural 
rights enjoyed by persons convicted’ for the purpose of the European arrest warrant.494 In 
fact, the objective of harmonisation under the Framework Decision ‘is to enhance the 
procedural rights of persons subject to criminal proceedings’ by replacing the ‘multilateral 
system of extradition between Member States with a system of surrender […] based on the 
principle of mutual recognition’.495 The mutual trust and understanding of a given 
fundamental right empowers the EU to legislate in favour of a common lower standard.496 
This has been confirmed, not only in Melloni, but also in Wereld, where the Court held that 
the Framework Decision did not breach the principles of equality and legality of criminal 
offences, although it derogated from the requirement of double criminality with regard to 
the crimes listed in Article 2(2).497 Hence, consensus among Member States regarding a 
certain level of fundamental rights protection creates a limit to the subsidiarity principle.498 
At a first glance, the Melloni judgment appears to render the principle of subsidiarity 
non-existent in the field of EU fundamental rights. The judgement ensures neither the best 
nor the most immediate protection available. Rather, the case seems to confirm the fear of 
the Charter as a centralising force, extending its scope of application and imposing its 
harmonised standards of protection, without any regard to subsidiarity.499 In its judgement, 
the Court even invoked primacy, despite the fact that the Framework Decision could not 
have direct effect.500 This might nevertheless be a too hasty conclusion. What the Melloni 
judgement rather with certainty makes clear is that the subsidiarity of the Charter must be 
evaluated in the light of the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law. 
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Firstly, it is important to note that primacy of EU law must not be understood as 
supremacy of Union law. Like subsidiarity, primacy does not represent a hierarchisation of 
the different systems of protection. Rather, the two principles favour a plurality of sources 
that need to be reconciled through a balance of interests and objectives.501 Furthermore, 
both subsidiarity and primacy have a strong connection to the principle of sincere 
cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU.502 The previous Amsterdam Protocol on subsidiarity 
emphasised that ‘[w]here the application of the principle of subsidiarity leads to no action 
being taken by the Community, Member States are required […] [to take] all appropriate 
measures to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty and [abstain] from 
any measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.’503 
Parallels can also be drawn between this principle of loyalty and the principle of mutual 
recognition. As indicated by the CJEU in Pelz, there is a requirement of ‘mutual trust 
between Member States in the fact that their respective national legal systems are capable 
of providing an equivalent and effective protection of fundamental rights, recognised at 
European Union level, in particular, in the Charter’.504 
Although no longer in force, the Amsterdam Protocol on subsidiarity can be read as 
further clarifying the relation between primacy and subsidiarity.505 As a fact, the Protocol 
stated that the principle of subsidiarity ‘shall not affect the principles developed by the 
CJEU regarding the relation between national and Community law’. ’The principle of 
subsidiarity does not call into question the powers conferred on the European Community 
by the Treaty, as interpreted by the CJEU.’506 In practice, these provisions suggest that the 
principle of subsidiarity cannot be invoked to obstruct the objectives of the internal market 
and the primacy of Union law.507 In this sense, the Charter reconciles primacy with 
fundamental rights. Although EU law takes primacy over national constitutions, the Union 
is still bound by the Charter. The primacy of the Charter is vital, because the lack of a 
common maximum level of protection could in some situations undermine the unity and 
effectiveness of the EU legal order, in the same way as the lack of a common minimum 
standard could risk the universality of fundamental rights.508 
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Secondly, regarding the unity of EU law, it must be kept in mind that the Lisbon Treaty 
does not take a state-centred negative approach to the principle of subsidiarity. In its 
positive form, subsidiarity may as well favour EU actions based on shared values and 
objectives.509 Thus, there is no prima facie hierarchy between the different-level systems 
of protection.510 In some situations the whole concept of a maximum standard become 
meaningless, as illustrated by Grogan, where three different rights had to be balanced 
against each other.511 In other situations, negative subsidiarity might undermine the 
universality of rights.512 Especially in the context of the common market, a uniform action 
coordinated at EU level is preferable and sometimes even unavoidable.513 That is to say, 
when a clear comparative advantage exists, a particular situation should be regulated 
through harmonisation at Union level. As held by AG Cruz Villalón in Åkerberg Fransson, 
‘ultimately, on occasions which it is difficult to stipulate in advance, it is legitimate that the 
Union’s interest in leaving its mark – its conception of the fundamental right – should take 
priority over that of each of the Member States’.514 
Similarly to the European arrest warrant cases, the CJEU in UK v Council regarding the 
Working Time Directive 93/104 stated – in a tautological manner – that the intention to 
harmonise national legislation necessarily entailed Union action.515 In line with the 
principle of subsidiarity, Member States have discretion only to the extent that the content 
of a given right has not been exhaustively determined at supranational level.516 Within a 
system of constitutional character, such as the EU, it is sometimes necessary to strike a 
balance in favour of uniformity, at the expense of pluralism, in order to preserve the 
autonomy of the system.517 As the Court held already in Handelsgesellschaft, the validity 
of Community ‘measures can only be judged in the light of Community law […] [as] an 
independent source of law.’ ‘[R]ecourse to […] national law in order to judge the validity 
of [such] measures […] would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of 
Community law.’ As a consequence, ‘[t]he protection of [fundamental] rights […] must be 
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community.’518 
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Thirdly, the effectiveness of EU law justifies a maximum approach to the Charter as 
compliant with the principle of subsidiarity. In accordance with the concept of positive 
subsidiarity, efficiency considerations may require that integration be regulated at EU 
level.519 For instance, the effectiveness of the internal market and the financial interests of 
the EU can be seen as legitimising EU intervention in Åkerberg Fransson.520 In practice, 
the efficiency considerations appear to weigh even heavier than arguments based on 
transnational implications in favour of Union action.521 It is therefore argued that the CJEU 
tends to favour integrationist interpretations, stressing the effet utile of EU law when 
balancing different interests of individuals and the EU.522 
The judgement in Melloni can be read as a confirmation from the CJEU that a 
satisfactory balance had been struck by the legislator when reconciling the efficiency of the 
European arrest warrant on the one hand, with the individual right to a fair trial on the 
other.523 If Member States could interpret a harmonised right in a divergent manner, its 
impact would vary between Member States. This would be detrimental to the efficacy and 
full effect of the fundamental right in question.524 As the Court concluded in Hernandez, 
‘the reason for pursuing the objective of protecting fundamental rights in EU law […] is 
the need to avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies 
according to the national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy 
and effectiveness of EU law’.525 
Article 53 CFR can be interpreted as opening up for a constitutional dialogue between 
the EU and its Member States.526 According to the Court in Melloni, the Article allows 
Member States to apply a higher level of protection as far as this standard does not 
compromise the protection offered by the Charter or the primacy, unity and effectiveness 
of Union law.527 Although ambiguously formulated, the wording of the Article may still 
imply such a restrictive interpretation.528 In fact, Article 53 declares that ‘nothing in this 
[emphasis added] Charter shall be interpreted as restricting’ domestic fundamental rights 
standards. This does not exclude the possibility that domestic standards may be restricted 
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with reference to other sources of Union law.529 Similarly, Article 53 limits the Charter’s 
potential of restricting other fundamental rights standards to ‘their respective fields of 
application’. This may be interpreted as referring only to rights falling outside the scope of 
Union law. Conversely, nothing prevents the Charter from restricting fundamental rights 
within its scope.530 Such a reading of Article 53 tends to accentuate the sui generis nature 
of EU law and emphasise the Charter as an autonomous fundamental rights standard.531 
Although the maximum approach to the Charter can be justified by positive 
subsidiarity, the notion of subsidiarity it represents may still be criticised. In the light of the 
Melloni judgment, the expansive approach to fundamental rights can no longer be justified 
by more extensive protection. It is even questionable whether the CJEU can be claimed to 
have a prudent approach to fundamental rights.532 From the perspective of fundamental 
rights alone, the highest level of protection should prevail, but in reality the Court balances 
fundamental rights with many other objectives and values under the Treaties.533 
While the effective protection of fundamental rights is the primary concern of 
subsidiarity in international human rights law, subsidiarity as a general principle of EU law 
is more concerned with the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law in general.534 
Traditionally, subsidiary human rights mechanisms have been preoccupied with the 
protection of the individual. The common denominator for subsidiarity and human rights 
concerns has been human dignity.535 However, the principle of subsidiarity under Union 
law only partly shares these objectives and values. Fundamental rights are just one of many 
concerns of the EU, as demonstrated by the subsidiarity test. In determining the level of 
intervention, the Union looks for measures that can satisfactorily guarantee the common 
interests of the Member States. In defining these objectives, it assumes that its proper 
interests correspond to those of the Member States.536 Member States appear to have no 
ultimate veto when the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law are at stake. 
For these reasons, it can be concluded that the principle of subsidiarity – as defined by 
the EU and applied by the CJEU – is not value-neutral. Subsidiarity is not in itself a threat, 
neither to European integration nor to fundamental rights. However, it represents a 
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particular vision of integration, which in some situations can be considered to fail in 
striking a balance between unity and diversity.537 The weakness of subsidiarity as a 
principle of fundamental rights under the Charter lies in the difficulties it experiences in 
addressing and balancing conflicts between different objectives and values in the EU 
fundamental rights context. Under the current subsidiarity parameters in EU law, the 
common objectives and values dictated by the Union are likely to prevail over colliding 
national fundamental rights standards and their respective values and objectives.538 As 
exemplified by the Melloni judgement, positive subsidiary triggers the application of the 
Charter in situations where fundamental rights objectives and values at national level risk 
to jeopardise the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law. 
3.4 The Subsidiary Scope of the Charter within the Field of EU Law 
3.4.1 The Charter’s Limited Scope of Addressees 
For the purpose of examining the Charter’s subjective scope ratione personae, its formal 
status must be taken as the point of departure.539 As a preliminary observation, the Charter 
distinguishes between an active and a passive category of addressees. The active personal 
scope determines the holders of the rights and freedoms it guarantees, in other words the 
circle of persons protected under the Charter. The passive personal scope identifies the 
guarantors of rights and freedoms, broadly speaking the Union and its Member States, 
which are all under the obligation to respect the Charter.540 
In accordance with its Preamble and the principle of subsidiarity, the Union has 
elaborated the Charter with ‘the individual at the heart of its activities’.541 By increasing 
the clarity, transparency and visibility of EU fundamental rights, the Charter raises 
awareness among the European citizens about their rights and freedoms.542 Further to this, 
the legally binding status of the Charter raises important questions about its personal 
scope.543 Who is entitled to invoke provisions under the Charter and against whom? 
The active personal scope of the Charter primarily applies to natural persons domiciled 
or residing within the jurisdiction of an EU Member State.544 However, each Charter 
                                                
537 ESTELLA A. (2002): p. 6-7, 80-81. 
538 MUIR E. (2014): p. 239-244. 
539 ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 8; TANASESCU E.S. (2013): p. 223. 
540 CURTIN D. – VAN OOIK R. (2001): p. 103. 
541 Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
542 DE BÚRCA G. (2001): p. 130; Walkila S. (2011): p. 816; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 146. 
543 GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) (2013): p. 97. 
544 LEBECK C. (2013): p. 60. 
 
 
72 
provision more specifically outlines its beneficiaries.545 Many Charter provisions do not 
make any apparent distinction between EU citizens and a third-country nationals.546 Due to 
the universal and unconditional nature of human dignity, especially Title I of the Charter 
refers to ‘everyone’ as ‘persons’, without any distinction.547 Other provisions are tied to the 
EU citizenship548, whereas some are explicitly directed to third-country nationals.549 
Some of the rights guaranteed may be applicable also to legal persons with registered 
office, administration or establishment within the EU.550 However, the Charter cannot be 
invoked against the Union or its Member States by third countries or international 
organisations. Similarly, local and national authorities as well as Member States are 
excluded from the circle of right-holders.551 Borderline cases may yet arise from situations 
involving legal entities of semi-private nature or with semi-public functions.552 
Nonetheless, in Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat, the General Court a contrario came to the 
conclusion that ‘neither in the Charter […] nor in European Union primary law are there 
any provisions which state that legal persons who are emanations of States are not entitled 
to the protection of fundamental rights.’553 The two rulings suggest that even legal persons 
from third countries may take advantage of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. 
While each provision defines its beneficiaries, the passive personal scope of the Charter 
is specifically addressed in one of the general provisions, namely Article 51(1).554 The 
obligation to respect the rights and observe the principles therein is addressed to the EU 
and the Member States. This vertical dimension follows from the traditional function of 
fundamental rights, protecting the individual against the arbitrary use of public power.555 
When it comes to the validity, application and interpretation of measures falling within the 
scope of EU law, private parties thus have the possibility to invoke the Charter against 
Member States or the Union.556 
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According to Article 51(1), the provisions of the Charter are primarily ‘addressed to the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity’. Through the codification of the fundamental rights protected within the EU, 
the Union has strengthened its legitimacy as an autonomous legal order with primacy over 
national law.557 In line with the subsidiarity principle, the Union establishes legal ties not 
only with its Member States, but also directly with EU citizens. Together with the Member 
States, the Union is explicitly responsible for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of its 
citizens. In this respect, the EU legal order distinguishes itself from international public 
law and other international organisations.558 Stressing its innovative character, the CJEU in 
Van Gend pronounced that ‘the [Union] constitutes a new legal order of international law 
[…] the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.’559 
Although EU actions have to comply with fundamental rights as general principles 
resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the ECHR, 
the Union was never formally bound by any fundamental rights document prior to the 
proclamation of the Charter.560 Despite the fact that all EU Member States are contracting 
parties to the ECHR, it does not automatically follow that the instrument also binds the 
Union itself.561 As confirmed by the ECtHR, the Strasbourg court does not have 
jurisdiction to examine claims raised directly against the EU.562 The ECtHR can only 
exercise its jurisdiction indirectly, when Member States apply Union law within their 
respective domestic jurisdictions.563 Under the current Bosphorus doctrine, the ECtHR 
presumes that the EU protection of fundamental rights is ‘comparable’ and thus also 
‘equivalent’ to the ECHR.564 Even though the Charter today is legally binding for the EU, 
the Union is nonetheless under no obligation to respect human rights in public international 
law. Hence, the obligation of the EU to accede to the ECHR under Article 6(2) TEU is an 
important complement to the Charter.565 
The Union’s fundamental rights obligations under the Charter are addressed to its 
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institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The list is consistent with the formulations in 
Articles 15 and 16 TFEU and must be considered thorough. The seven institutions of the 
Union are listed in Article 13 TEU, among others the Council, the Parliament, the 
Commission and the CJEU. No exhaustive list of EU bodies, offices and agencies exist, 
but the formulation must be considered to refer to all entities established by primary or 
secondary Union law. For instance, the Committee of Regions, the Economic and Social 
Committee, the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank as well as 
decentralized agencies deserve to be mentioned.566 
With due regard to subsidiarity, the Charter applies when the Union exercises its 
powers. Naturally, all actions of its institutions, bodies and agencies fall within the scope 
of EU law.567 Therefore, all EU organs can be held liable for fundamental rights violations 
before the CJEU.568 Proceedings are likely to concern either claims that the EU has failed 
to guarantee a sufficient level of protection or taken measures that are incompatible with 
the Charter.569 
Whereas the Charter is generally applicable to the activities of the Union, it sets out a 
limited scope of application with regard to the Member States.570 Article 51(1) CFR 
identifies the EU Member States as vertical addressees of its passive personal scope, but 
‘only when they are implementing Union law.’ Against the background of subsidiarity, this 
dimension of the Charter reflects the multi-level collaborative execution of EU law in 
general, and of EU fundamental rights law in particular. To a large extent, the EU is 
dependent on its Member States for the implementation, application and enforcement of 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Charter.571 
In accordance with Article 19 TEU, ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to 
ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.’ Although the 
Member States guarantee fundamental rights under their national constitutions, they are 
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obliged to respect and uphold the rights and freedoms under the Charter when they 
implement Union law.572 The Charter’s reference to ‘Member States’ in Article 51(1) 
naturally covers both central and regional authorities as well as local bodies and public 
organisation.573 Because the CJEU recognizes national courts as Member State authorities, 
these must equally be considered bound by the Charter.574 What rather causes 
interpretational challenges is the concept of ‘implementing Union law’.575 
The different formulations of the Charter’s applicability to Member State activity, such 
as ‘only where the latter transpose or apply’, ‘exclusively within the framework of 
implementing’ or ‘exclusively within the scope of Union law’, suggest that the drafters of 
the Charter envisaged a limited field of application at national level.576 A literal 
interpretation of the current formulation points towards a limited Member State 
applicability alike.577 Still, the Explanations to the Charter implies a wider field of 
application, covering both implementation of and derogation from EU law, when stating 
that ‘it follows unambiguously from the case law of the CJEU that the requirement to 
respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the 
Member States when they act in the scope of Union law’.578 This ambiguity – together 
with the UK and Poland Protocol No. 30 – illustrates the political sensitivity that surrounds 
the applicability of the Charter and the extent to which it binds Member States, particularly 
in areas where national autonomy remains strong.579 
In Åkerberg Fransson, the Court – with reference to the Explanations and the pre-
Charter case law – eventually held that ‘implementing Union law’ refers to all situations 
‘where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law’.580 Similarly, in 
N.S., the Court confirmed that Protocol No. 30 does not constitute a general opt-out from 
the Charter for Poland and the UK. Rather, the Protocol should be understood as clarifying 
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the limited applicability of the Charter to Member State actions.581 
Based on the case law of the CJEU, the notion of national measures considered to 
implement EU law must be understood broadly.582 As suggested by different AGs and later 
confirmed by the Court in Åkerberg Fransson, the formulation ‘implementing Union law’ 
does not exclusively refer to the direct and explicit transposition of EU norms into national 
law. In fact, the Charter applies to national measures serving a purpose of EU law, 
irrespective of whether they were intentionally designed to implement Union law or 
formerly adopted and therefore just happen to already fulfil such a purpose.583 Similarly, in 
DEB, the Court held that despite the procedural autonomy of the Member States, their 
general procedural rules must comply with the Charter when giving effect to EU law.584 
A part from the agency situation, where the Member States act on behalf of the Union, 
the Charter is also binding when the EU accords a margin of discretion to the Member 
States. While it is possible that the implementation of Union law leaves room for domestic 
considerations, this does not mean that Member States are allowed to disregard their 
fundamental rights obligations under the Charter.585 As established by the Court in N.S., 
Article 51(1) CFR covers situations where the Member States enjoys such discretion under 
EU law.586 Correspondingly, in Kamberaj, the Court held that although the implemented 
Union law in question refers to definitions in national law, those definitions must still 
guarantee at least the same protection as the Charter.587 Additionally, in Alemo, the Charter 
was used to review national implementation measures that went beyond the minimum level 
of harmonisation under EU law.588 
In continuity with the pre-Lisbon ruling in ERT – the Court has confirmed that the 
Charter is binding on Member States also when they derogate from Union law.589 
According to the Court in Tsakouridis, ‘reasons of public interest may be relied on to 
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justify a national measure which is liable to obstruct the exercise of freedom of movement 
for person only if the measure in question takes account of [fundamental] rights’.590 
Similarly, in Pfleger, ‘[t]he use by a Member State of exceptions provided for by EU law 
in order to justify an obstruction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty’ was 
regarded as implementation for the purpose of Article 51(1) CFR.591 In line with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the possibility of derogations in compliance with the Charter 
offers Member States leeway in the implementation of EU law.592 
Although the Charter primarily aims to protect its beneficiaries against arbitrary 
exercise of public power in vertical relations, the holder of rights may as well wish to 
invoke Charter provisions in horizontal relations against another private party.593 
Admittedly, no clear-cut answer to the question of the Charter’s horizontal impact is to be 
found in its provisions or the Explanations thereto.594 At the outset, however, it is true that 
Article 51(1) does not mention individuals or private entities as addressees with 
obligations under the Charter. As argued by AG Trstenjak in Dominguez, a private party 
cannot fulfil the requirement in Article 52(1) CFR indicating that ‘[a]ny limitation on the 
exercise of rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law’.595 
Still, in Kücükdeveci, the CJEU incidentally referred to Article 21 CFR and held that it 
is for the national court hearing a dispute between private parties to disapply ‘if need be 
any provision of national legislation contrary to’ ‘the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age as given expression in Directive 2000/78’.596 Arguably, Article 51(1) does 
not explicitly exclude private parties from the Charter’s passive personal scope.597 In fact, 
the CJEU recognised the horizontal effects of rights in private relations already prior to the 
existence of the Charter.598 Hence, ‘it would be paradoxical if the incorporation of the 
Charter into primary law actually changed that state of affairs for the worse’, as argued by 
AG Villalón Cruz in AMS.599 In effect, the Court has held that the Charter is ‘applicable in 
all situations governed by European Union law’.600 In addition to this, the Preamble of the 
                                                
590 Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis, para. 52. 
591 Case C-390/12 Pfleger, para. 36. 
592 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 55-56. 
593 LEBECK C. (2013): p. 41; CHRONOWSKI N. (2014): p. 14. 
594 CRAIG P. (2012c): p. 206-207; WARD A. (2014): p. 1430. 
595 Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-282/10 Dominguez, paras. 80-83. See LENAERTS K. – GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2014): p. 
1579. 
596 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, paras. 22, 51, relating to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. 
597 CURTIN D. – VAN OOIK R. (2001): p. 112; LAZZERINI N. (2014): p. 925; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 168. 
598 See e.g. Cases C-36/74 Walrave, para. 17; C-13/76 Donà, para. 17; C-415/93 Bosman, para. 82; C-51/96 & 191/97 Deliège, para. 47; 
C-281/98 Angonese, para. 31; C-309/99 Wouters, para. 120; C-438/05 Viking, para. 33. 
599 Opinion of AG VILLALÓN CRUZ in Case C-176/12 AMS, paras. 32-35. 
600 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 19. See LAZZERINI N. (2014): p. 929. 
 
 
78 
Charter states that the enjoyment of rights ‘entails responsibilities and duties with regard to 
other persons, to the human community and to future generations.’ 
As a fact, several provisions of the Charter recognise rights that can be relied on in 
judicial proceedings between private parties.601 Secondary legislation, case law as well as 
the Explanations recognise that rights, such as non-discrimination under Article 21, can be 
materially relevant in horizontal relations.602 Furthermore – in comparison to Articles 14 
ECHR and 1(2) of Protocol No. 12 – Article 21 CFR does not state that discrimination 
must be attributable to a public authority.603 By analogy, the case law of the ECtHR also 
supports a horizontal application of the Charter.604 However, the ECHR does not impose a 
requirement of direct horizontal effect. The impact of the ECHR on horizontal relations is 
rather indirect, as it is deemed sufficient that individuals are able to rely on the Member 
States’ obligation to protect the individual rights guaranteed, also in the private sector.605 
Although the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter may have a certain impact 
on horizontal relations, such an effect is not unlimited. Given the secondary nature of the 
Charter, its provisions will become relevant rather indirectly, through their connection to 
other primary or secondary norms conferring rights and obligations on individuals and 
private entities.606 As an example, Article 23 CFR, regarding equality between women and 
men, is to be observed in all areas of Union law, whereas its practical scope of application 
will be determined by other norms such as Article 157 TFEU – having both vertical and 
horizontal effect – regarding equal pay between female and male workers.607 Therefore, it 
may be concluded that the Charter does not entail any universal or autonomous horizontal 
applicability. Any other interpretation would not only be likely to increase the number of 
judicial proceedings between private parties before the CJEU, but also boost constitutional 
litigation through the transfer of powers from the EU legislator to the CJEU in the area of 
fundamental rights protection.608 
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PELLONPÄÄ M. (2007): p. 23-25; HARTKAMP A. (2010): p. 535; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 298-299, 454; GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) 
(2013): p. 112. 
605 Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-282/10 Dominguez, paras. 84-87. See LENAERTS K. – GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2014): p. 
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606 LEBECK C. (2013): p. 321-322, 454-455. See also e.g. Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-282/10 Dominguez, para. 83. 
607 CRAIG P. (2012c): p. 206-207. 
608 WALKILA S. (2015): p. 178, 267-269. 
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3.4.2 The Relative Field of Application of the Charter 
In spite of the universal nature of human rights, EU fundamental rights have a spatial 
scope of application that is different from that of rights guaranteed under domestic law and 
the ECHR. The EU Courts are not human rights courts with a general jurisdiction, such as 
the ECtHR. Rather than universally applicable, the ratione materiae of the Charter must be 
defined in relation to the scope of EU law itself.609 Notwithstanding the function that the 
Convention fulfils as a source of inspiration for the Charter, their respective fields of 
application must not be assimilated.610 
Article 51(1) CFR aims to determine and limit the situations in which the rights, 
freedoms and principles guaranteed can be invoked and enforced.611 Consistent with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Charter’s field of application can be described as relative, 
since fundamental rights do not in themselves constitute a competence-conferring source 
of primary law. It follows, that for the Charter to be applicable, another norm of 
substantive EU law first needs to apply to the situation at hand.612 To determine whether 
the circumstances of the case are ‘governed by European Union law’, an analysis of the 
subject matter first needs to be carried out.613 A sufficient connection to EU law must be 
established before the Charter is considered applicable.614 
Still, the required degree of connection between EU law and the subject matter raises 
problems of legal certainty regarding the applicability of the Charter.615 A too abstract 
connection might extend the scope of the Charter to almost any domestic measure, whereas 
a too narrow reading of Article 51(1) could create a discontinuity between the scope of the 
Charter and the scope of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.616 For these 
reasons, it is argued that a Member State obligation – either positive or negative – deriving 
from EU law triggers the application of the Charter.617 In Siragusa, the CJEU formulated 
this criterion as a question of whether ‘the provisions of EU law in the subject area 
                                                
609 PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 20; AZOULAI L. (2012): p. 208-209; MUIR E. (2012): p. 17; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): 
p. 166; FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 317; TANASESCU E.S. (2013): p. 223; WARD A. (2014): p. 1424. However, under Article 24(1) 
TEU, the jurisdiction of the CJEU is very limited with respect to the common foreign and security policy of the Union. 
610 However, it may be asked whether the EU’s accession to the ECHR under Article 6(2) TEU could have the potential of extending the 
scope of the Charter. See SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 15. 
611 WARD A. (2014): p. 1413-1415. 
612 Opinion of AG SHARPSTON in Case C-427/06 Bartsch, para. 69. See KAILA H. (2012): p. 305-306; ROSAS A. (2012): p. 1280-
1281; SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 13; SARMIENTO D. (2013): p. 1272; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 215; WARD A. (2014): p. 1446. 
613 WARD A. (2014): p. 1435, 1451-1452, referring to Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 19. 
614 KAILA H. (2012): p. 303; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 154. 
615 WARD A. (2014): p. 1452. 
616 ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 8; ROSAS A. (2012): p. 1280-1281; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 215. 
617 HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1421; VAN BOCKEL B. – WATTEL P. (2013): p. 877-879; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 234; WARD A. 
(2014): p. 1451. It has also been suggested that the Union should have a ‘specific interest’ in the subject matter, in order for it to have 
jurisdiction, but the CJEU has not endorsed such an approach. See Opinion of AG CRUZ VILLALÓN in Case C-617/10 Åkerberg 
Fransson, para. 40. Also, see FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 322; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1415; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 215. 
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concerned […] impose any obligation on Member States with regard to the situation at 
issue in the main proceedings’.618 In Åkerberg Fransson, the connection to EU law was 
deemed sufficient, despite the fact that the tax penalties and criminal proceedings for 
breaches to declare VAT were only ‘connected in part’ to the Member State’s obligation 
under Union law to collect VAT.619 Even the mere existence of a Directive was considered 
sufficient in cases Mangold, Bartsch, Kücükdeveci and Römer, once the time-limit for 
national transposition had elapsed.620 
The Court’s case law on the scope of the Charter can be understood from a functional 
perspective as well as from the point of effectiveness of Union law. When assessing the 
applicability of the Charter, the first question that needs to be answered is whether the 
national legislation in the dispute affects the function of Union law.621 As illustrated by 
cases McB and N.S., domestic rules may be complementary and thus functionally related to 
the EU legal order.622 These functional criteria were specified in Iida, where the Court 
stated that ‘it must be ascertained among other things whether the national legislation at 
issue is intended to implement a provision of European Union law, what the character of 
that legislation is, and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by European 
Union law […] and also whether there are specific rules of European Union law on the 
matter or capable of affecting it’.623 These criteria reflect the subsidiarity application of the 
Charter as set out in Article 51(1) CFR. 
The functional relation between national measures, EU law and the Charter became 
even more apparent in Åkerberg Fransson. In this ruling, the national norms in question 
had not been adopted with the intention to implement Union law, but still gave effect to 
Member State obligations flowing from the EU.624 Consequently, the objective function of 
the national norm was decisive, irrespective of what had been its original subjective 
intention.625 The judgement must nevertheless be read in conjunction with the Court’s 
ruling in Siragusa, which stressed that Article 51(1) CFR still ‘requires a certain degree of 
                                                
618 Cases C-206/13 Siragusa, paras. 26-27; C-198/13 Hernandez, para. 35, both judgments referring to Case C-144/95 Maurin, paras. 11-
12. See WALKILA S. (2015): p. 162.  
619 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 24-25. See WARD A. (2014): p. 1432. 
620 Cases C-144/04 Mangold, para. 76; C-427/06 Bartsch, para. 17; C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, para. 25; C-147/08 Römer, para. 61. See 
GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) (2011b): p. 24-30; KAILA H. (2012): p. 311; PECH L. (2012): p. 1863-1865; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): 
p. 166; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 73; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 211-212. However, in discrimination cases the prohibition must 
derive from an EU norm of substantive nature and not a competence conferring norm, such as Article 19 TFEU on non-discrimination. See 
SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 13. 
621 LEBECK C. (2013): p. 459. 
622 Cases C-400/10 PPU McB, para. 52; C-411/10 & 493/10 N.S., para. 68. See SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 7-8, 11-12. 
623 Case C-40/11 Iida, para. 79, referring to Case C-309/96 Annibaldi, paras. 21-23. See also FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 320; LEBECK 
C. (2013): p. 459. 
624 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 24-27. See also Case C-650/13 Delvigne, paras. 33-39. Also, see FONTANELLI F. (2014): 
p. 219-220; MUIR E. (2014): p. 238. 
625 FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 333. 
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connection above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those 
matters having an indirect impact on the other’.626 In other words, the appreciation of the 
sufficient connection to EU law is ‘an assessment of degree, not one of existence.’627 
Domestic measures may be reviewed by the CJEU in the light of EU fundamental rights, 
whenever the measure in question can be objectively but concretely linked to the EU.628 
Apart from the functional approach to Charter applicability, the CJEU also takes into 
consideration the principle of effectiveness when establishing jurisdiction in the area of 
fundamental rights. Article 19 TEU obligates the Member States to ‘ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law’ and the CJEU, in turn, strives to uphold a 
uniform application of Union law among the Member States.629 Through references to the 
effet utile doctrine, the Court may thus establish a link between the Charter and domestic 
measures also in situations where national authorities do not formally execute obligations 
under EU law.630 For instance, in DEB, the Court held that German procedural rules 
denying legal persons legal aid made compensation claims under EU law excessively 
difficult or even practically impossible, in a way which conflicted with the principle of 
effective judicial protection under Article 47 CFR.631 Similarly, in Åkerberg Fransson, the 
relevant provisions of Swedish criminal law were not harmonised at EU level, but were 
still indirectly significant for the effective enforcement of tax operations under EU law. In 
order to not jeopardise the effectiveness of the Charter, the Court reiterated that ‘any 
[national] legislative, administrative or judicial practice […] which might prevent 
European Union rules from having full force and effect’ must be set aside.632 The same 
line of reasoning was followed in Melloni, where the Court reiterated that national 
procedural rules must not compromise ‘the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law’.633 
What emerges from the examination of the Charter’s field of application is an 
assumption about its coexistence with the general scope of EU law. In Åkerberg Fransson, 
the CJEU eventually confirmed the coinciding nature of the two and hence laid the basis 
for a doctrine of equivalence.634 In essence, ‘[t]he applicability of European Union law 
                                                
626 Case C-206/13 Siragusa, paras. 24. See also Case C-198/13 Hernandez, para. 34. 
627 FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 241-242. 
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entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.’ In other words, 
‘the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must […] be complied with where 
national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist 
which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights 
being applicable.’635 The Texdata judgement further clarified that ‘if national legislation 
falls within the scope of EU law, the Court, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, 
must provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the national court to 
determine whether that legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights’.636 
Based on the coinciding scopes of the Charter and general EU law, it may be concluded 
that Court has adopted an extensive understanding of Article 51(1) CFR.637 This naturally 
follows from the principle of conferral and the fact that the Charter, in accordance with 
Article 51(2) CFR, does not extend the competences of the Union.638 On the one hand, the 
invocation of fundamental rights under the Charter presupposes that the situation is 
governed by Union law.639 On the other hand, fundamental rights condition the application 
of EU law.640 Hence, the Union legal order does not allow for interpretations of EU norms 
in conflict with fundamental rights.641 
Notwithstanding the clarifications made by the CJEU with regard to the Charter’s scope 
of application, uncertainty pertains as to the general scope of EU law. In the end, it 
becomes obvious that the obscurity rather originates from the fluid nature of the Union 
legal order itself, and that the conditions for Charter applicability merely illustrates this 
problem.642 The Charter’s field of application develops in parallel with the competences of 
the Union.643 Because the legal order of the Union is constantly evolving, no fixed rules 
exist to identify its boundaries in relation to the domestic legal orders. Ultimately, a line 
between the two can only be drawn by the CJEU on a case-by-case basis.644 So far, 
however, the Court has not provided any comprehensible criteria to determine the outer 
                                                
635 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 21. 
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limits of Union law.645 
In fact, the Court itself experiences difficulties in addressing the question of the scope 
of EU law. Articles 19 TEU and 267 TFEU merely mandate the Court to interpret the 
Union legal order. It delivers its interpretation in the abstract, because it neither applies 
national law nor Union law directly to the situation in the main proceedings.646 This 
ambivalence is well illustrated by Zakria, where the national court, in essence, asked 
whether the Charter applies to the case. In its preliminary ruling, the Court first explained 
that it was ‘not in a position to determine whether the situation of the claimant in the main 
proceedings is governed by European Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter’, but only due to the lack of sufficient information regarding the main proceedings. 
Nevertheless, – and without giving any further guidance – the Court paradoxically 
concluded that ‘[i]t is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of the facts in the 
main proceedings, whether the situation of the claimant in the main proceedings is 
governed by European Union law’.647 Similarly, in Dereci, the Court gave an abstract 
answer to the question referred, but still concluded that it was for the national court to 
assess whether the concrete situation was covered by EU law in the first place.648 
Despite – or possibly because of – the fluid nature of EU law itself, concerns have been 
expressed about the potential of the legally binding Charter as an instrument for the CJEU 
to extend its powers. As is well known, it was the Court that initially took the lead in 
introducing fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. The Court’s initial 
requirements of Union measures respecting fundamental rights was gradually extended 
into areas where the EU had only limited influence, first through the obligation of Member 
States to respect fundamental rights when implementing, and later also when derogating 
from Union law.649 It is true that the functional approach and effectiveness of EU law have 
contributed to an extensive application of the Charter in cases such as Åkerberg 
Fransson.650 Still, cases like Dereci and Zakria appear to represent a more cautious 
approach to the applicability of the Charter.651 
All in all, the questions about the Charter as a source of ‘competence creep’, federal 
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integration or autonomous application of fundamental rights boil down to the applicability 
of other concepts of EU law, most prominently the economic freedoms of the Union and 
EU citizenship.652 As AG Kokott noted in Tas-Hagen, these two concepts have ‘a scope 
which is not restricted to specific matters.’653 Together with discrimination cases such as 
K.B., Maruko, Mangold, Kücükdeveci and Römer – which do not present any cross-border 
element – the economic freedoms and the citizenship of the Union have contributed to a 
significant decrease in utility of the doctrine of ‘purely internal’ situations falling outside 
the scope of EU law.654 As demonstrated in cases such as Pistre, Terhoeve, Guimont, 
Carpenter and Karner, internal situations can be brought within the ambit of Union law 
because the national measures in question compromise the effective exercise of economic 
freedoms.655 Likewise in Avello, Zhu and Rottman, national measures depriving EU 
citizens of the useful effect of their citizen rights have been held to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In Zambrano, the Court even extended its protection of the 
‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights’ attached to the EU citizenship to include 
a wholly domestic situation.656 As the law of the Union stands today, the existence of a 
‘purely internal’ situation can no longer be determined based on the lack of cross-border 
elements, but its meaning must be restricted to refer to areas of law where Member States 
retain their sovereign powers.657 
Regardless of whether the Charter is considered to extend the scope of EU citizenship 
or vice versa, its conditions of applicability remain unclear, or at least difficult to 
anticipate.658 This lack of legal certainty was addressed by AG Sharpston in her Opinion in 
Zambrano.659 From the case law of the CJEU, it is clear that neither EU citizenship nor the 
Charter extend the jurisdiction of the Court beyond the conferred powers of the Union.660 
Consequently, the AG chose to approach Article 51(1) CFR from the perspective of 
existing competences, rather than from the subject matter analysis normally applied by the 
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MUIR E. (2014): p. 233. 
653 Opinion of AG KOKOTT in Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen, para. 34. 
654 Cases C-117/01 K.B., paras. 30-34; C-267/06 Maruko, paras. 58-60; C-144/04 Mangold, paras. 37-38; C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, paras. 
23-27; C-147/08 Römer, paras. 34-36. See MUIR E. (2012): p. 17; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 165-166; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 
194-195, 206; MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 220. For purely internal situations falling outside the scope of EU law, see e.g. Cases C-175/78 
Saunders, para. 11; C-332/90 Bundespost, paras. 9-12; C-299/95 Kremzow, paras. 15-18; C-328/04 Vajnai, paras. 12-13. 
655 Cases C-321/94 – 324/94 Pistre, para. 44; C-18/95 Terhoeve, paras. 27-29; C-448/98 Guimont, paras. 19-22; C-60/00 Carpenter, para. 
37-39; C-71/02 Karner, paras. 19-22. See CHALMERS D. (2010): p. 143; ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 8; ANDERSON 
D. – MURPHY C.C. (2012): p. 165; WHEATHERILL S. (2013): p. 29; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 237. 
656 Cases C-148/02 Avello, paras. 22-25; C-200/02 Zhu, paras. 25-26, 44-47; C-135/08 Rottman, para. 43-46, 59; C-34/09 Zambrano, 
paras. 41-45. See SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 3; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1431; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 201, 206; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 
205-207. 
657 SHARPSTON E. (2012): p. 270. 
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CJEU.661 The suggestion echoes the civis europeus sum reasoning presented by AG Jacobs 
in Konstantinidis, where he in vain argued that an EU citizen should be ‘entitled to assume 
that, wherever he goes […] in the European Community, he will be treated in accordance 
with a common code of fundamental values’.662 
While the Court did not endorse Sharpston’s suggestion, her Opinion still remains both 
interesting and powerful, as she argued ‘that, in the long run, the clearest rule would be one 
that made the availability of EU fundamental rights protection dependent neither on 
whether a Treaty provision was directly applicable nor on whether secondary legislation 
had been enacted, but rather on the existence and scope of a material EU competence. To 
put the point another way: the rule would be that, provided that the EU had competence 
(whether exclusive or shared) in a particular area of law, EU fundamental rights should 
protect the citizen of the EU even if such competence has not yet been exercised.’663  
Although it must be recognised that Sharpston’s vision has the potential of reinforcing 
the federal structure of the EU, it might as well have an impact on the constitutionalisation 
of the Union legal order.664 Her competence-based approach offers a concrete connection 
to EU law, while still respecting the principle of conferral. It would give impulses for 
Member States to adopt a minimum level of protection in accordance with the Charter, 
especially in areas of shared competence where the EU has not yet acted. A reading of 
Article 51(1) CFR in line with the material competences of the Union would also support 
the genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship rights.665 Eventually, an extensive interpretation 
of Charter applicability could have the potential of further contributing to the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of Union law.666 Admittedly, this kind of interpretation would 
broaden the scope of application of the Charter. Nevertheless, the general scope of EU law 
would remain unaltered. As a consequence, the relative field of application of the Charter 
would endure in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.667 
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4 Expressions of Subsidiarity in the Application of the Charter 
4.1 Balancing Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Rights under the 
Charter 
4.1.1 The Relation between Fundamental Rights and Economic Freedoms 
Agreeably, the European integration process was originally built on a basis of economic 
cooperation.668 As a consequence, it has been maintained, on the one hand, that EU 
fundamental rights protection is submitted to the forces of the market and thus constitutes a 
means of integration rather than an end in itself.669 On the other hand, social considerations 
in the form of fundamental rights have formed an integral part of the internal market since 
the 1970’s. The CJEU has actively been involved in the protection of fundamental rights 
long before the formal introduction of fundamental rights in the Maastricht Treaty or the 
definition of the EU as a ‘social market economy’ in the Lisbon Treaty.670 
Arguably, fundamental concepts such as primacy of Union law, free movement and EU 
citizenship were essential to the penetration of fundamental rights into the Union legal 
order.671 Conversely, the proper functioning of the economic freedoms is dependent on the 
effective guarantee of fundamental rights, such as the right to property, liberty and equal 
treatment.672 Given this complementarity, economic freedoms and fundamental rights are 
inherently intertwined within the EU legal system.673 As a fact, the CJEU itself has 
qualified the economic freedoms as fundamental rights.674 
The intertwinement of economic freedoms and fundamental rights is emphasised not 
only by their mutual status as EU primary law, but also by the Charter. Its Preamble 
affirms that the EU preserves ‘common values’ and ‘ensures the free movement of 
persons, services, goods and capital, and the freedom of establishment.” The provisions of 
the Charter comprise civil rights crucial to the exercise of economic activity and free 
                                                
668 TUORI K. (2010): p. 15-17; AUGENSTEIN D. (2013): p. 1918. 
669 COPPEL J. – O’NEILL A. (1992): p. 691-692; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 302; CARTABIA M. (2012): p. 264-265; SCHIEK D. 
(2012): p. 223; AUGENSTEIN D. (2013): p. 1917. 
670 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 212; BARNARD C. (2013): p. 46; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 59-60; WHEATHERILL S. 
(2013): p. 35-36. See Article F of the Maastricht Treaty and Article 3(3) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. For early notable 
judgments, see e.g. Case C-11/70 Handelsgesellschaft, para. 4; C-43/75 Defrenne I, para. 10. 
671 MURPHY D.T. (1994): p. 81; CUNHA RODRIGUES J. N. (2010): p. 96; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 205-206, 213; RAITIO 
J. (2013): p. 523. 
672 PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 8; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 84; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 115. 
673 LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 305; TRSTENJAK V. (2013): p. 309-310. 
674 See e.g. Cases C-152/82 Forcheri, para. 11; C-222/86 Heylens, para. 14; C-49/89 Corsica, para. 8; C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37; C-
415/93 Bosman, para. 129. See LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 302; MICKLITZ H.-W. (2012): p. 361; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 261; WALKILA 
S. (2015): p. 114. Also, see Opinion of AG STIX-HACKL in Case C-36/02 Omega, para. 50. The economic freedoms of the EU (Articles 
26 TFEU) comprises the free movement of goods (Articles 34-36 TFEU), persons (Articles 20(2), 21 and 45 TFEU), services (Articles 49 
and 56 TFEU) and capital (Articles 63-65 TFEU). 
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movement in general, but also social and economic rights in particular. Moreover, the it 
contains Articles that coincides with the Treaty provisions on some of the economic 
freedoms. For instance, Article 15(2) ensures the right to engage in work in any Member 
State and Article 16 guarantees the freedom to conduct a business. 
Article 45 CFR enhances the EU citizens’ right to free movement, as enshrined in 
Articles 20(2) and 21 TFEU.675 Because the right in question is quite abstractly formulated, 
it is nevertheless necessary to rely on the relevant Treaty provisions for its 
interpretation.676 As pointed out by the Court in Zeman, Article 45 CFR must be 
interpreted in the light of Article 45 TFEU.677 As an expression of subsidiarity, Article 
52(2) CFR further specifies that rights with corresponding Treaty provisions ‘shall be 
exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.’ Similarly, 
Article 53 provides that nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or 
adversely affecting fundamental rights recognised elsewhere in EU law. In other words, 
the economic provisions of the Charter must not be understood as replacing the provisions 
on free movement enshrined in the Treaties, but rather as guaranteeing a minimum level of 
protection of the rights attached thereto.678 
In contrast to fundamental rights under the Charter, the economic freedoms under the 
Treaties have an autonomous scope of application. However, this does not mean that a 
hierarchy would prevail between the two.679 The subsidiary quality of Charter rights does 
not deprive them of their normative force. While economic freedoms may operate 
independently and provide a legislative basis for the Union, fundamental rights conditions 
the legality of all acts of EU law.680 Given the ‘broad convergence both in terms of 
structure and content’ of economic freedoms and fundamental rights, ‘it would be a 
mistake to seek to construct a generally conflictual or hierarchical relation between 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms’, as argued by AG Trstenjak in Commission 
v Germany.681 Bearing in mind the Union’s constant reconciliation of a plurality of values, 
                                                
675 Explanations to Article 45 CFR. See MENÉNDEZ A.J. (2002): p. 477; ROSAS A. – KAILA H. (2011): p. 17; AUGENSTEIN D. 
(2013): p. 1937; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 84; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 259-261; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 167. However, the fact that the 
Charter does not explicitly codify all the economic freedoms, may also be understood as a wish to keep them separate from fundamental 
rights. See WALKILA S. (2015): p. 115. 
676 MENÉNDEZ A.J. (2002): p. 477; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 260-261. 
677 Case C-543/12 Zeman, para. 39. See also Cases; C-162/09 Lassal, para. 29; C-434/09 McCarthy, para. 27. Also, see Case C-367/12 
Seebacher, paras. 20-22, regarding the relation between Article 16 CFR and Article 49 TFEU. 
678 BESSELINK L.F.M. (2001): p. 73; CRAIG P. (2012c): p. 226; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 141. 
679 PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 9; TRIDIMAS T. (2006): p. 339; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 162; DE VRIES S.A. 
(2013b): p. 87-88; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 116. Cf. PARMAR S. (2001): p. 354; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 295-298, 302; 
AUGENSTEIN D. (2013): p. 1937. 
680 LEBECK C. (2013): p. 44; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 118. 
681 Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany, paras. 183-199. 
 
 
88 
it is only natural that tensions arise between economic objectives and social policies.682 
With respect to their mutual constitutional status within the Union legal order, collisions 
between fundamental rights and economic freedoms must ultimately be solved through 
their respective balancing by the CJEU.683 This judicial levelling presupposes that both 
economic freedoms and fundamental rights are legitimate factors to consider when 
reconciling individual rights with public interests, on the one hand, and the divisions of 
competences between the Member States and the EU, on the other.684 
Because the weighing of different interests is done with regard to the specific 
circumstances of each case, the outcome of individual judgments may vary. Whether the 
balance is struck in favour of economic or social interests in a particular case, therefore, 
does not allow for any far-reaching conclusions.685 In order to understand the relation 
between economic freedoms and fundamental rights, instead, it is necessary to examine the 
general approach that the CJEU takes when engaging in their respective balancing. 
Essentially, the question lies in whether fundamental rights under the Charter operate on an 
equal basis with the economic freedoms, as one of many factors to consider within the EU 
legal system. When economic and social interests are balanced, do fundamental rights 
function merely as justifications to restrictions on free movement, or do economic 
freedoms as well have to justify restrictions on fundamental rights?686 
4.1.2 Economic Freedoms, Fundamental Rights and Their Respective 
Restrictions in the Light of the Charter 
‘[S]ince 1 December 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, it has been 
necessary to take into account a number of provisions of primary social law which affect 
the framework of the fundamental [economic] freedoms’, as pointed out by AG Villalón 
Cruz in Palhota.687 Article 6 TEU together with the legally binding Charter emphasise the 
importance of interpreting economic freedoms with due regard to fundamental rights.688 
Consistently with the case law of the CJEU, fundamental rights condition the exercise of 
regulatory measures of the Union and its Member States when they act within the scope of 
                                                
682 PARMAR S. (2001): p. 354; MENÉNDEZ A.J. (2002): p. 477-478; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 294; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): 
p. 212-213; WHEATHERILL S. (2013): p. 29. 
683 TUORI K. (2010): p. 28-29; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 83; SARMIENTO D. (2013): p. 1297; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 250. 
684 WEILER J.H.H. (1999): p. 106-107, 120; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 94. 
685 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 212-213; DE VRIES S.A. (2013a): p. 191; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 530; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 20. 
686 WHEATHERILL S. (2004): p. 201; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 302; TUORI K. (2010): p. 28-29; AUGENSTEIN D. (2013): p. 1935; 
DE VRIES S.A. (2013a): p. 188; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 88. Cf. the system of protection under the ECHR, which is said to operate 
based on the logic that economic interests must be justified as exceptions to human rights, rather than vice versa. 
687 Opinion of AG VILLALÓN CRUZ in Case C-515/08 Palhota, para. 51. 
688 DE VRIES S.A. (2013a): p. 188; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 117. 
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EU law.689 When implementing Union law, Member States have to ensure that a fair 
balance is struck between the economic objectives involved and the different fundamental 
rights concerned.690 Conversely, when restricting fundamental freedoms, the national 
derogating measures have to be appreciated in the light of EU fundamental rights.691 As 
confirmed by the Court in the post-Lisbon case Pfleger, ‘unjustified or disproportionate 
restrictions of the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU is also not permitted 
under Article 52(1) of the Charter in relation to Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter.’692 
However, fundamental rights are not absolute or fixed standards, but must be carefully 
balanced against other legitimate interests affecting the subject matter.693 In accordance 
with Article 52(1) CFR, ‘[a]ny limitation […] must be provided for by law and respect the 
essence of [Charter] rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.’ In other words, restrictions on fundamental rights are not considered violations, as 
long as they can be justified and respect the substantive core of the rights in question.694 As 
a result, the mere applicability of a given fundamental right does not in itself dictate the 
outcome of an individual case.695 For instance, in Delvigne, Articles 39(2) and 49(1) CFR 
did not preclude the deprivation of the right to vote from EU citizen convicted of serious 
crime.696 Notwithstanding this derogation option, it must be noted that rights considered as 
non-derogable under the ECHR, are also absolute in accordance with Article 52(3) CFR. 
Similarly, derogations under the Charter cannot go further than derogations under the 
ECHR due to their mutual level of minimum protection.697 
 Referring to the Charter, the CJEU quashed the General Court’s ruling in Knauf, 
                                                
689 WEILER J.H.H. (1999): p. 120; BESSELINK L.F.M. (2001): p. 78-79; WHEATHERILL S. (2004): p. 203-204; TRIDIMAS T. 
(2010): p. 103; SARMIENTO D. (2013): p. 1299. See e.g. Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 19. 
690 FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 317-318; ANAGNOSTARAS G. (2014): p. 122. See e.g. Cases C-5/88 Wachauf, paras. 17-22; C-274/99 
P Connolly, paras. 40-41, 49; C-465/00, C-138/01 & 139/01 Rundfunk, para. 83; C-101/01 Lindqvist, para. 91. 
691 WHEATHERILL S. (2004): p. 203; GROUSSOT X. (et.al) (2013): p. 114-115; AUGENSTEIN D. (2013): p. 1934; WHEATHERILL 
S. (2013): p. 23. DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 208; See e.g. Case C-260/89 ERT, paras. 41-43 
692 Case C-390/12 Pfleger, para. 59. See also Cases C-391/09 Wardyn, paras. 89-91; C-98/14 Berlington, paras. 90-92. 
693 BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): p. 639; ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 15; AZOULAI L. (2012): p. 214; DE VRIES S.A. 
(2013b): p. 75-76; TRSTENJAK V. (2013): p. 300; OJANEN T. (2014): p. 533. See also Opinion of AG POIARES MADURO in Case C-
305/05 Ordre des barreaux, para. 49. 
694 BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): p. 634; LENAERTS K. – DE SMIJTER E. (2001): p. 97; LINDFELT M. (2007): p. 297; KUMM. M. 
(2010): p. 115; SCHLÜTTER B. (2010): p. 4-5. See e.g. Cases C-4/73 Nold, para. 14; C-44/79 Hauer; C-5/88 Wachauf, para. 18; C-
112/00 Schmidberger, para. 80; C-62/90 Medicinal Products, para. 23; C-404/92 P X, para. 18; C-145/04 Spain v UK, para. 94. 
695 RAITIO J. (2013): p. 523, 528; MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 226. See e.g. Cases C-71/02 Karner, para. 50-53; C-470/03 COS.MET, 
paras. 72-73, regarding freedom of expression. 
696 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, paras. 46, 58; See also e.g. Cases C-291/12 Schwartz, paras. 35-39; C-237/15 PPU Lanigan, para. 55. 
697 BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): p. 652; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 66-67; PEERS S. – PRECHAL S. (2014): p. 1469-1470; WARD A. 
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because restrictions of Article 47 CFR had not been provided for by law.698 Conversely, in 
Melloni, the Court held that the right to an effective judicial remedy under Article 47 CFR 
had lawfully been restricted.699 Similarly, in Sky, it was stated that Article 16 CFR on ‘the 
freedom to conduct a business may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part 
of public authorities which may limit the exercise of economic activity in the public 
interest.’700 Contrariwise, in Alemo, Article 16 CFR did not entitle ‘the Member States to 
take measures which, while being more favourable to employees, are liable to adversely 
affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business’.701 
In order to lawfully restrict a fundamental right, the measures must not only be 
objectively justified, but also proportionately balanced with regard to the general interests 
involved, the protection of fundamental rights of others and the particular circumstance of 
the case.702 Hence, alongside the subsidiarity principle, the scope of fundamental rights 
protection under the Charter is governed by the principle of proportionality.703 In the 
search for the optimal balance in Commission v Germany, AG Trstenjak emphasised that 
‘[f]or the purposes of drawing an exact boundary between fundamental [economic] 
freedoms and fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality is of particular 
importance. In that context, for the purposes of evaluating proportionality, in particular, a 
three-stage scheme of analysis must be deployed where (1) the appropriateness, (2) the 
necessity and (3) the reasonableness of the measure in question must be reviewed.’704 
For illustration, when assessing the proportionality of EU actions against Articles 7 and 
8 CFR in Digital Rights, the Court emphasised that ‘where interferences with fundamental 
rights are at issue, the extent of the EU legislature’s discretion may prove to be limited, 
depending on a number of factors, including, in particular, the area concerned, the nature 
of the right guaranteed by the Charter, the nature and seriousness of the interference and 
the object pursued by the interference’. Inherent to the subsidiarity principle, ‘the principle 
of proportionality requires that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the 
legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of 
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699 Case C-399/11 Melloni, para. 49. See also Case C-619/10 Trade Agency, paras. 52, 55. See TORRES PÉREZ A. (2014): p. 313. 
700 Case C-283/11 Sky, para. 46. See also Cases C-348/12 P Naft, para. 123; C-390/12 Pfleger, para. 58. 
701 Case C-426/11 Alemo, para. 36, referring by analogy to Case C-544/10 Weintor, paras. 54, 58. See BARTL M. – LEONE C. (2015): p. 
146-149, 15. 
702 See e.g. Cases C-275/06 Promusicae, para. 68; C-468/10 & 469/10 ASNEF, paras. 40, 43. 
703 BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): p. 639; SANKARI S. (2010): p. 212; BARNARD C. (2013): p. 47; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 36-37, 447; 
MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 42-43; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 20. 
704 Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany, para. 189. See also GROUSSOT X. (2006): p. 146-152; 
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what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those objectives’.705 While there is no 
exact formula for assessing proportionality, it is suggested that the Charter may contribute 
to increased transparency in the proportionality review of restrictive measures.706 
Following the judgements in Viking and Laval, it has been argued that the CJEU treats 
fundamental rights as obstacles to free movement, rather than as objectives of the Union in 
themselves.707 With reference to their intertwined character and respective status as 
primary law, it has therefore been suggested that the Court should engage in a true 
balancing-act by applying a double proportionality test.708 Fundamental rights should not 
be understood as exceptions to the rules on free movement, but in the words of AG 
Trstenjak in Commission v Germany, ‘a fair balance between both of those legal positions 
must be sought. In that regard, it must be presumed that the realisation of a fundamental 
[economic] freedom constitutes a legitimate objective which may limit a fundamental 
right. Conversely, however, the realisation of a fundamental right must be recognised also 
as a legitimate objective which may restrict a fundamental [economic] freedom.’709 
Since the Charter became legally binding, increased tendencies towards such a line of 
reasoning can be identified in Pfleger, where the Court indicated that ‘[n]ational legislation 
that is restrictive from the point of view of Article 56 TFEU […] is also capable of limiting 
the freedom to choose an occupation, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to 
property enshrined in Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter.’ In other words, ‘Article 56 TFEU 
covers also possible limitations of the exercise of the rights and freedoms provided for in 
Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter, so that a separate examination is not necessary.’710 
However, already in Karner the Court reviewed the respect for fundamental rights, even 
though it had not found any restriction of the free movement in the case.711 
Evidently, economic freedoms may be subject to limitations in the same way as 
fundamental rights.712 However, whereas the CJEU in ERT confirmed that restrictions of 
the free movement have to comply with fundamental rights, in Schmidberger and Omega it 
                                                
705 Cases C-293/12 & 594/12 Digital Rights, paras. 46-47. See also Cases C-343/09 Afton, para. 45; C-92/09 & 93/09 Schecke, 74; C-
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710 Case C-390/12 Pfleger, paras. 57, 60. See also Cases C-233/12 Gardella, paras. 39-41; C-98/14 Berlington, paras. 90-91. Also, see 
PEERS S. – PRECHAL S. (2014): p. 1489-1490. 
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established that fundamental rights may also in themselves provoke derogations from the 
economic freedoms.713 This line of cases can be traced back to the ruling on mandatory 
requirements in Cassis de Dijon and demonstrates the Courts evolving inclination to 
consider social interests in parallel with economic objectives.714 Similarly, in Familiapress, 
the Court held that the ‘[m]aintenance of press diversity may constitute an overriding 
requirement justifying a restriction on free movement of goods. Such diversity helps to 
safeguard freedom of expression’.715 
As evidenced by Sayn-Wittgenstein, Article 51(1) CFR applies also in situations where 
Member States invoke fundamental rights as reasons for derogating from the economic 
freedoms.716 With reference to Article 21 CFR, the CJEU held that ‘it does not appear 
disproportionate for a Member State to seek to attain the objective of protecting the 
principle of equal treatment by prohibiting […] titles of nobility […]. [R]efusing to 
recognise the noble elements of a name […] cannot be regarded as a measure unjustifiably 
undermining the freedom to move and reside enjoyed by citizens of the Union.’717 
Similarly, the best interest of the child in Article 24(1) CFR was used to justify the 
prohibition of selling image storage media lacking age-limit labelling in Dynamic 
Medien.718 On the one side, positive evaluators of the Charter’s impact on free movement 
claim that it is likely to facilitate the justification of national exemptions from economic 
freedoms.719 Critics, on the other side, point out that the Charter merely operates as a 
justification to exceptions from the economic freedoms and not vice versa.720 
In any case, the balancing of fundamental rights and economic freedoms well illustrates 
the constitutional nature of collisions that may arise between the two. After all, the Court’s 
delicate reconciliation of fundamental rights with other general and individual interests 
touches upon the division of competences as well as sensitive economic, social and moral 
issues.721 Rulings such as Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein exceptionally allow national 
fundamental rights to prevail over economic EU objectives and may thus – in the spirit of 
constitutional pluralism – be said to accord Member States a certain margin of discretion 
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when it comes to their most fundamental values.722 This observation is highlighted by the 
Court’s reference in Sayn-Wittgenstein to national constitutional identity under Article 4(2) 
TEU.723 Ultimately, the Union’s respect for the Member State’s constitutional identity may 
be understood as a form of judicial subsidiarity imposed on the CJEU.724 
While the case law of the CJEU conveys tendencies speaking both for and against the 
subsidiarity of fundamental rights in relation to free movement, it appears safe to conclude 
that, at least, fundamental rights have not become primary to the economic freedoms. After 
all, the respect for fundamental rights represents only one of several objectives and values 
that need to be balanced. Whilst respecting the core of both economic freedoms and 
fundamental rights, the Court must strike a fair balance between the unity of the Union 
legal order and the diversity of the Member States’ constitutional traditions. 
4.2 The Application of the Charter in Conjunction with Other Norms 
of EU Law 
4.2.1 The Question of the Charter’s Direct Effect or Direct Applicability 
As primary law, the Charter is to be observed by the Union and its Member States when 
acting within the scope of EU law. In other words, it does not need any further 
implementation to be binding.725 This suggests that the Charter could be invoked even 
before domestic courts and thus – potentially – also have direct effect. Admittedly, the 
principle of direct effect is closely linked to the principle of primacy. Through these two 
constitutional principles, the Union legal order retains its force and autonomous nature.726 
However, it must be kept in mind that primacy of EU law is not synonymous with direct 
effect.727 While the Charter has primacy over national law, this does not automatically 
mean that it would also have direct effect. 
The concept of direct effect is not enshrined in the Treaties, but can be traced back to 
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invoked as a justification for restrictions of or on the basis of fundamental rights. See MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 468-469, referring to e.g. 
Cases C-58/13 & 59/13 Torresi, paras. 54-59; C-202/11 Las, paras. 26-27; C-393/10 O’Brien, para. 49; C-391/09 Wardyn, paras. 87-88; 
C-51/08 Commission v Luxembourg, paras. 72, 124. 
724 KOMBOS C. (2006): p. 435; LENAERTS K. – GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2011): p. 193; BIONDI A. (2012): p. 223; ROSAS A. – 
ARMATI L. (2012): p. 71; DELMAS-MARTY M. (2013): p. 332; GROUSSOT X. – BOGOJEVIĆ S. (2014): p. 244; WHEATHERILL 
S. (2013): p. 31; CHRONOWSKI N. (2014): p. 17; MUIR E. (2014): p. 243; MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 438-448. 
725 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 110; PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 38; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 258; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): 
p. 76; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 41. In the early case law of the CJEU, the concepts of direct applicability and direct effect are used 
interchangeably. See e.g. Cases C-26/62 Van Gend, section B; C-41/74 Van Duyn, para. 12. 
726 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 76-79; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 40. 
727 DE WITTE B. (2010): p. 12. 
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Van Gend, where the CJEU emphasised that the Member States ‘have acknowledged that 
Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before courts and 
tribunals.’728 In its broad sense, direct effect refers to situations where an EU norm has an 
autonomous and immediate impact on the legal order of a Member State, such as providing 
a free-standing ground for judicial review. In accordance with this concept of objective 
direct effect,729 any EU norm deemed to have direct effect can be immediately and 
independently relied on before national courts.730 
Another question is, however, whether an EU norm may have subjective direct effect,731 
in other words whether it is capable of directly conferring substantive rights or obligations 
on private parties.732 Individual rights may follow from a directly effective EU norm, but 
the former is not a condition of the latter.733 Hence, in a narrower sense, the question of the 
Charter’s direct effect refers to its potential to create free-standing rights and obligations 
that can be invoked before national courts by its active addressees.734 ‘Independently of the 
legislation of the Member States, Community law […] not only imposes obligations on 
individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but 
also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon 
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the 
Community’, as explained by the Court in Van Gend.735 
Independently of whether an EU norm intends to confer substantive rights on 
individuals or not, the case law of the CJEU establishes that it must be unconditional, 
sufficiently clear and precise, in order to be directly effective.736 These requirements of 
clarity, precision and unconditionality serve to identify norms that can be directly relied on 
and immediately justiciable before national courts.737 In essence, objective direct effect 
pertains to the direct invocability of an EU norm at national level. Its character is thus 
                                                
728 Case C-26/62 Van Gend, section B. See CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 181-182; MUTANEN A. (2015): p. 79. 
729 EDWARD D. (1998): p. 442; VAN GERVEN W. (2000): p. 506; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 181-182. 
730 WINTER J.A. (1972): p. 425; RAITIO J. (2003): p. 108; PRECHAL S. (2005): p. 226-270; DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 933-935; 
PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 37; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 67. 
731 EDWARD D. (1998): p. 442; VAN GERVEN W. (2000): p. 506; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 181-182. 
732 CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 180; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 76. 
733 The question of whether a norm of EU law has the capacity to vest individuals with substantive rights (subjective direct effect) has 
sometimes been equated with the question of whether the norm can be immediately and autonomously relied on before national courts 
(objective direct effect). See ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 76-77; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 63-64, 89. 
734 DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 933-934. 
735 Case C-26/62 Van Gend, section B. 
736 E.g. Cases C-26/62 Van Gend, section B; C-13/68 Salgoil, p. 460; C-9/70 Grad, para. 9; C-2/74 Reyners, para. 10; C-41/74 Van Duyn, 
paras. 5-7, 12-15; C-6/90 & 9/90 Francovich, para. 11; C-156/91 Hansa Fleisch, paras. 12-21; C-62/00 Marks & Spencer, para. 25; C-
397/01 – 403/01 Pfeiffer, para. 103; C-268/06 Impact, paras. 59-68. See DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 935; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. 
(2011): p. 180; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 84. 
737 DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 933-934, 942-943. 
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primarily procedural. Subjective direct effect, however, additionally requires that a norm is 
capable of conferring individual rights or obligations. Hence, it relates not only to the 
immediate justiciability of the norm at national level, but more importantly to its 
substance.738 Due to the fact that fundamental right guarantees can be more vaguely 
formulated than other EU provisions, the conditions for direct effect must be appreciated 
with special attention to the facts of the case and other related norms of EU law.739 
With regard to the specific circumstances of each case, the CJEU will examine the 
invoked EU right or obligation in order to determine whether its normative content is 
unconditional, sufficiently clear and precise for the purpose of direct effect.740 In cases 
such as Defrenne I, Viking Line, Laval, Mangold and Kücükdeveci private parties have 
been entitled to rely directly on EU norms of a fundamental rights character before 
national courts.741 In fact, the Court has accorded norms subjective direct effect 
irrespectively of their ‘source, character, or rank in hierarchy’. Rather, the decisive quality 
has been their ‘remedial force’, capable of sufficiently ascertaining substantive rights or 
obligations that can be cognised by national courts.742 
The direct invocability and immediate justiciability of EU fundamental rights at 
national level can further be categorised in terms of vertical or horizontal impact.743 
Vertical direct effect was established in Van Gend, where the CJEU held that a negative 
obligation of the Member State can be directly relied on by a private party before a 
national court.744 In Lutticke, the Court later confirmed that also positive Member State 
obligations can be directly justiciable in national proceedings, thus creating rights for 
private parties.745 Conversely, horizontal direct effect refers to situations where an EU 
norm may be directly relied on in national proceedings between private parties, as was the 
case in Defrenne I.746 The horizontal effect of fundamental rights is not decisively 
consolidated in either primary or secondary EU law, but its evolution has been 
characterised by a continuous extension into relations between private parties.747 The 
question nevertheless pertains as to whether and to what extent provisions of the Charter 
                                                
738 PRECHAL S. (2005): p. 105-106; PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 37; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 64-65. 
739 WALKILA S. (2015): p. 248. 
740 WALKILA S. (2015): p. 84, 244, 250. 
741 Cases C-43/75 Defrenne I, paras. 24, 39; C-341/05 Laval, paras. 97-100; C-438/05 Viking Line, para. 61; C-144/04 Mangold, para. 77; 
C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, para. 51. 
742 WALKILA S. (2015): p. 80-84, 235-236. See also DUTHEIL DE LA ROSCHÈRE J. (2009): p. 122. 
743 DE MOL (2011): p. 110-111; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 79-80, 179-180; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 41; MUTANEN A. (2015): 
p. 79; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 67. 
744 Case C-26/62 Van Gend, section B. 
745 Case C-57/65 Lutticke, p. 210-211. 
746 Case C-43/75 Defrenne I, paras. 24, 39. See also e.g. Cases C-281/98 Angonese, paras. 34-35; C-453/99 Courage, paras. 23-24 ; C-
144/04 Mangold, para. 77; C-438/05 Viking Line, para. 61; C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, para. 51. 
747 WALKILA S. (2015): p. 4-5. 
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may have either vertical or horizontal direct effect. 
Similarly to the appreciation of other EU fundamental rights norms, the direct effect of 
Charter provisions must be examined in the light of their specific content and context.748 
Accordingly, the provisions must be unconditional, sufficiently clear and precise in order 
to produce direct effect at national level.749 Although the Court has never explicitly applied 
the doctrine on direct effect to provisions of the Charter, in AMS it still, in a comparable 
manner, held that ‘[i]t is […] clear from the wording of Article 27 of the Charter that, for 
this article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European 
Union or national law.’750 In Glatzel, alike, the Court found that Article 26 ‘cannot by 
itself confer on individuals a subjective right which they may invoke as such’.751 
In line with Article 52(5) CFR, the Court takes the position that fundamental principles 
need further implementation to be fully effective. As a consequence, Charter principles are 
judicially cognisable only through the interpretation of other EU norms. This need for a 
concretising legal basis must be understood independently from the requirement of a 
sufficient connection between the subject matter and EU law for the purpose of Article 
51(1) CFR.752 With reference to the Explanations and Protocol No. 30, the CJEU has 
confirmed that social rights, such as Articles 26 and 27 CFR, cannot in themselves be 
directly relied on at national level.753 Due to their incomplete character, seemingly, 
principle-like fundamental rights were never intended to have direct effect.754 
Given the reasons to why Charter principles would not be capable of producing direct 
effect at national level, it may seem appealing to presume that Charter rights would, a 
contrario, be directly effective. Indeed, it has been argued that at least some of the rights 
and freedoms of the Charter may have direct effect and thus be cognisable before national 
courts, even between private parties.755 As a fact, the drafting Convention held that there 
are rights in the Charter ‘which are clearly amenable to the law.’756 Further to this, the 
                                                
748 WALKILA S. (2015): p. 236, 259. 
749 CURTIN D. – VAN OOIK R. (2001): p. 111-112; DE MOL M. (2012): p. 297. 
750 Case C-176/12 AMS, paras. 45-47. See LAZZERINI N. (2014): p. 925-928. 
751 Case C-356/12 Glatzel, para. 78. 
752 WARD A. (2014): p. 1417. 
753 Explanations to Article 52(5) CFR. Article 1(2) of Protocol No. 30 on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. See e.g. Cases C-176/12 AMS, paras. 45-47; C-
356/12 Glatzel, para. 78. 
754 OJANEN T. (2003): p. 675; DUTHEIL DE LA ROSCHÈRE J. (2009): p. 125-126; DE MOL M. (2012): p. 297; ROSAS A. – 
ARMATI L. (2012): p. 178; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 86-87; PEERS S. – PRECHAL S. (2014): p. 1511; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 243-
245, 248. Nevertheless, drawing inspiration from Article 28 CFR, the CJEU granted direct horizontal effect to the right to collective action 
as a general principle of EU law in Case C-438/05 Viking Line, para. 61. 
755 CURTIN D. – VAN OOIK R. (2001): p. 111-112; PECH L. (2012): p. 1872-1873, 1879; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 178-179; 
GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) (2013): p. 106; LAZZERINI N. (2014): p. 921-932. 
756 Draft Charter, CHARTE 4111/00, 20.1.2000, para. 20. 
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CJEU in AMS stated that ‘the facts of the case may be distinguished from those which gave 
rise to Kücükdeveci in so far as the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age at 
issue in that case, laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer 
on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as such.’757 In AMS, the Court 
thus seemed to imply that some rights of the Charter might – at least under specific 
circumstances – produce direct effects at national level.758 What made Kücükdeveci 
different, in the words of AG Trstenjak in Dominguez, was the fact that ‘[t]he distinctive 
feature of prohibitions on discrimination is that their substantive core is essentially 
identical at both primary and secondary law levels.’759 
In line with settled case law, however, the CJEU has retained its requirement of a 
concrete connection between the subject matter and an EU norm, other than the Charter.760 
Notwithstanding its status as primary law, the Charter appears to lack the capacity of direct 
effect.761 With reference to Article 51(1), the Court has confirmed the secondary nature of 
the Charter, rather than affirmed that it would be capable of having direct effect at national 
level. In line with the subsidiarity principle of the Charter, it is therefore submitted that the 
direct invocability of fundamental rights is best ensured through national legislation. 
Alternatively, direct effect can be accorded to certain provisions of the Treaties and 
secondary legislation, if the Union is better placed to guarantee certain rights, such as 
rights stemming from the economic freedoms or EU citizenship.762 
Intuitively, the possible existence of a fundamental rights rationale in terms of 
subsidiarity was also implicitly addressed by AG Sharpston in Zambrano, where she 
criticised EU fundamental rights protection as being ‘partial and fragmented; that it is 
dependent on whether some relevant substantive provision has direct effect or whether the 
Council and the European Parliament have exercised legislative powers.’763 If the Court, 
on the contrary, deviated from its subsidiarity logic for the Charter and instead established 
its direct effect, it would be liable to open up for an uncountable number of possibilities to 
invoke fundamental rights within the Union legal order. Rather than having direct effect, it 
has therefore been argued that the rights and freedoms under the Charter should primarily 
                                                
757 Case C-176/12 AMS, para. 47, referring to Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, paras. 22, 51. 
758 ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 15; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 79. 
759 Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-282/10 Dominguez, para. 162. See DE MOL M. (2012): p. 289; LENAERTS K. – 
GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2014): p. 1579. 
760 C-198/13 Hernandez, paras. 34-35; C-92/14 Tudoran, paras. 44-48. See WALKILA S. (2015): p. 165, 178. 
761 DE MOL M. (2012): p. 296-297, referring to Case C-282/10 Dominguez. 
762 See e.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast, paras. 82-84, where the CJEU established that Article 21 TFEU has direct effect, conferring a free-
standing right of free movement on citizens of the Union who do not have any direct connection with the economic activities on the 
internal market. See DE MOL M. (2012): p. 302; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 260. 
763 Opinion of AG SHARPSTON in Case C-34/09 Zambrano, para. 170. See GROUSSOT X. (et.al) (2013): p. 104. 
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be guaranteed through the reliance on indirect effect.764 
In the end, irrespectively of whether the Charter is deemed to have a direct or merely 
indirect impact, its capacity of direct applicability at national level must not be 
disregarded. Namely, domestic courts can apply EU primary law directly regardless of 
whether it was intended to confer rights on private parties or not.765 As a fact, in Melki, the 
Court implied a possibility for a national tribunal to directly apply the Charter, on the 
condition that the situation at hand was brought into its scope by virtue of another norm of 
EU law.766 The Court’s judgement in Martín, delivered only few days after the Charter 
became legally binding, also seems to embrace the idea of the Charter as being directly 
applicable at national level. According to its ruling, Directive 85/577, interpreted in 
conjunction with Article 38 CFR, did not preclude a national court from declaring, of its 
own motion, a contract void ‘on the ground that the consumer was not informed of his 
right of cancellation, even though the consumer at no stage pleaded that the contract was 
void before the competent national courts.’767 Similarly, in Safe Harbour, ‘Directive 95/46, 
read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter […] [did] not prevent a supervisory 
authority of a Member State […] from examining the claim of a person concerning the 
protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to 
him which has been transferred from a Member State to that third country’.768 Direct 
applicability of the Charter is also evidenced by its invalidation of EU secondary 
legislation in Schecke, Test-Achats, Digital Rights and Safe Harbour as well as by cases 
like in Melloni, where the Charter has been used to set aside national constitutional law.769  
In conclusion, it may be added that the direct applicability of the Charter is 
complemented by the principle of primacy. The Charter may not have direct effect and is 
thus lacking capacity to provide a normative substitute if the national legal order fails to 
guarantee a given right or obligation. While the Charter does not have the capacity to fill 
normative gaps in the national legal order, the principle of primacy may still exclude 
national legislation, if deemed to be in conflict with EU law.770 With reference to the 
                                                
764 RAITIO J. (2013): p. 361; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 268. 
765 BENGOETXEA J. (2008): p. 9-10. 
766 Cases C-188/10 & 189/10 Melki, para. 55. See MUIR E. (2012): p. 20; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 72; CHRONOWSKI N. 
(2014): p. 15. 
767 Case C-227/08 Martín, paras. 17, 36, regarding Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect 
of contracts negotiated away from business premises. See LEBECK C. (2013): p. 287-288. 
768 Case C-362/14 Safe Harbour, para. 66. See European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
769 Cases C-92/09 & 93/09 Schecke, paras. 87-89; C-236/09 Test-Achats, para. 32; C-293/12 & 594/12 Digital Rights, para. 69; C-362/14 
Safe Harbour, para. 105. See also C-399/11 Melloni, paras. 54, 64. 
770 MUIR E. (2012): p. 8; LENAERTS K. – GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2014): p. 1575-1576. 
 
 
99 
primacy of Union law, national provisions declared incompatible with the Charter can be 
set aside. In other words, the primacy of the Charter may contribute to the enforcement of 
EU fundamental rights at national level, even though its provisions are not considered to be 
unconditional, sufficiently clear and precise to produce direct effect.771  
4.2.2 Indirect Effect and the Interpretative Value of the Charter 
Although the Charter, due to its subsidiarity, does not have an autonomous scope of 
application or direct effect, it still conditions the interpretation and application of EU law 
through its indirect effect. In line with the principle of consistent interpretation or indirect 
effect, a norm that brings the subject matter within the scope of EU law must be interpreted 
as far as possible in harmony with its wording and objectives.772 This obligation of 
harmonious interpretation entails the interpretation of EU law in the light of fundamental 
rights.773 With regard to the Charter, the CJEU confirmed in Åkerberg Fransson that there 
can be no situations in EU law where fundamental rights do not apply.774 
The incorporation of fundamental rights into EU law not only contributed to its 
legitimacy as formal rules on the normative surface, but also influenced the legal culture 
and the underlying fundaments of the EU legal system.775 As an expression of common 
values, fundamental rights and principles offer guidance to the interpretation of EU law. In 
addition to enhanced constitutional guarantees of the Union, they increase legal certainty 
and contribute to the coherence and consistence of the Union legal order.776 The stronger 
impact guiding principles such as fundamental rights have on the judiciary, the more 
rational and predictable the judicial decision-making will be.777 
According to Article 51(1) CFR, the EU shall ‘respect the rights, observe the principles 
and promote the application thereof’ within the limits of its powers. Thereto, the principle 
of indirect effect presupposes that norms are interpreted with respect to their hierarchy.778 
                                                
771 On the concepts of substitutionary effect of directly effective EU norms and exclusionary effect of the principle of primacy of EU law, 
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772 See e.g. Cases C-51/76 Verbond; para. 11; C-14/83 Von Colson, para. 26; C-106/89 Marleasing, paras. 8-9; C-165/91 Van Munster, 
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100 
As suggested by AG Léger in Hautala, ‘the Charter […] should provide guidance’ and ‘the 
authorities responsible for applying it are under a strict requirement to give it a wide 
interpretation’.779 In other words, EU norms benefit from other – both higher and lower 
ranking – norms of EU law for their interpretation and concretisation.780 
Ultimately, the CJEU is responsible for ensuring that primary and secondary law is 
interpreted in compliance with the Charter.781 This interpretative obligation exists 
regardless of whether the norms in question have been implemented by Member States or 
the Union. For instance, in Strack, the Court overturned a ruling, because the General 
Court ‘should have favoured an interpretation […] which ensured the consistency […] 
with the right to paid annual leave as a principle […] affirmed by Article 31(2) of the 
Charter.’782 Nevertheless, in McB, the Court pointed out that the Charter ‘should be taken 
into consideration solely for the purpose of interpreting [EU law] and there should be no 
assessment of national law as such.’783  
Stemming from the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU, the 
provisions of the Charter have indirect effect also in the Member States ‘when they are 
implementing Union law’ for the purpose of Article 51(1) CFR. In this sense, the 
obligation of consistent interpretation may also contribute to a smoother incorporation of 
EU law into the national legal orders.784 Irrespective of whether Charter provisions are 
considered to have direct effect, their indirect effect prevails when Member States act 
within the scope of EU law.785 As established by the CJEU in Promusicae, national 
measures under EU law must comply with fundamental rights.786 This obligation concerns 
‘national law as a whole’.787 For instance, in Åkerberg Fransson, the Court held that 
national measures must comply with the Charter even though the national legislation in 
question was not intended to implement Union law.788 
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For purpose of harmonious interpretation, an EU measure ‘must be interpreted, as far as 
possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity and in conformity with primary law as a 
whole and, in particular, with the provisions of the Charter’.789 In this regard, the 
interpretative impact of the Charter may take a variety of expressions. For instance, the 
Court has used the Charter to evidence general principles of EU law, such as equal 
treatment and non-discrimination in cases like Kücükdeveci, Prigge, Chatzi and 
Soukupová.790 In Pérez, Weintor and Susisalo, the protection for human health under 
Article 168(1) TFEU was reinforced by Article 35 CFR.791 Furthermore, the Court has 
interpreted Directives in the light of the Charter in cases such as Danosa, Samba, ASNEF, 
Kott, XYZ and ABC, in order to determine the content and scope of substantive rights.792 
With reference to the Charter in PMOI, the Court validated a Council Decision restricting 
the right to be heard.793 Lastly, in DEB, national procedural rules were complemented by 
Article 47 CFR, making it possible also for legal persons to obtain legal aid in accordance 
with the principle of effective judicial protection.794 
In addition to the indirect effect that the Charter has on EU primary and secondary law, 
it can also have a restricting or conditioning impact on national legislation ‘implementing 
Union law’.795 For instance, in Berlington, the Court emphasised that ‘where a Member 
State relies on overriding requirements in the public interest […], such justification must 
also be interpreted in the light of […] the fundamental rights now guaranteed by the 
Charter’.796 Similary, in Kamberaj, the CJEU found that ‘when determining […] social 
protection measures defined by their national law’ for the purpose of a Directive, ‘Member 
States must comply with the rights and observe the principles provided for under the 
Charter’.797 In accordance with the principle of subsidiary, the Court held that ‘in so far as 
the benefit in question in the main proceedings fulfils the purpose set out in [Article 34(2)] 
of the Charter […] [i]t is for the referring court to reach the necessary findings, taking into 
consideration the objective of that benefit, its amount, the conditions subject to which it is 
                                                
789 Case C-579/12 Strack, para. 40. See also C-149/10 Chatzi, para. 43; C-12/11 McDonagh, para. 44. Also, see LENAERTS K. – 
GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2014): p. 1576. 
790 Cases C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, para. 21; C-447/09 Prigge, para. 38; C-149/10 Chatzi, para. 63; C-401/11 Soukupová, para. 28. 
791 Cases C-570/07 & 571/07 Pérez, para. 65; C–544/10 Weintor, paras. 54, 58; C-84/11 Susisalo, para. 37. 
792 Cases C-232/09 Danosa, para. 71; C-69/10 Samba, paras. 48-50; C-468/10 & 469/10 ASNEF, paras. 40-45; C-364/11 Kott, para. 48; C-
199/12 – 201/12 XYZ, para. 40; C-148/13 – 150/13 ABC, para. 46. 
793 Case C-27/09 P PMOI, para. 66, regarding the validity of Council Decision 2008/583/EC of 15 July 2008 implementing Article 2(3) of 
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating 
terrorism and repealing Decision 2007/868/EC. 
794 Case C-279/09 DEB, para. 59. 
795 MUIR E. (2012): p. 11-12; LENAERTS K. – GUTIÉRREZ-FONS J.A. (2014): p. 1575-176. 
796 Case C-98/14 Berlington, para. 74. 
797 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj, para. 80. 
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awarded and the place of that benefit in the Italian system of social assistance.’ 798 
The indirect effect of the Charter is not only vertical, but may also be horizontal. The 
CJEU as well as national courts of the Member States are bound to interpret EU norms 
applicable between private parties in the light of fundamental rights.799 Through judicial 
review, the public power may act as a mediator, letting the effects of fundamental rights 
radiate into relations between private parties, by means of interpretation.800 The Charter has 
been used in this way by the CJEU to influence private relations in cases like Scarlet, 
SABAM, McB, Alemo, Cimade and Sky.801 
In any case, the rulings of the Court must comply with the Charter. For this reason, it 
has been suggested that the distinction between direct and indirect effect of fundamental 
rights is rather procedural and not always pertinent in practice.802 For instance, in Alemo, 
the CJEU interpreted Directive 2001/23 in the light of Article 16 CFR, and reached the 
conclusion that Member States cannot permit employers to apply the Directive in a way 
liable to seriously affect the employees’ freedom to conduct a business.803 The similarities 
in protection afforded – regardless of whether fundamental rights are given direct or 
indirect effect – may be explained by the confluence of fundamental rights sources in 
primary and secondary EU law.804 As held by AG Poiares Maduro in Viking, ‘[w]ith regard 
to the demarcation of the respective spheres of rights, indirect horizontal effect may differ 
from direct horizontal effect in form; however, there is no difference in substance.’805 
Ultimately, the indirect effect of the Charter contributes to ‘the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law’.806 In theory, the principle of indirect effect is more related to the 
primacy of EU law than to the concept of direct effect. As a fact, indirect effect 
presupposes primacy of Union law and will trigger its application to guarantee the uniform 
application of EU law, if conflicts of norms cannot be solved through harmonious 
interpretation.807 Similarly, the Charter was drafted with the aim of ensuring a uniform 
                                                
798 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj, para. 92. See SCMAUCH M. (2012): p. 475. 
799 See e.g. Cases C-265/95 Commission v France, para. 32; C-112/00 Schmidberger, paras. 74-75; C-275/06 Promusicae, para. 68. Also, 
see LEBECK C. (2013): p. 454-455; COLOMBI CIACCHI A. (2014): p. 115-116; WARD A. (2014): p. 1431. 
800 GROUSSOT X. (et.al.) (2013): p. 116; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 67, 223. 
801 Cases C-70/10 Scarlet, paras. 43-50; C-360/10 SABAM, paras. 41-48; C-400/10 PPU McB, paras. 49-53; C–179/11 Cimade, para. 42; 
Case C-283/11 Sky, para. 42; C-426/11 Alemo, paras. 30-35.  
802 HARTKAMP A. (2010): p. 543-546; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 249-254. 
803 Case C-426/11 Alemo, paras. 30-35, relating to Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses, JO L 82/16, 22.3.2001.  
804 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 94; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 26, 449; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 84. 
805 Opinion of AG POIARES MADURO in Case C-438/05 Viking, para. 40. 
806 See Cases C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 29; C-399/11 Melloni, para. 60; C-112/13 A v B, para. 44; C-198/13 Hernandez, para. 
47; C-206/13 Siragusa, paras. 31-32. See ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 73-74; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 249, 270. 
807 PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 39-40; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 67, 72. 
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interpretation of EU law, through the expression of common values and fundamental rights 
of the Union.808 The unity of the law, in consequence, promotes the proper functioning of 
the internal market.809 Hence, the requirement of conform interpretation, aiming as far as 
possible to give full effect to the Charter, also contributes to the effectiveness of EU law 
within the legal orders of the Member States.810 
Notwithstanding this symbiosis between the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law 
and the principle of consistent interpretation, these requirements are not unconditional. In 
fact, the indirect effect of the Charter may render these requirements of the Union legal 
order conditional upon the principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations of 
individuals. In Belvedere, concerning the reopening of a final judicial decision, the CJEU 
held that ‘the obligation to ensure effective collection of European Union resources cannot 
run counter to compliance with the principle that judgment should be given within a 
reasonable time […] under the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter’.811 Although 
the Court emphasised that the issue concerned an ‘exceptional provision of national law’, 
the respect for the fundamental rights of the individual had to be balanced against the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.812 
In the end, the indirect effect of the Charter appears to confirm its subsidiary nature. 
The Charter has become a significant determinant of fundamental rights within the EU, but 
it still operates mainly as a complementary source, in parallel with a range of other 
fundamental rights sources in primary and secondary law.813 Its predominantly indirect 
effect can be understood as an expression of subsidiarity, since norm conflicts should 
primarily be solved at national level – albeit by references to the CJEU for preliminary 
rulings – through the method of harmonious interpretation.814 In the same way as 
subsidiarity aims to reconcile different-level interpretations of fundamental rights, also the 
interpretative method of indirect effect can be said to promote a visions of constitutional 
pluralism, in which a multitude of fundamental rights sources coexist.815 
                                                
808 Commission Communication on the strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, COM(2010) 573 final, section 1.3.3. See PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 6; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 164. 
809 PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 39-40. 
810 RAITIO J. (2003): p. 113; PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 38-39; BENGOETXEA J. (2008): p. 13. 
811 Case C-500/10 Belvedere, para. 23. 
812 Case C-500/10 Belvedere, para. 28. See DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 952; SCMAUCH M. (2012): p. 476-477; VAN BOCKEL B. – 
WATTEL P. (2013): p. 881. By analogy, see Cases C-108/01 Asda, paras. 85-96; C-234/04 Kapfere, paras. 19-24; C-392/04 & 422/04 
Arcor, paras. 51-57; C-453/00 Kühne, paras. 23-28. 
812 DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 952. 
813 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 57; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 141-145.  
814 PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 39-40; DE WITTE B. (2012): p. 360; DE LA MARE T. – DONNELLY C. (2011): p. 376-378; ROTH W.-H. 
(2011): p. 82-88. 
815 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 58; BESSON S. (2014): p. 173. 
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4.3 The Charter as a Basis for Judicial Review 
4.3.1 Disapplication of National Norms in Conflict with the Charter 
As demonstrated, collisions between national norms and the Charter should primarily be 
solved through consistent interpretation of domestic law in a way that complies with the 
Charter.816 Only if the conflict cannot be harmoniously settled through this method of 
indirect effect, the national norm will have to be set aside with reference to the primacy of 
Union law. When the application of national legislation and EU law would lead to different 
outcomes in a given situation, EU norms are given priority.817 
In Costa, the CJEU established that the Union legal order, as ‘an independent source of 
law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic 
provisions, however framed, without […] the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question.’818 No exceptions are made for national norms with constitutional 
status, not even if they guarantee individual rights or other interests in conflict with EU 
law.819 As held in Simmenthal, ‘every national court must […] apply Community law in its 
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set 
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent 
to the Community rule.’820 In other words, primacy precludes national measures liable to 
jeopardise the protection of fundamental rights under EU law.821 
Although closely related, the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU law must not 
be confounded. The primacy of the Charter is not dependent on whether its provisions can 
be considered to have direct effect or not. As previously discussed, the question of whether 
the Charter has direct effect refers to its potential of conferring substantive rights that may 
be directly enforced by private parties before national courts. The primacy of the Charter, 
in contrast, must be understood as referring to the exclusionary effects that it may have on 
national legislation that comes within the scope of EU law.822 
In accordance with Article 52(5), also Charter principles are judicially cognisable ‘in 
                                                
816 PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 38; KÜHN Z. (2010): p. 153; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 250. 
817 BESSELINK L.F.M. (1998): p. 643-644; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 67; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 39-40. 
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the interpretation of [Union and Member State] acts and in the ruling on their legality.’823 
As a consequence, Charter rights, freedoms and principles have the capacity of setting 
aside conflicting norms at national level, irrespective of whether they are deemed to be 
unconditional, sufficiently clear and precise.824 For instance, in cases ABC concerning 
asylum on grounds of sexual orientation, even a principle as abstract as the respect for 
human dignity was used to set aside national measures in conflict with Directive 2004/83. 
Article 1 CFR precluded competent national authorities from accepting the submission of 
the applicant ‘to “tests” with a view to establishing his homosexuality’.825 
Compliance of domestic measures with the Charter may be reviewed by the CJEU to 
the extent that Member States are implementing or derogating from Union law for the 
purpose of Article 51(1) CFR.826 Nevertheless, the norm establishing a sufficient 
connection to EU law is not necessarily the one to be reviewed under the Charter. For 
example, in Åkerberg Fransson, national laws implementing Article 235 TFEU and 
Directive 2006/112 brought the situation within the scope of EU law, but in the end the 
Court reviewed provisions of Swedish criminal law in the light of the Charter’s provision 
on ne bis in idem.827 Similarly, in Melloni, procedural guarantees under the Spanish 
Constitution were set aside, although the subject matter was brought within the scope of 
EU law by means of Framework Decision 2002/584.828 This approach to compliance of 
national measures with fundamental rights considerably broadens to Court’s jurisdiction, 
especially in situations where Member State derogations from EU law are reviewed under 
the Charter.829 Conversely, it has been argued that the Charter in fact facilitates the 
appreciation of compatibility with national measures, by providing a concrete standard of 
review for EU fundamental rights.830 
In line with the Simmenthal doctrine, any national court ‘is under a duty to give full 
effect to such provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting 
                                                
823 It has nevertheless been suggested that the distinction between rights and principles under Article 52(5) CFR might lead to paradoxical 
situations, where a mis-implementation of a principle can be set aside based on primacy of EU law, whereas the same principle could not 
be deemed to have direct effect to fill the normative gap in the national legislation in the event of complete non-implementation. See 
ANDERSON D. – MURPHY C.C. (2011): p. 6. 
824 DOUGAN M. (2007): p. 933; PRECHAL S. (2007): p. 44; CRAIG P. – DE BÚRCA G. (2011): p. 260. 
825 Cases C-148/13 – 150/13 ABC, paras. 46, 53, 65, 72, regarding Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards 
for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted. 
826 PERNICE I. (2008): p. 246-247; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 61. 
827 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 24-27, regarding Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common 
system of value added tax. See FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 243-244. 
828 See Case C-399/11 Melloni, paras. 30-34. 
829 VON DANWITZ T. (2001): p. 303; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 165-166; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 195; MIETTINEN S. 
(2015): p. 225. For pre-Lisbon rulings considered to extend the jurisdiction of the CJEU, see e.g. Cases C-273/97 Sirdar, para. 17; C-
285/98 Kreil, para. 17; C-117/01 K.B., paras. 30-34. 
830 Cf. CHALMERS D. (2010): p. 142-143; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 254. 
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provision […] of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial 
practice which might impair the effectiveness’ of the EU legal system.831 In Melloni, the 
Spanish court was obliged to recognise the primacy of the Charter, at the expense of a 
higher national standard. The CJEU considered it sufficient that the harmonised standard 
of protection under the Framework Decision already in itself complied with the Charter.832 
Conversely, in Åkerberg Fransson, the Court held that the disapplication of national law 
cannot be made conditional upon whether or not the Swedish court first finds the national 
provision to be in clear breach with the Charter. Such a condition would withhold the full 
effect of the Charter.833 By way of explanation, the clarity of neither the Charter provision 
in question, nor its infringement, may be used as requirements for the Charter to take 
primacy over conflicting national legislation. 
What eventually triggers the exclusionary effect of the Charter at national level is the 
overarching objective of preserving the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law. As 
long as these three fundamental prerequisites of EU law are not compromised, Member 
States remain free to apply a domestic standard of protection in accordance with Articles 
51(1) and 53 CFR.834 To date, the CJEU has applied the Charter in a variety of cases in 
order to set aside national measures with reference to the proper functioning of the Union 
legal order and respect for fundamental rights. In Chakroun and Kamberaj the Charter 
precluded material provisions of national legislation, whereas domestic procedural rules 
and practices were struck down in Morcillo and N.S. respectively.835 Equivalently, 
discriminatory clauses in domestic collective agreements were disapplied in Prigge, 
Hennings and Alemo, due to their incompliance with the Charter.836 
Notwithstanding the formal competence of the CJEU to review national measures 
within the scope of EU law, it has been argued that this prerogative is not in consistency 
with the principle of subsidiarity.837 It is true that the judicial review of national measures 
by the Court puts restrains on the autonomy of the Member States as well as their 
constitutional orders. This might in turn lead to problems of democracy deficit, the rule of 
                                                
831 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 45-46, referring to Cases C-106/77 Simmenthal, paras. 21-24; C-314/08 Filipiak, para. 81; 
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p. 326; WARD A. (2014): p. 1418-1419. 
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judges, confusion of powers and legal uncertainty.838 Nonetheless, it must be emphasised 
that the preclusion of an inconsistent national measure under EU law merely imposes an 
obligation on the national court to disapply the norm in question. The conflicting norm 
must be set aside in the specific situation at hand, but for the rest it may remain in force 
within the national legal order.839 The CJEU does not have the power to annul or invalidate 
national legislation. In the end, it is therefore for the national court to rule on the legal 
effects of incompliance, beyond disapplication in the case at hand.840 
Allegedly, the CJEU applies a gradient scale of review, in compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity under the Charter.841 As a first step, the Court strives to solve collisions 
between EU norms or between Union law and national provisions through the use of 
consistent interpretation.842 Alternatively, the CJEU may render the disapplication of 
national law conditional upon certain criteria to be verified by the national court with 
regard to the circumstances of the case. This kind of fundamental rights review accords a 
broader discretion for the national court to appreciate Member State implementation of or 
derogation from EU law in the light of the Charter.843 Such conditional review can be 
exemplified by HK, where the Court held that ‘the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age, enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter […] must be interpreted as not 
precluding an occupational pension scheme under which […] pension contributions […] 
increase with age, provided that the difference in treatment on grounds of age […] is 
appropriate and necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, which it is for the national court to 
establish.’844 The Court can also deliver a ready-made solution in favour of the national 
action at issue.845 Only in cases where the a national measure demonstrates unconditional 
incompliance with the Charter, they will be immediately set aside by the CJEU with 
reference to the primacy of Union law.  
Admittedly, the Member States’ use of competence is to a large extent conditioned by 
the Charter.846 Still, primacy of EU law must not be assimilated with supremacy.847 In the 
                                                
838 SARMIENTO D. (2012b): p. 327-336. 
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must be interpreted as not precluding proof of origin of imported goods […], provided that the principles of effectiveness and equivalence 
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words of AG Poiares Maduro in Europa, ‘a distinction must be drawn between […] 
jurisdiction to review any national measure in the light of fundamental rights and […] 
jurisdiction to examine whether Member States provide the necessary level of protection 
[…] to fulfil their other obligations as members of the Union. The first type of review […] 
is not within the Union’s current competences. However, the second type of review flows 
logically from the nature of the process of European integration. […] Though the degree of 
protection of fundamental rights at national level does not have to be exactly the same as 
[…] the European Union, there must be some measure of equivalence in order to ensure 
that the law of the Union can operate effectively within the national legal order.’848 In 
other words, EU and Member State standards are not mutually exclusive, but complement 
each other through the medium of interpretative dialogue.849 In line with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the CJEU accords the Member States discretion, as long as the protection 
under the Charter and the proper functioning of the Union legal order are guaranteed. 
‘[T]he national courts and tribunals, in collaboration with the CJEU, fulfil a duty entrusted 
to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed’, as emphasised by the Court in Inuit.850 
4.3.2 The Validity of EU Law in the Light of the Charter 
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the gradient scale of judicial review, 
the strictest form of central scrutiny is applied when the CJEU appreciates the validity of 
measures originating from the Union itself.851 With respect to its jurisdiction under Article 
263 TFEU, the Court has the power to review the legality of acts of EU institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies. The Charter, as part of the EU constitutional framework, may 
thus be used by the Court to declare secondary legislation and individual decisions void, 
due to their incompliance with fundamental rights.852 
The obligation of the Union to comply with fundamental rights as general principles of 
EU law was introduced by the CJEU through its rulings in Stauder and 
Handelsgesellschaft.853 Later, in Les Verts, it declared that the Treaties, as the ‘basic 
constitutional charter, […] established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures 
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designed to permit the CJEU to review the legality of measures adopted’ by the Union.854 
This development has led to criticism implying that the Court is substituting its position for 
that of the EU legislature. Nevertheless, this form of ‘constitutional review’ may also act 
as a counter-majoritarian power.855 
Notwithstanding the discretion of national courts to review the compatibility of Member 
States’ implementing measures with the Charter, this does not make them competent to 
scrutinise EU law. In the same way as the CJEU is not competent to invalidate national 
laws, Member State courts cannot appreciate the validity of EU measures. Accordingly, 
Member States cannot invoke the existence of national fundamental rights standard, or the 
lack of a Union standard, as reasons for having mis-implemented or wrongfully derogated 
from EU law. The EU Courts alone, as the supreme interpreters of Union law, have the 
power to invalidate acts of secondary law.856 With regard to Article 51(1) CFR, their 
power of judicial review of EU acts exists regardless of whether the claim of invalidity 
arose from the Union’s proper exercise of competence, or as a result of a national 
implementing measure.857  
As was held by the Court in Hauer, ‘[t]he question of a possible infringement of 
fundamental rights by a measure of Community institutions can only be judged in the light 
of Community law itself. The introduction of special criteria for assessment stemming 
from the legislation or constitutional law of a particular Member State would, by damaging 
the substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, lead inevitably to the destruction of 
the unity of the Common Market and the jeopardising of the cohesion of the 
Community.’858 As a result, Articles 52(6) and 53 CFR cannot be interpreted as granting 
Member States the competence to review the legality of EU acts. For instance, in Melloni, 
the validity of Framework Decision 2002/584 could not be appreciated under the Spanish 
Constitution, but only in the light of the Charter.859 
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This centralisation of judicial review of EU actions has been criticised as an inter-
judicial transfer of powers from the constitutional courts of the Member States towards the 
CJEU.860 From the perspective of positive subsidiarity, however, it may conversely be 
argued that the Court itself is best placed to review the compliance of EU measures with 
EU fundamental rights, in order to guarantee the uniform interpretation of EU law within 
the Union. To a great extent, the fundamental rights standard of the Union also draws on 
common constitutional traditions, which indirectly gives the Member States influence over 
the judicial review of EU norms.861 
As emphasised by the CJEU, respect for fundamental rights is ‘a condition of the 
lawfulness of Community acts.’862 The EU ‘is a union based on the rule of law in which 
the acts of its institutions are subject to review of their compatibility with, in particular, the 
Treaties, the general principles of law and fundamental rights’.863 Consequently, the 
Charter limits rather than extends the competences of the Union.864 In its capacity to 
provide a legal basis for invalidating measures of EU law, it functions as a competence-
check and thus obligates the Union to take fundamental rights seriously.865 Not only does 
the Charter legitimate the actions of the Union, but it also constitutes an internal source of 
reflexive self-restrain.866 This can be seen in the increased mainstreaming of references to 
fundamental rights in the legislative practice of the EU, even in secondary legislation not 
explicitly addressing issues of a fundamental rights nature.867 
Article 53 CFR provides that ‘[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting 
or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised […] by 
Union law’. The CJEU may thus review the EU legislature’s respect for fundamental rights 
with the Charter as a minimum standard of protection.868 In Parliament v Council, the 
Court first used this scrutiny and referred to the Charter, before it was even legally 
binding.869 Some four years later, shortly after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
legally binding Charter was applied in Schecke, where the Court for the first time 
invalidated parts of an EU legislative act on grounds of its lack of respect for fundamental 
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rights.870 In fact, the line of cases on data protection and privacy well illustrates the 
increased influence that the Charter has gained over time. Whilst the Court took a 
restrictive approach to data-processing in the Passenger Name Records case of 2006, 
Directive 2006/24 survived the action for annulment on grounds of legal basis brought by 
Ireland & Slovak Republic in 2009, only to later be declared void in 2014 in Digital Rights 
for reasons of incompliance with the Charter.871 
Through judicial review of EU secondary law, the interpretative force and direct 
applicability of the Charter is brought into the spotlight.872 This forceful application is 
illustrated most notably by Digital Rights, where the CJEU declared the entire Directive 
2006/24 void.873 Despite its legitimate objective, ‘the EU legislature [had] exceeded the 
limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 
7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter.’874 With reference to the protection of personal data under 
Article 8 CFR, the Court equally invalidated Decision 2000/520 in Safe Harbour.875 
Similarly, the annulment of Articles of secondary law in Schecke and Test-Achats confirm 
the constant Charter scrutiny of EU competences. Indeed, fundamental rights may lawfully 
be restricted under Article 52(1) CFR, but restrictions need to be proportionate and 
justified as necessary and genuinely meeting objectives recognised by the EU.876 As put by 
AG Kokott in Test-Achats, ‘the discretion [of the Union] is not boundless. In particular, the 
exercise of that discretion cannot have the effect of frustrating the implementation of a 
fundamental principle of European Union law.’877 
When appreciating the validity of EU measures under the Charter, the Court must first 
consider whether the interests involved are legitimate. If deemed to be objectively justified 
and necessary, the Court further evaluates the proportionality of restrictions, hence 
considering whether the EU legislature has adequately balanced general and individual 
interests.878 In Test-Achats, the CJEU did not even consider the restrictions of the principle 
of non-discrimination justified, because ‘a provision, which enables the Member States 
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871 Cases C-317/04 & 318/04 Passenger Name Records, paras. 54-61; C-301/06 Ireland & Slovak Republic, paras. 56-61, 67-70; C-293/12 
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[…] to maintain […] an exemption from the rule of unisex [insurance] premiums and 
benefits, works against the achievement of the objective of equal treatment between men 
and women’ and was thus ‘incompatible with Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter.’879 
Conversely, in Schecke, the objective was legitimate, but the restriction was annulled as 
disproportionate. It did ‘not appear that the institutions [had] properly balanced, on the one 
hand, the objectives’ of the Regulation ‘against, on the other, the rights which natural 
persons are recognised as having under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.’880 However, 
counterexamples exist, where the legislature was accorded a broad margin of appreciation. 
For instance, in Melloni, the Court considered the procedural right in question exhaustively 
regulated at EU level, without further examining the proportionality of the measure.881 
In conclusion, the Charter has become a powerful tool for the judicial review of EU 
secondary law in the light of fundamental rights. As part of the Union’s constitutional 
order, it embodies fundamental values of the Union expressed in Article 2 TEU. In 
consequence, it has even been suggested that the Charter could have the potential of 
assuming an even ‘higher legal status and scope among the source of EU law.’882 On the 
one side, this statement may be supported by Kadi, where the CJEU affirmed that the 
respect for human dignity preconditions the validity of the Treaties, which ‘in no 
circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very foundations 
of the Community legal order, one of which is the protection of fundamental rights’.883 On 
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99-101, 119, 164, where the CJEU confirmed the annulation of Regulation 1190/2008 made by the General Court in T-85/09. See 
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the other side, however, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the validity of primary 
law.884 Further to this, the ECtHR, in line with its Bosphorus doctrine, presumes that the 
EU protection of fundamental rights complies with the ECHR.885 
Certainly, the Charter already contributes to the interpretation of primary law in the 
light of fundamental rights. However, to give priority to fundamental rights ‘protection and 
to disapply for that purpose the relevant provisions’ of the Treaties ‘would necessitate 
recognising that there was also a hierarchy among primary rules and a kind of “supra-
constitutional” value in the respect for fundamental rights’, as stated by AG Mengozzi in 
Gestoras, at a time when the Charter was not yet legally binding.886 Since then, the Charter 
has become mandatory, but this has still not resulted in the elevation of the Charter above 
the status of primary law. Indeed, it is questionable to what extent such an idolisation of 
the Charter would be compatible with the principle of subsidiarity that it presently 
embodies. Would a possible review of primary law with respect to the Charter ultimately 
contribute to the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law as a whole? 
4.4 Non-application of the Charter 
4.4.1 Reasoning Silence as an Expression of the Charter’s Subsidiarity 
The silence on fundamental rights that prevailed in the genesis of European integration, 
has turned into a cacophonic discourse on constitutional pluralism.887 However, occasional 
silence still persists with respect to the Charter as a source in EU fundamental rights 
adjudication before the CJEU. It is, indeed, a conspiracy of silence, as the absence of 
reasoning may intentionally be used by the Court as a counterweight to judicial 
activism.888 By selectively using silence as a means of reasoning its judgments, the Court 
may be sidestepping important constitutional questions concerning the Charter and its 
relation to other sources of EU law.889 In fact, the rulings of the Court may conceal more 
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than they reveal, which in turn necessitates a look beyond their textual reasoning.890 
Already in 2010, the CJEU established that ‘it is important, since the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, to take account of the Charter, which has “the same legal value as the 
Treaties”’.891 Yet today, the Court tends to only inconsistently make use of the Charter. 
The procedure for preliminary references gives the Court leeway to answer questions from 
the national courts in a selective and heterogeneous manner. This procedural flexibility 
opens up for judicial minimalism and the possibility of leaving sensitive issues aside, such 
as the application of the Charter.892 
By means of reasoning silence, the Court may choose not to answer a question referred, 
or to answer it in a different way than it was posed.893 However, it is difficult to draw any 
far-reaching conclusions from the Court’s use of silence. Not all judicial vacuums are 
carefully reasoned. They might as well be the result of old habit, doctrinal confusion, 
missed opportunities or peculiar developments.894 Therefore, the mere identification of 
relevantly speaking silences can already in itself be of importance for understanding the 
constitutional framework in which the Court operates.895 With respect to the Charter, such 
intentional silences may, above all, be observed in cases, where the referring national court 
or the AG make a reference to the Charter, which the Court nevertheless chooses to ignore. 
In Römer, AG Jääskinen made reference to Article 21(1) of the legally binding Charter 
and argued that ‘in the same way as the Court decided with regard to discrimination on 
grounds of age’ in Mangold and Kücükdeveci, ‘the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation should be regarded as a general principle of Union law.’896 
Any other interpretation would lead to differences in normative status among the grounds 
of discrimination prohibited under the Charter.897 Still, the Court remained silent as to the 
applicability of the Charter and non-discrimination as a general principle of EU law. 
Although sexual orientation was recognised as a prohibited ground of discrimination, the 
Court still relied merely on secondary legislation in its reasoning.898 Conversely, in 
Kücükdeveci, the Court had referred to Article 21 CFR – albeit only in passing – even 
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before it was legally binding.899 The silence in Römer, may thus be interpreted as a means 
of supposedly avoiding further elaboration on the relation between the Charter and 
principles of EU law in general, or the question of sexual orientation in particular.900 
Similarly, in Dominguez, AG Trstenjak considered Article 31(2) CFR when elaborating 
on the question of whether paid leave may be enforced as a substantive right in a dispute 
between a worker and the employer.901 Although the Court found that ‘the entitlement of 
every worker to paid annual leave must be regarded as a particularly important principle of 
European Union social law’, it still disregarded the Charter and exclusively relied on 
secondary legislation in its judgement.902 Allegedly, the absence of the Charter might 
imply hesitancy as whether to categorise annual paid leave as either a fundamental right or 
a fundamental principle under of Article 52(5) CFR. The case also touches upon the 
Charter’s possible capacity or incapacity of direct horizontal effect.903 In any case, the 
silence in Dominguez cannot be deduced from the ambivalent status of social rights. As a 
matter of fact, the Charter has been absent in the Court’s reasoning on first, second as well 
as third generation rights.904 Since Kücükdeveci, there has even been rulings on age 
discrimination that completely lack references to Article 21(1) CFR.905 
In contrast to Römer and Dominguez, the initiative for Charter application in Zambrano 
came from the referring court. In essence, the national court asked whether the expulsion 
of a family, consisting of third-country national parents and children with EU citizenship, 
was compliant with Articles 21, 24 and 34 CFR. Still, the CJEU answered the question 
solely based on Article 20 TFEU.906 The Court’s review of fundamental rights remained 
merely indirect, which, on the one hand, implies that fundamental rights are inherent to EU 
citizenship.907 On the other hand, Zambrano and subsequent cases regarding third-country 
national family members and their derived rights, also suggest that the Court makes a 
distinction between its abstract jurisdiction and the Charter’s concrete field of application. 
                                                
899 C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, para. 22. See PECH L. (2012): p. 1860; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 145. Also, see Cases C-297/10 & 298/10 
Hennigs, paras. 47, 78, where the CJEU referred to Article 21 CFR when recognising discrimination on grounds of age. 
900 PECH L. (2012): p. 1841. 
901 Opinion of AG TRSTENJAK in Case C-282/10 Dominguez, paras. 70-88. 
902 Case C-282/10 Dominguez, paras. 16-21. See DE MOL M. (2012): p. 290-293; PECH L. (2012): p. 1843, 1857-1858; LAZZERINI N. 
(2014): p. 914; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 237. 
903 DE MOL M. (2012): p. 295-297; PECH L. (2012): p. 1856-1857, 1861-1862; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1422-1423; LAZZERINI N. 
(2014): p. 930-932; MUIR E. (2014): p. 231-232; MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 229. 
904 See e.g. Cases C-139/07 P Glaswerke (access to documents); C-28/08 P Lager (access to documents); C-104/09 Alvarez (sex 
discrimination); C-34/10 Brüstle (principles of bioethics); C-67/14 Alimanovic (nationality discrimination). Also, see SAIZ ARNAIZ A. – 
TORRES PÉREZ A. (2012): p. 10; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 145. 
905 See Cases C-229/08 Wolf; C-341/08 Petersen; C-45/09 Rosenbladt; C-250/09 & 268/09 Georgiev. 
906 Case C-34/09 Zambrano, paras. 35-45. 
907 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 165; SAIZ ARNAIZ A. – TORRES PÉREZ A. (2012): p. 10; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 523; 
DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 194-195, 202; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 145. See e.g. Cases C-413/99 Baumbast, paras. 68-75; C-60/00 Carpenter, 
paras. 37-40; C-109/01 Akrich, para. 58; C-430/10 Gaydarov, paras. 21, 24-42; C-434/10 Aldazhov, paras. 16, 41-49, where the CJEU did 
use the Charter as a source for the fundamental rights considered. 
 
 
116 
The Charter is applied only once it has been established that the circumstances of the third-
country nationals in question fall within the scope of Union law, for the purpose of Article 
51(1) CFR.908 
The Court’s reasoning silence on the Charter may be understood as an expression of 
subsidiarity. First of all, the subsidiary nature of the Charter becomes visible in the 
secondary significance that the CJEU accords to it as a source of fundamental rights.909 
The Charter does not only lack an autonomous field of application, but the Court also tends 
to give priority to Treaty provisions, fundamental rights as general principles and 
secondary legislation, favouring the provision that most concretely sets out the 
fundamental right in question.910 Neither has the Charter come to replace the concept of 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.911 Instead of assimilating its provisions 
with the general principles, Kücükdeveci and the subsequent case law appear to dissociate 
the two sources from each other.912 For instance, in cases regarding the horizontal direct 
effect of fundamental rights, the Court has consistently referred to general principles rather 
than the Charter. Evidently, all its provisions do not express general principles of EU law.  
Ultimately, the vacuum left by the CJEU when disregarding the Charter, not only 
demonstrates the sensitive nature of the issue, but also constitutes a form of judicial 
subsidiarity.913 By not taking the interpretation of EU law further than what is necessary to 
solve the case at hand, the Court accords Member States a margin of discretion. The degree 
of judicial review applied by the CJEU will thus indicate to what extent and on what 
conditions it is willing to engage in a judicial dialogue with its national correspondents.914 
A complete silence would undermine the authority of the Court and the credibility of the 
Charter, but to a certain extent judicial minimalism functions as an argumentative model 
for peaceful reconciliation of institutional, normative and moral interests in constitutional 
conflicts. The judicial strategy of reasoning silence thus helps the CJEU to navigate 
                                                
908 See e.g. Cases C-434/09 McCarthy, paras. 57, 27; C-40/11 Iida, para. 79-81; C-356/11 Dereci, para. 66, 70-74; C-87/12 Ymeraga, 
paras. 21-22, 40-43, where the Charter was considered but not applied by the CJEU, because the situations of the third-country family 
members of the applicants were found to not be governed by EU law. Contrastingly, the CJEU applied the Charter with respect to the 
rights of third-country nationals in Cases C-69/10 Samba, paras. 34, 49; C-356/11 O. & S., paras. 75-82, but not at all in Case C-61/11 
PPU Dridi, paras. 31-43. See SANKARI S. (2013): p. 242-245; VAN BOCKEL B. – WATTEL P. (2013): p. 882-883; DUBOUT E. 
(2014): p. 206-207. 
909 CAROZZA P.G. (2003): p. 54. 
910 VON DANWITZ T. (2001): p. 294; PECH L. (2012): p. 1879; SARMIENTO D. (2012a): p. 297; SANKARI S. (2013): p. 214; 
MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 220-221; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 145. 
911 MUIR E. (2012): p. 8; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 141. See Article 6(3) TEU and Article 52(2) CFR. 
912 MUIR E. (2012): p. 14; PECH L. (2012): p. 1860-1861; DE VRIES S.A. (2013b): p. 73. 
913 DE BÚRCA G. (1998): p. 225; KOMBOS C. (2006): p. 435; MUIR E. (2014): p. 243. 
914 SARMIENTO D. (2012a): p. 291, 310; SARMIENTO D. (2012c): p. 29. 
 
 
117 
through the European landscape of constitutional pluralism.915 
4.4.2 The Isolated Charter as an Insufficient Connection to EU Law 
With respect to subsidiarity, the Charter was never intended to apply outside the scope of 
EU law, when Member States act within their own jurisdictions.916 In contrast to the 
general applicability of the ECHR, the Charter’s field of application is rather relative. It 
does not apply autonomously to any given situation, but the subject matter needs to 
demonstrate a sufficient degree of connection to Union law.917 The broad interpretation of 
the scope of EU law made by the CJEU in Åkerberg Fransson, however, sparked new life 
into the old debate of whether the Charter may in fact extend the powers of the EU.918 
Similarly, the extensive content of the Charter might cast doubt as to whether it 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity.919 The initial aim of the Charter was never to 
create any new rights or expand the EU competences. Still, it contains material provisions 
covering areas where the Union has none or only little competence, such as the right to life 
in Article 2.920 In addition to this, the Charter contains innovative provisions traditionally 
not recognised as fundamental rights, such as the principles of bioethics set out in Article 
3(2).921 Drafted with future changes of society and the Union legal order in mind, at 
present the material scope of the Charter is admittedly broader than the scope of EU law 
itself.922 Given that the impact of the Charter is limited to the areas governed by the 
Treaties, some of these provisions thus risk becoming empty statements, promising more 
than they can keep.923 Nevertheless, these limits to do not prevent the Union from drawing 
inspiration from the entire content of the Charter for the purpose of the ultima ratio 
procedure under Article 7 TEU, which is not limited to the scope of EU law itself.924 
Be that as it may, it remains a fact that that the Charter applies to all situations governed 
by Union law. Nonetheless, it is equally true that it cannot apply outside this scope.925 In 
                                                
915 SANKARI S. (2010): p. 200; SANKARI S. (2013): p. 214; SARMIENTO D. (2012a): p. 305, 309-312. 
916 Draft Charter, CHARTE 4111/00, 20.1.2000, p. 2; CHARTE 4123/1/00 REV, Convent 5, 15.2.2000, p. 9. The Drafts refer to Cases C-
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917 KAILA H. (2012): p. 303; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 154, 175-176. 
918 DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 208; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 243; MUIR E. (2014): p. 233; WARD A. (2014): p. 1425; MIETTINEN S. 
(2015): p. 67. 
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922 LEANERTS K. – DE SMIJTER E. (2001): p. 273; KNOOK A. (2005): p. 371; KAILA H. (2012): p. 298;  
923 DE WITTE B. (2001): p. 88; OJANEN T. (2003): p. 677-678; PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 18; WARD A. (2014): p. 1413-
1414. 
924 DE WITTE B. – TOGGENBURG G.N. (2004): p. 81; PERNICE I. – KANITZ R. (2004): p. 18; FOLLESDAL A. (2011): p. 20-21; 
KAILA H. (2012): p. 314; ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 168; TANASESCU E.S. (2013): p. 224. 
925 See e.g. Cases C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 19; C-258/13 Agricola, para. 19; C-483/11 & 484/11 Boncea, para. 29. 
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purely internal situations, demonstrating an insufficient connection to EU law, the Court 
will thus declare itself incompetent to rule on questions relating to fundamental rights.926 
As a result, the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the Charter can be defined not only 
positively as conditions for applicability, but also negatively as boundaries for 
inapplicability.927 However, the Court’s judgments and orders on inadmissibility 
demonstrate a heterogeneous line of reasoning, which makes it challenging to identify the 
separating line between applicability and inapplicability of the Charter.928 
From the subsidiary nature of the Charter, it follows that litigants cannot rely directly on 
its provisions as the only legal basis of a dispute.929 In other words, the isolated Charter 
does not in itself form a basis for jurisdiction even in cases concerning the protection of a 
right that it guarantees.930 Instead, the CJEU has explicitly stated that in order for the 
Charter to apply, the situation must be brought within the scope of Union law by an EU 
norm other than the Charter.931 For illustration, the Court declined jurisdiction in Chartry, 
‘[a]lthough the right to an effective legal remedy […] was reaffirmed by Article 47 of the 
Charter’. However, ‘the order for reference [did] not contain any specific information 
enabling the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings to be considered to be 
connected with EU law. The dispute […] [was] not connected in any way with any of the 
situations contemplated by the provisions of the EC Treaty on the free movement of 
persons, of services, or of capital.932 
By way of explanation, a vague or abstract Treaty connection, such as the general 
respect for fundamental rights provided in Articles 2 and 6 TEU, is not a sufficient 
connection to EU law. Similarly, it is questionable whether a provision such as Article 18 
or 21 TFEU could bring any infringement of fundamental rights within the scope of EU 
law. Not just any nationality discrimination or other violation suffered in connection to the 
exercise of freedom of movement automatically falls within the scope of the Union law, 
                                                
926 KAILA H. (2012): p. 314; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 206; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 155. For pre-Lisbon judgments where the protection 
of fundamental rights fell outside the scope of EU law, see e.g. Cases C-299/95 Kremzow, paras. 15-16; C-306/96 Annibaldi, para. 13; C-
186/01 Dory, paras. 34-41; C-328/04 Vajnai paras. 13-14; C-427/06 Bartsch, paras. 16-18, 25. For pre-Lisbon judgments where the 
protection of fundamental rights came within the scope of EU law, see e.g. Cases C-60/00 Carpenter, paras. 37-45; C-71/02 Karner, 
paras. 49; C-148/02 Avello, paras. 24-31; C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, paras. 23-25; C-147/08 Römer, paras. 60-61, 64. See also ROSAS A. – 
ARMATI L. (2012): p. 165; FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 319; LEBECK C. (2013): p. 302; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 361; TANASESCU E.S. 
(2013): p. 221; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 204; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 361. 
927 SARMIENTO D. (2013); p. 1286-1287; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 204. 
928 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 165; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1423. 
929 Cases C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 22; C-466/11 Currà, para. 26. 
930 VAN BOCKEL B. – WATTEL P. (2013): p. 869-870; MIETTINEN S. (2015): p. 228; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 169. See e.g. Cases C-
617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 22; C-265/13 Marcos, para. 30; C-650/13 Delvigne, para. 27. 
931 E.g. Cases C-314/10 Pagnoul, paras. 23-24; C-27/11 Vinkov, paras. 57-60; C-418/11 Texdata, paras. 72-73; C-483/12 Turnhout, paras. 
17-23; C-488/12 – 491/12 & 526/12 Nagy, paras. 17-18; C‑614/12 & 10/13 Dutka, para. 15; C-14/13 Cholakova, para. 30; C-265/13 
Marcos, paras. 29-33, 36, 43; C-332/13 Weigl, paras. 13-16; C-92/14 Tudoran, paras. 44-49. See SCMAUCH M. (2012): p. 473; 
FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 320; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1423; RAITIO J. (2013): p. 362; FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 209. 
932 Case C-457/09 Chartry, para. 25. 
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without further demonstration of a substantive connection thereto.933  
As a fact, the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights under the 
Charter are binding on Member States only when they implement or derogate from Union 
law in the meaning of Article 51(1) CFR.934 For instance, in Asparuhov, the CJEU 
concluded that ‘the order for reference does not contain any specific information to show 
that the [national] decision […] would constitute a measure implementing European Union 
law’.935 Equivalently, in Gueye, national actions against domestic violence, albeit closely 
connected, were not considered to be implementation of Framework Decision 2001/220 on 
the standing of victims in criminal proceedings.936 Neither the coincidence that a national 
provision is worded in a way similar to the Charter, can be considered implementation.937 
The conditions for applicability in Article 51(1) are inherently connected to Article 
51(2) CFR, providing that the Charter does not extend the competences of the EU.938 
‘[A]lthough respect for the fundamental rights […] is a condition of the legality of 
Community acts, those rights cannot in themselves have the effect of extending the scope 
of the Treaty provisions beyond the competences of the Community’, as consistently held 
by the CJEU.939 In the spirit of subsidiarity, this characteristic of fundamental rights has 
also been confirmed with respect to the Charter.940 
In McB, the Charter could not be used to review the contested national provision in 
relation to the ‘Brussels II’ Regulation 2201/2003, because the Union lacked specific 
competences to regulate the attribution of custody rights.941 In Ymeraga, the applicant 
could not invoke the Charter as a means of extending the personal scope of Directives 
2004/38 and 2003/86 to include him as a beneficiary.942 Similarly, in Pringle, the Charter 
was not applicable to the European Stability Mechanism, as a measure of enhanced 
                                                
933 ROSAS A. – ARMATI L. (2012): p. 167-168; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1423-1425. Cf. Opinion of AG JACOBS in Case C-168/91 
Konstantinidis, para. 46. 
934 SCMAUCH M. (2012): p. 473; FONTANELLI F. (2013): p. 320; HANCOX E. (2013): p. 1423; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 208; 
FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 240; WARD A. (2014): p. 1447; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 164. 
935 Case C-339/10 Asparuhov, paras. 13-14. See also Cases C-267/10 & 268/10 Rossius, paras. 19-20; C-434/11 Corpul, paras. 14-15; C-
498/12 Pedone, paras. 12-15; C-499/12 Gentile, paras. 12-15; C-555/12 Loreti, paras. 15-18; C-73/13 T, paras. 11-14. 
936 Cases C-483/09 & 1/10 Gueye, para. 68-69. 
937 Case C-482/10 Cicala, paras. 21-30. See FONTANELLI F. (2014): p. 209; WALKILA S. (2015): p. 156. 
938 WARD A. (2014): p. 1446-1447. 
939 See e.g CJEU Opinion 2/94, paras. 34-35; Case C-249/96 Grant, para. 45. See KAILA H. (2012): p. 298; CHRONOWSKI N. (2014): 
p. 13; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 196; WARD A. (2014): p. 1413-1414. 
940 See e.g. Cases C-20/10 Vino I, para. 52; C-161/11 Vino II, para. 24; C-256/11 Dereci, para. 71;  
941 Case C-400/10 PPU McB, paras. 51-52, regarding Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. See KAILA H. (2012): p. 312; SAFJAN M. (2012): p. 9-10; DUBOUT E. (2014): p. 208-209; WARD A. 
(2014): p. 1440-1443. 
942 C-87/12 Ymeraga, paras. 40-43, regarding Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification; 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
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cooperation under Article 20(1) TEU, because the establishment of such a mechanism 
went beyond the competences of the EU itself. In the words of the Court, ‘the Charter does 
not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union, or 
establish any new power or task for the Union or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties. Accordingly, the Court is called upon to interpret, in the light of the Charter, the 
law of the European Union within the limits of the powers conferred on it.’943 
However, as stated by the Court in Hernandez, ‘the mere fact that a national measure 
comes within an area in which the European Union has powers cannot bring it within the 
scope of EU law, and therefore cannot render the Charter applicable’.944 Whilst the Court 
examined the case in Ymeraga as admissible under Article 20 TFEU, and held that the 
national legislation at issue ‘indeed [was] intended to implement’ EU law, it still found that 
the situation of the applicant was ‘not governed by European Union law’, for the purpose 
of Article 51(1) CFR, as established in Åkerberg Fransson.945 Hence, the CJEU upholds a 
strict distinction between the abstract existence of jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the 
concrete application of relevant EU norms to the circumstances of the case, on the other. 
Out of these two conceptions, only the latter may trigger the applicability of the Charter.946 
The Charter’s field of application does not coincide with the broader notion of EU 
competences, as boldly suggested by AG Sharpston in Zambrano, but only with the more 
moderate conception of situations falling within the scope of EU law.947 
It is evident from the Court’s ruling in Siragusa that the mere existence of an action 
within the scope of EU law does not in itself constitute a sufficient connection to the 
Charter. For the purpose of ‘implementing Union law’ under Article 51(1) CFR, it is not 
enough that the matters covered are ‘closely related’ or that one has an ‘indirect impact’ on 
the other. Aspects such as the ‘nature’ of the measure in question, whether it ‘pursues 
objectives other than those covered by EU law’, the fact that it is only ‘indirectly affecting 
EU law’ or not governed by any ‘specific rules of EU law on the matter’, might indicate 
that the issue lies outside the scope of the Charter.948 
However, these criteria are not clear-cut and borderline cases may easily arise. Without 
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giving any further guidelines in Zakaria, the Court laconically stated that ‘the decision to 
refer does not provide sufficient information’ in order to assess the treatment of border 
guards in relation to Regulation 562/2006.949 It was ‘for the referring court to ascertain, in 
the light of the facts in the main proceedings, whether the situation of the claimant in the 
main proceedings [was] governed by European Union law’ and thus also by the Charter.950 
Conversely, in Norte, Portugal had reduced wages in the public sector as a result of its 
obligations under the EU Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless – and without any 
further explanation – the Court did not find that the measures constituted implementation 
of Union law under Article 51(1) CFR, but ruled that it had no jurisdiction.951 
Alternatively, had the Court accepted jurisdiction in the case, this would have rendered the 
Charter applicable to many other austerity measures in the Member States as well. This 
could, in turn, be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity under the Charter.952 
To conclude, the limits to Charter applicability– although divergent and difficultly 
defined – fulfil an important function of contributing to the observance of the subsidiarity 
principle.953 Because of the constant push and pull between unity and diversity inherent to 
European constitutional pluralism, as well as the intertwinement of EU law with the laws 
of the Member States, it is not always easy to draw a line between the two.954 Furthermore, 
the CJEU cannot control which cases are brought before it in relation to the Charter.955 
Yet, it can choose to decline jurisdiction with reference to Article 51 CFR, to avoid 
extending its jurisdiction and distorting the vertical division of powers between the EU and 
its Member States.956 In accordance with subsidiarity, fundamental rights are ensured by 
the Member States’ constitutional systems in disputes outside the scope of EU law.957 
Inside its scope, the principle of subsidiarity will be respected by the CJEU when 
interpreting the Charter, as long as the national constitutional frameworks comply with its 
minimum level of protection and do not undermine the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
the Union legal order.958 
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CONCLUSION: Taking Fundamental Rights and Subsidiarity 
Seriously 
Looking back at the parallel evolution of fundamental rights and subsidiarity in EU law, 
the Charter eventually became their common point of intersection. Both concepts endorse 
similar transversal affinities, conditioning the exercise of EU competences with the 
constant aim of determining the most appropriate level of intervention. In the same way as 
negative subsidiarity, fundamental rights may limit the Union’s use of power. Conversely, 
fundamental rights may justify intervention at EU level, in the same way as positive 
subsidiarity. In this sense, both fundamental rights and subsidiarity contribute to the 
constitutionalisation of the Union legal order.  
The Charter itself presents several traits of subsidiarity. From a structural point of view, 
the Charter is unable to provide an autonomous legal basis or extend the competences of 
the Union. This subsidiary approach is further evidenced by its many references to national 
legislation and other sources of EU law. Also, the distinction between substantive rights 
and programmatic principles has a similar impact on the Charter. As a result, its personal 
as well as its material scope is limited and dependent on the applicability of other EU 
norms. The Charter only applies once the subject matter falls within the scope of Union 
law, as demonstrated not only by the Åkerberg Fransson line of cases, but also by rulings 
where the CJEU has declined jurisdiction under the Charter. 
From a material point of view, the Charter introduces subsidiarity as an interpretative 
principle of EU fundamental rights. Setting out a minimum level of protection, all norms 
of EU law must be interpreted in the light of the Charter. Notwithstanding this indirect 
effect, it still leaves room for the Union and its Member States to provide a higher level of 
protection. Similarly, the Court’s reasoning silences on Charter applicability leave Member 
States a margin of discretion in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore, 
the minimum level under the Charter conditions the validity of EU secondary law, as 
evidenced by cases Schecke, Test-achats, Digital Rights and Safe Harbour. In the same 
way, national law in conflict with fundamental rights will be set aside for the benefit of the 
Charter’s direct application. In fact, under certain circumstances, the Charter may even 
impose a maximum level of protection. 
As demonstrated in Melloni, preservation of the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
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Union law may trigger a maximum level of protection under the Charter. Although such 
EU level intervention can be justified in the light of positive subsidiarity, it all the same 
becomes evident that the EU legal system has adopted its proper understanding of 
subsidiarity, comprising more than one single priority.959 Given its sui generis character, 
the Union legal order sets its own objectives.960 In contrast to international human rights 
law, fundamental rights protection is only one of many objectives that EU subsidiarity has 
to balance when determining the appropriate level of intervention for the proper 
functioning of the internal market and the EU legal order. Hence, collisions might arise 
between these objectives and the fundamental values of the Union itself.961 In the end, the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law can only exceptionally be set aside by 
reasons of legal certainty of the individual under the Charter, as evidenced in Belvedere. 
Enhanced legal certainty in EU fundamental rights protection was one of the primary 
aims when drafting the Charter. On the one hand, its provisions render the existence and 
content of fundamental rights more visible to EU citizens and hence contribute to increased 
substantive legal certainty and acceptability. On the other hand, it may be argued that the 
principle of subsidiarity, in turn, contributes to formal legal certainty and predictability.962 
As an interpretative principle, subsidiarity offers a basis for systematisation of the 
increased number of EU fundamental rights sources in the post-Lisbon context. Ultimately, 
such enhanced formal and substantive legal certainty contributes to a more consistent 
application of EU fundamental rights law in the Member States.963 In addition to this, the 
subsidiary nature of the Charter has the potential of mitigating the transfer of normative 
powers from the EU legislature to the judiciary in the field of fundamental rights. 
All the same, it may be argued that subsidiarity undermines legal certainty, because it 
recognises a plurality of fundamental rights standards. However, in a system of multilevel 
governance, such as the EU, uniformity is not necessarily the ultimate goal.964 Although 
fundamental rights have a universal core, their concrete implications are strongly 
dependent on national particularities.965 In other words, fundamental rights function 
differently in this supranational setting than within a national State.966 Whereas States are 
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the primary guarantors of human rights under international law, the Union has its proper 
fundamental rights obligations under EU law.967 Moreover, the claim that subsidiarity 
reduces the exercise of power to a vertical reasoning of either EU or Member State 
intervention may be addressed in a similar manner.968 In line with constitutional pluralism, 
there is no hierarchy between the different sources of fundamental rights in Europe. 
Instead, loyalty and dialogue are vital for their harmonious coexistence.969 Within the 
limits of its minimum and maximum level of protection, the Charter eventually unites a 
diversity of national fundamental rights standards through the principle of subsidiarity. 
As a common standard of protection, the relevance of the Charter increases along with 
the competences of the Union.970 Despite its contribution to enhanced attention to 
fundamental rights, it nevertheless leaves many questions unanswered. Could the Charter 
give rise to directly enforceable fundamental rights in horizontal relations, despite its 
subsidiary nature? Or does subsidiarity eventually risk neutering the effects of the Charter 
in favour of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law?971 Would EU accession to 
the ECHR have an impact on the subsidiarity of the Charter? And is Charter subsidiarity of 
relevance in areas where the Union has exclusive competences? In the end, only the CJEU 
is likely to be able to provide further insight into these issues, through its continuous 
application of the Charter. 
In its interpretation, the Court no longer focuses solely on when the Charter is 
applicable, but also on how it is to be reconciled with other standards.972 For this purpose, 
the EU needs a proper fundamental rights methodology.973 In response, it is therefore 
submitted that subsidiarity – as a means of striking a balance between national diversity 
and European unity – may constitute an interpretative tool for EU fundamental rights 
protection. Eventually, subsidiarity contributes to solving collisions between conflicting 
standards of protection.974 Ultimately, the Charter invites the Union to take, not only 
fundamental rights, but also subsidiarity seriously. 
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